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The human hand has been held to be of crucial importance for under-
standing (the evolution of) human intelligence (Arbib, 2005; Radman, 2013). Next 
to the unique morphological characteristics of the human hand (e.g., opposing 
thumbs relative to other digits) that allow humans to craft the environment in 
more flexible and sensitive ways than other animals, the use of the hands by hu-
mans is also truly unique (Tallis, 2003). Notably, humans often move their hands 
in signifying ways that mirror or complement the content of speech and thought 
(Kendon, 2004). To set these unique but ubiquitous types of hand-movements 
apart from the hands‘ most concrete manipulations, these hand-movements are 
referred to as gesticulation, or gestures in short. This dissertation is about the 
various ways that manual activity, such as gestures, but also actions on the envi-
ronment, can support learning and problem solving. 
 Upon taking a closer look, the idea that manual actions ―support‖ cogni-
tive processes is by classic psychological interpretations of ―action‖, quite a risky 
claim (Newell & Simon, 1972). That is, actions are - sometimes implicitely - held 
to be output (i.e., the result) of cognitive processes. This assumption involves the 
intuition that when a task-relevant movement is produced, say writing out a cal-
culation on a piece of paper, the psychologically interesting stuff has already hap-
pened. More precisely, the physical movements of writing out the calculation are 
deemed reflective and an output of mental calculations that have occurred before 
the act of writing out the calculations. Cognition is as it were sandwiched be-
tween perception and action, and cognition should be logically distinguished from 
these peripheral input-output modules (Hurley, 2002).  
 In the recent decades the action-as-output assumption has come under 
scrutiny by approaches that sail under the banner of Embodied Cognitive Science 
(e.g., Hurley, 2002; Keijzer, 2001; for an overview see Shapiro, 2010). ―Cognitive 
Science‖, as it involves insights from a wider range of disciplines, including philos-
ophy (e.g., Clark, 1997, 2008; Dewey, 1896; Merleau-Ponty, 1956), psycholinguis-
tics (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Zwaan, 2003), psychology (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 
Gibson, 1969), and robotics (e.g., Brooks, 1991; Van Gelder, 1998). ―Embodied‖ 
as these approaches assert, in more or less radical ways (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 
Chemero, 2009; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Pouw, De Nooijer, Van Gog, Zwaan, 
& Paas, 2014), that cognitive processes are dependent on bodily processes, that 
is, the body‘s interaction with the environment. As such, mental inner processes, 
although necessary, are not sufficient for explaining cognition - the body and the 
environment need to be taken into account as well. 
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Given the exponential outgrowth of embodied cognition perspectives in 
the recent decade or two, ―embodied cognition‖ has come to mean many differ-
ent things to many different researchers (for reviews see Pouw & H. de Jong, 
2015; Shapiro, 2010; Wilson & Golonka, 2013). To avoid confusion, therefore, 
some organization is necessary. In fact, at several places in this dissertation it is 
argued that failing to concretize the different underlying claims in embodied ap-
proaches may lead to inconsistencies that can reduce a theory‘s explanatory 
power (Pouw et al., 2014; Pouw, Van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, in press). 
An important, albeit still broad distinction between embodied ap-
proaches, is the direct versus indirect involvement of bodily processes in cog-
nition. We will start with the more straightforward embodied approach, which 
assumes a direct cognitive function of bodily processes of the cognitive agent. In 
this dissertation, this kind of approach is often referred to as ―em-
bedded/extended cognition‖ (Pouw, De Nooijer et al., 2014). This approach can 
be introduced by a quote (recurring throughout this dissertation), concerning the 
act of drawing a picture:  
 
―One draws, responds to what one has drawn, draws more, and 
so on. The goals for the drawing change as the drawing evolves 
and different effects become possible, making the whole devel-
opment a mutual affair rather than a matter of one-way deter-
minism.‖ (Bredo, 1994, pp. 28). 
 
Key to this example is that drawing a picture does not imply a complete 
inner mental picture that is transformed into corresponding hand-movements 
(i.e., drawing). Although some inner mental process is necessary to understand 
the act of drawing, it is unsufficient for explaining how the drawing of a picture is 
accomplished. Instead, understanding the cognitive act of drawing, requires taking 
into account the ongoing loop of acting and perceiving its consequences. The im-
plications of this drawing example are far from trivial. Researchers who are sensi-
tive to this broader focus have shown, for instance, that children learn to under-
stand fractions (1/5 of 10) by moving tiles around, and by doing so, discover that 
objects that are grouped together can be seen as part (fraction) of a greater 
whole (Martin & Schwartz, 2005). Without such manual exploratory actions, chil-
dren are less likely to discover the concept of fractions. Notably, even when they 
are handed the partitioned solutions from the start, children still drastically un-
derperform compared to children who explore the tiles manually. In similar vein, 
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when we write out calculations (say 5+4x6), it has been shown (Landy & Gold-
stone, 2007), that we automatically space the symbols in a way that corresponds 
with the order of precedence, i.e., 5+4 x6 (note the spaces). Such spacing affects 
the way such calculations are performed. Many such examples will be reported in 
this dissertation.  
Upping the ante, the simple example of drawing that was presented 
above can also be mapped onto the more complex bidirectional effects of action 
and cognition that occur on shorter time-scales. Take J. J. Gibson‘s famous asser-
tion that perception is something we do (Gibson, 1979). According to this view, 
the perceiving organism does not construct a 3-D inner world through some 
cognitive transformations of static 2-D sense-data afforded by a single bi-ocular 
sample of the environment. Rather, visual information changes as soon as one 
moves and the motor-driven visual changes (and invariants present over those 
changes) provide the type of information to perceive the environment directly, as 
it is relevant for the organism, thus 3-D. According to Gibson, just as in the case 
of drawing, cognition must be understood as a temporally extended loop of per-
ception and action - and this leads us to a different and less complex picture of 
the internal cognitive processes in such a wider organism-environment whole 
(e.g., Gibson, 1969; O‘regan & Noë, 2001). That is, internal cognitive processes 
are embedded in immediate bodily processes, and these bodily processes may, at 
times, extend the cognitive capacities of the embodied organism. 
  Yet, of course, much of human cognition does not seem to be directly 
guided by action (e.g., thinking about tomorrow‘s chores; working out a problem 
mentally). In such cases it seems difficult to maintain that bodily processes are 
directly necessary for understanding such cognitive processes. However, accord-
ing to a major branch of embodied cognition, often referred to as grounded cog-
nition (Barsalou, 1999), cognition is still dependent on bodily processes in such 
instances, but in a more indirect way. That is, the history of bodily interactions 
with the environment shapes the way cognitive processes unfold, and cognitive 
processes unfold by recruiting the information structures (or brain-mechanisms) 
that were initially active for guiding interactions with the environment (Barsalou, 
1999; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1990). An intuitive example 
demonstrating that the structure of human thought is dependent on bodily pro-
cesses is the standard use of a ten-base decimal system in mathematics. This 
seemingly arbitrary (from a purely objective standpoint) system in all likelihood 
developed as the standard because basic arithmetic skills in humans emerged 
from using our fingers as arithmetic operators (Lakoff & Nuñez, 2000). As men-
12 
 
1 
tioned, according to indirect embodied approaches it is not only that our cogni-
tive processes are constrained by previous bodily experiences, they also operate 
through functional reuse of those bodily experiences. Indeed, researchers sympa-
thethic to this view suggest that activations of hand motor-areas in the brain that 
are commonly found when subjects engage in mental counting and calculations 
are evidence that such motor-activations are still functionally involved in mental 
artithmetic operations (e.g., Andres, Seron, & Oliver, 2007; Roux et al., 2003; 
Zago et al., 2001). Across the neuroscientific board, it is indeed well-established 
that during more abstract cognition such as reading and mental imagery, sensori-
motor brain areas are consistently activated without apparent physical move-
ments (e.g., Anderson, 2014). Such findings can be understood from the idea that 
the sensori-motor activations that initially evolved to guide interactions with the 
environment become constitutive for more abstract cognition. Yet, the common 
criticism to this interpretation is that activation does not necessitate functional 
involvement (e.g., Mahon & Caramazza, 2008), that is, such activation may be epi-
phenomenal, driven by basic association mechanisms. In light of this criticism, one 
of the major challenges for this type of embodied view is to show in which way 
the information that typically governs basic perception-action processes may 
come to be functionally employed in the service of more abstract cognitive pro-
cesses. Thus, research in experimental psychology is identifying the functional 
mechanisms underlying the behavior under study. The theoretical and empirical 
studies presented in this dissertation aim to contribute to that goal. 
 
Organization and Outline of this Dissertation 
If cognition indeed depends directly or indirectly on bodily processes, 
then what are the implications for learning and problem solving? In other words, 
what type of behaviors and interventions would we expect to impact learning and 
problem solving if cognitive processes are dependent on bodily processes? These 
general questions formed the starting point for the more specific questions ad-
dressed in the theoretical and empirical studies presented in this dissertation. 
The dissertation is organized in three parts, and the chapters roughly follow a 
chronological order of completion during the PhD project.  
In Part 1 the applicability of embodied cognition approaches for im-
proving learning from instructional animations is explored. This part starts out 
with a theoretical chapter that lays the groundwork for the subsequent ex-
perimental studies. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of current literature on the 
effectiveness of instructional manipulatives, and how these findings might relate 
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to principles put forward by direct and indirect embodied approaches to cogni-
tion as compared to more traditional approaches. Instructional manipulatives are 
physical objects that invite the learner to interact with them, and through this 
interaction, they afford acquisition of knowledge that is difficult to obtain by pas-
sive observation alone. As such, a test of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of 
these instructional manipulatives provides an ideal testbed for some principles of 
embodied cognition. Chapter 3 essentially tests an assumption identified in 
Chapter 2 regarding the effectiveness of learning through physical interaction. It 
is often assumed, rather than directly tested, that improvements of learning 
through physical interaction can be attributed to the type of meaningful infor-
mation that emerges in the interaction. Therefore we manipulated the meaning-
fulness of the information that could be obtained in interacting with an instruc-
tional animation about levers through the use of a Wii Board. As such we could 
assess whether physical interaction meaningful to the learning principle (i.e., 
movements needed to be performed that perfectly covaried with the mechanics 
of the seesaw) afforded information that is functionally reused in solving prob-
lems about levers after training. Such information was manipulated to be absent 
in the non-meaningful condition, where the required movements did only imper-
fectly covary with the mechanics of the seesaw. Finally, in Chapter 4, we report 
a study with primary school childrens‘ learning with a similar instructional anima-
tion about class 1 levers. Instead of providing learners with an opportunity to 
interact with the animation as in Chapter 3, we draw on indirect approaches to 
embodied cognition that predict that learning about some abstract principle 
might improve if it is related to knowledge obtained during daily interaction with 
the environment. As such we test whether childrens‘ learning about levers can be 
improved by mapping the physical forces that act on the child‘s own body (i.e., 
the arms) with the physical forces that occur in similar ways on a lever.  
In Part 2 the occurrence of non-communicative hand-gestures and their 
influence on problem-solving performance are investigated. Again, this part starts 
with a theoretical analysis, presented in Chapter 5 that evaluates current theo-
retical approaches to cognitive function of gesture. It is suggested that there are 
some logical inconsistencies common to present perspectives on the embodied 
nature of gesticulation, as these assert that gestures are supporting cognition, 
whilst failing to characterize what cognitively potent consequences arise when 
moving the hands (i.e., gesturing). If gestures do not have cognitively potent con-
sequences, they cannot (logically) support cognition. It is argued that our under-
standing of gesture and cognition should draw more from direct embed-
14 
 
1 
ded/extended approaches to embodied cognition. In Chapters 6 and 7, drawing 
from hypotheses formulated in Chapter 5, it is investigated whether non-
communicative gestures would spontaneously occur in the absence of speech 
(i.e., co-thought gestures) during mental problem solving, and whether gesturing 
(either spontaneously or when instructed to do so) during mental problem solv-
ing would improve subsequent physical problem solving under conditions of high-
er cognitive load (when working memory capacity is low, and task difficulty is 
high). This was investigated in adults (Chapter 6) as well as primary school chil-
dren (Chapter7). In Chapter 8 we report a study designed to investigate the 
possible functional role that gestures may have in mental problem solving by 
gauging the effect of gesture versus no gesture on gaze-behavior. We predicted 
that gestures bring about stable proprioceptive states that can be used to mark 
space in similar ways as has been found in how problem solvers use gaze-
transitions. 
In Part 3 the main ideas in the dissertation are synthesized and inter-
preted in light of recent developments. In Chapter 9 a perspective on gesture is 
presented that aims to reconcile the indirect versus direct juxtaposition made 
throughout the dissertation concerning embodied approaches to the role of 
manual activity in cognition. This is reconciliation is made by introducing a recent 
theoretical development in cognitive science, namely, Predictive Processing Per-
spectives. In the general discussion chapter (Chapter 10), the main results of 
the dissertation are summarized and briefly discussed. 
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2 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
An embedded and embodied cognition review of instructional 
manipulatives* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter has been published as Pouw, W. T. J. L., Van Gog, T., & Paas, F. 
(2014). An embedded and embodied cognition review of instructional manipu-
latives. Educational Psychology Review, 26(1), 51-72. doi: 10.1007/s10648-014-
9255-5 
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An embedded and embodied cognition review of instructional 
manipulatives 
 
Recent literature on learning with instructional manipulatives seems to call for a 
moderate view on the effects of perceptual and interactive richness of instruc-
tional manipulatives on learning. This ‗moderate view‘ holds that manipulatives‘ 
perceptual and interactive richness may compromise learning in two ways: 1) by 
imposing a very high cognitive load on the learner, and 2) by hindering drawing of 
symbolic inferences that are supposed to play a key role in transfer (i.e., applica-
tion of knowledge to new situations in the absence of instructional manipula-
tives). This paper presents a contrasting view. Drawing on recent insights from 
Embedded Embodied perspectives on cognition, it is argued that: 1) perceptual 
and interactive richness may provide opportunities for alleviating cognitive load 
(Embedded Cognition), and 2) transfer of learning is not reliant on decontextual-
ized knowledge but may draw on previous sensorimotor experiences of the kind 
afforded by perceptual and interactive richness of manipulatives (Embodied Cog-
nition). By negotiating the Embedded Embodied Cognition view with the moder-
ate view, implications for research are derived.  
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2 
Introduction 
In a seminal but critical paper on instructional manipulatives and their ap-
plications for the classroom, Ball (1992) stated ―Understanding does not travel 
through the fingertips and up the arm‖ (p.3). This statement was meant to go 
against an overly simplistic view (or ―magical hope‖; Ball, 1992) prevalent in the 
literature concerning the effectiveness of learning with physical manipulatives. 
Many scholars today have followed suit (Brown, McNeil, & Glenberg, 2009; Ka-
minski, Sloutsky, & Heckler, 2009; McNeil & Jarvin 2007; Sarama & Clements, 
2009; Sherman & Bisanz, 2009; Uttal, Scrudder & DeLoache, 1997), suggesting 
that ―physicality is not important‖ and rather ―their manipulability and meaningful-
ness make them [manipulatives] educationally effective‖ (original emphasis; Sara-
ma & Clements, 2009, pp. 148). Indeed, it has been suggested that previously 
identified virtues of physical manipulatives - learning through concrete and per-
ceptually rich physical practices - are not the drivers of learning (e.g., Triona & 
Klahr, 2003; Zacharia & Olympiou, 2011), and can even be detrimental to learn-
ing (e.g., DeLoache, 2000, 2004; Finkelstein et al., 2005; Sloutsky, Kaminski, & 
Heckler, 2005). This ―moderate view‖ has led to a trend towards minimizing per-
ceptual and interactive richness of manipulatives, as evidenced by the upsurge of 
mouse-based virtual manipulatives (e.g., Clements, 2000; Moyer, Bolyard, & Spikell, 
2002) that compared to their physical counterparts differ in perceptual aspects 
(e.g., information gained from touching objects vs. manipulating them with a 
mouse) as well as interactive aspects (e.g., mouse-based interaction is constrained 
to one hand). 
 Drawing on insights from embedded embodied perspectives on cognition 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Clark, 2005, 2008; De Vega, Glenberg, & Graesser, 2008; 
Hutchins, 1995; Kiefer & Trumpp, 2012; Lindgren & Johnson-Glenberg, 2013; 
Shapiro, 2011; Wilson, 2002; Winn, 2003) and state-of-the art research on physi-
cal and virtual manipulatives and including tangible-user-interfaces1 (Manches & 
O‘Malley, 2012) we suggest that some of the assumptions that underlie the mod-
erate view are to some extent misguided, most centrally the assumptions that: 
                                                          
1 Tangible User interfaces go beyond classical user interfaces (e.g., mouse, keyboard) 
and are designed to provide more natural or functional physical manipulation of virtual 
objects (Manches & O‘Malley, 2012; O‘Malley & Fraser, 2004; Shaer & Hornecker, 
2010). 
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I. Higher perceptual and interactive richness of manipulatives imposes 
a high cognitive load on the learner, resulting in lower learning out-
comes (Brown et al., 2009; McNeil & Jarvin, 2007; Sarama & Clem-
ents, 2009; Uttal et al., 1997)2.  
II. Transfer of learning from manipulatives involves a change in repre-
sentation from concrete to symbolic, which is hindered by higher 
perceptual and interactive richness (Kaminski et al., 2009; Uttal et al., 
1997; for an overview of this popular view in education see Nathan, 
2012). 
Without dismissing the empirical evidence upon which the above assumptions are 
based, we suggest that a viable case can be made for a more Embedded Embod-
ied perspective on learning with manipulatives, namely: 
I‘.  Under certain conditions, perceptual and interactive richness can al-
leviate cognitive load imposed on working memory by effectively 
embedding the learner‘s cognitive activity in the environment (Em-
bedded Cognition claim). 
II‘.  Transfer of learning from manipulatives does not necessarily involve 
a change in representation from concrete to symbolic. Rather, learn-
ing from manipulatives often involves internalizing sensorimotor rou-
tines that draw on the perceptual and interactive richness of manipu-
latives (Embodied Cognition claim).  
 We hasten to note that we will not argue for an exclusively Embedded 
Embodied approach to learning from manipulatives; rather, this review attempts 
to negotiate the findings from the Embedded Embodied perspective with findings 
associated more with the moderate view. For example, while researchers holding 
the moderate view may suggest that when physicality is not important this is evi-
dence against the Embedded Embodied view (e.g., Triona et al., 2005), our review 
will show that this would be an overly simplistic understanding of the relevance 
of Embedded Embodied Cognition to manipulatives. By combining findings from 
both streams of research, we aim to develop a more balanced view of how Em-
                                                          
2 For example, ―When children interact with manipulatives, their cognitive resources 
may be committed to representing and manipulating the objects and may be largely 
unavailable for other processes, such as accessing relevant concepts or implementing 
appropriate procedures‖ (McNeil & Jarvin, 2007, p. 313). 
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bedded Embodied Cognition might guide the design of instructional manipula-
tives. 
In the next section, we focus on Embedded Cognition, which suggests that 
effective learning depends on how learners coordinate their cognitive activity in 
concert with bodily and environmental resources. Embedded Cognition amounts 
to the idea that cognition is afforded and constrained by ongoing interactions be-
tween body and environment, emphasizing an intimate relation between external 
artifacts and cognitive processes (Clark, 2008; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsch, 1995, 
2010; Wilson, 2002). In the subsequent section, we focus on Embodied Cognition, 
which amounts to the claim that knowledge is grounded in sensorimotor rou-
tines and experiences (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Lakoff & 
Núñez, 2000)3. In this section, we discuss empirical evidence that suggests that 
transfer of learning does not necessarily involve a concrete-to-abstract shift. 
Importantly, Embedded Cognition and Embodied Cognition are comple-
mentary in their analysis of the role of the body in cognition (Shapiro, 2011; Wil-
son, 2002). Whereas Embedded Cognition focuses on the continuous coupling or 
―on-line‖ interaction with the environment, Embodied Cognition focuses on the 
role of these previously acquired sensorimotor experiences in ―off-line‖ cognitive 
activity (i.e., disembedded from the environment). 
For this review we provide a selective overview of state-of-the-art re-
search in cognitive and educational psychology. At the end of both the Embedded 
and Embodied Cognition section, we provide a short intermediate discussion, 
making a connection with empirical evidence that aligns with a more moderate 
view. In the conclusion we provide a brief overview of our main conclusions, re-
search challenges, and educational implications in relation to learning with manip-
ulatives.  
Embedded Cognition 
According to theories of Embedded Cognition, cognitive activity is not 
something that simply happens internally, but involves a continuous transaction 
between current states of the brain, body and the environment (Clark, 2008). As 
such, understanding cognition requires a broader level of analysis that considers 
how we use our body and the world during the unfolding of cognitive processes 
(Clark, 2008; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 2010; Wheeler, 2007). Examples of Embed-
                                                          
3
 Note that the literature does not always explicitly distinguish between Embodied 
Cognition and Embedded Cognition (e.g., Risko et al., 2013; cf. Wilson, 2001). 
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ded Cognition are readily apparent: reducing working memory load by making 
notes during a conversation, using fingers to keep track of counting, asking an-
other person to remind you of something, or using a tall building for navigating 
your way home, which alleviates the need to retain street names or spatial maps. 
As these examples show, Embedded Cognition refers to the adaptive flexibility of 
cognitive processes during interaction with the environment. 
Although we can make the case that cognition might at times be disem-
bedded during activities such as mental arithmetic, thinking about tomorrow‘s 
chores, talking about something absent (et cetera), learning from manipulatives 
pertains to an embedded cognitive situation. That is, learning with manipulatives 
involves a tight coupling of external artifacts with perceptual and cognitive pro-
cesses, in which the artifacts structure the learner‘s cognitive states (Clark, 
2005). As such, learning from manipulatives does not differ in kind from examples 
we have provided above, such as finger-counting. As the finger counting example 
also makes clear, however, manipulatives may in some cases become ill-suited for 
supporting cognitive states, just as arithmetic with large numbers might become 
difficult to perform through finger-counting. Thus, learning from manipulatives is 
always an embedded phenomenon in which some cognitive processes are more 
easily maintained than others. 
A theoretical implication of Embedded Cognition, is that the states of the 
body and the environment can be considered extra-neural contributors to 
(Hutchins, 1995; Norman, 1988), and in a more radical reading, external vehicles 
of cognition (Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Not only does Embedded 
Cognition hold the more widely accepted claim that the external environment 
may serve as external working-memory, the transactions between the environ-
ment and the learner might dramatically change the way in which cognitive pro-
cesses unfold. For example, thinking with or without a notepad may have dramat-
ically different cognitive profiles. Bredo (1994, pp. 28) provides an example of this 
dynamic coupling of cognition with the environment: ―One draws, responds to 
what one has drawn, draws more, and so on. The goals for the drawing change as 
the drawing evolves and different effects become possible, making the whole de-
velopment a mutual affair rather than a matter of one-way determinism‖. As 
such, in Embedded Cognition, the external environment has an important status 
for understanding the way cognitive processes unfold. 
That we use aspects of our environment in order to reduce cognitive 
load was demonstrated in an influential study by Ballard, Hayhoe, and Pelz (1995; 
see also Haselen, Steen, & Frens, 2000; Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997). In this study 
22 
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participants were asked to reproduce a pattern of colored blocks from a model 
as quickly as possible by clicking-and-dragging randomly ordered colored blocks 
from a resource space and ordering them in a workplace. Eye-movements were 
monitored to provide insight into the strategies that are involved in solving this 
problem. It was found that participants opted for a ‗minimal memory strategy‘ as 
indicated by the many switches of eye fixations between the model, resource and 
workplace area. That is, to minimize the components to be retained in memory, 
participants tended to gather information incrementally by first attending to the 
color and then the position, all just in time, instead of memorizing information all 
at once. Note that the use of a minimal memory strategy also emerged when 
participants physically manipulated real blocks (Ballard et al., 1995). 
To give another famous example, in a study by Kirsh and Maglio (1994) it 
was found that effective problem-solving behavior in the game Tetris does not 
solely rely on action that brings one physically closer to one‘s goal, which they 
termed ―pragmatic actions‖. Rather, problem-solving also relies on ―epistemic 
actions‖ that effectively structure the environment so as to uncover information 
that is hidden or cognitively demanding to compute. For instance, they found that 
advanced players, more often than less-advanced players, tended to rotate zoids 
physically instead of mentally when determining whether a zoid would fit the al-
ready-placed zoids at the bottom. This study as well as others (Gaschler, Va-
terrodt, Frensch, Eichler, & Haider, 2013; Stevenson & Carlson, 2003) show that 
the environment does not only allow for offloading, but that efficient problem-
solving evolves over time during interaction with the environment, and is de-
pendent on how the agent learns to effectively negotiate internal and external 
resources. 
 In both of these experimental demonstrations it seems that the cognitive 
system prefers to manage working-memory load by making use of external re-
sources when available. However, whether external resources are used also 
seems to depend on how readily information can be re-achieved from them. In a 
study by Gray and Fu (2004) participants were confronted with a task wherein 
subtle retrieval costs of attaining external task-relevant information in the con-
text of programming a simulated VCR were manipulated. Lowering the ease of 
retrieval of information from external resources, from a single glimpse or an ad-
ditional mouse-click, changed the cognitive strategy of the subjects. When exter-
nal information was directly accessible, participants leaned primarily on retrieving 
―perfect-knowledge-in-the-world‖. However, when this external information was 
only indirectly available through a mouse-click, participants were more likely to 
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retrieve it from memory. Although the reliance on internal memory lead to a 
higher number of mistakes it was shown that this ―imperfect-knowledge-in-the-
head‖ was more quickly available compared to retrieving information externally. 
That is, based on computational modeling Gray and Fu (2004) estimated the re-
trieval effort of relevant information expressed in the amount of milliseconds it 
takes to retrieve or recall information and showed that participants opt for the 
quickest problem-solving strategy with no a-priori preference for internal or ex-
ternal resources. It seems therefore that the cognitive system ―tends to recruit, 
on the spot, whatever mix of problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable 
result with a minimum of effort‖ (Clark, 2008, pp. 13; see also Borst, Buwalda, 
Rijn, & Taatgen, 2013; Fu, 2011). 
To date, Embedded Cognition research has been primarily focused on 
how and when the environment is used in terms of memory distribution (see also 
Droll & Hayhoe, 2007; Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006). Although current re-
search is extending its applications (e.g., Risko, Medimorec, Chisholm, & King-
stone, 2013) it is still ill-understood how information is encoded during embed-
ded cognitive situations, and whether different interactive possibilities for distrib-
uting internal and external resources result in different learning outcomes, that is, 
in different representations in long-term memory (Fu, 2011). Especially the latter 
question seems to be of central importance for understanding how perceptual 
and interactive properties of manipulatives may affect learning. As such, as it is 
currently left unanswered, we should be hesitant to accept any claims about ef-
fects of perceptual and interactive richness of manipulatives.  
Embedded Cognition and Instructional Manipulatives 
The theory of Physically Distributed Learning (Martin & Schwartz, 2005; 
Schwartz & Martin, 2006) suggests that the environment changes the way in 
which learning unfolds. According to this theory, the learning affordances of phys-
ical manipulation can be mapped onto four separate quadrants that roughly cate-
gorize physical learning in terms of the stability and the adaptability of the learner‘s 
ideas and the environment; the quadrants Repurposing and Mutual Adaptation being 
important for present purposes. The quadrant called Repurposing, pertains to a 
situation similar to the above mentioned Tetris-players who have learned to re-
purpose pragmatic actions that bring one closer to one‘s goals for epistemic ac-
tions that reduce computational load (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). In this example the 
environment is adaptable but ideas remain largely unchanged. 
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Most interesting for present purposes, however, are such situations in 
which new ideas arise through physical adaptation of the environment, called Mu-
tual Adaptation. Martin and Schwartz give an example of a young child asked to 
come up with a one-fourth share of eight candies. Children often focus on the 
one of one-fourth, which leads them to adopt ―one candy‖ to be the right an-
swer. However, in physical interaction with eight candies, the child might push 
two candies apart, which increases the likelihood of reinterpreting the new ar-
rangement of two candies as one group, putting the child on ―a trajectory‖ to 
learn that one-fourth of eight means attaining ―four groups of two‖ first (Martin 
& Schwartz, 2005, pp. 590). Thus, mutual adaptation involves structuring the en-
vironment haphazardly without preconceived goals that affords new interpreta-
tions difficult to obtain by thought alone. As such, the theory of Physically Dis-
tributed Learning extends the current focus of Embedded Cognition, suggesting 
that the environment also changes the way learning unfolds. 
 Martin and Schwartz (2005) have empirically substantiated the theory of 
Physically Distributed Learning through multiple experiments (see also Martin, 
Lukong, & Reaves, 2007). In the first two experiments reported by Martin and 
Schwartz (2005), children of nine to ten years old solved fraction operator prob-
lems (e.g., one-fourth of eight) with physical pie or tile wedges using physical ma-
nipulation and pictorial line drawings of pie or tile pieces using a pen to highlight 
partitions. In the first two experiments it was found that children using physical 
manipulatives solved more problems correctly which was measured by the num-
ber of partitions created correctly and the number of correct answers that were 
provided verbally. More importantly, it was shown that physical self-guided parti-
tioning was the driver of understanding rather than mere perception of the desir-
able end state, a correctly pre-partitioned organization. According to Martin and 
Schwartz (2005), physical open-ended interaction allows for exploration and 
search for new interpretations and structures, which benefits learning (see also 
Martin et al., 2007).  
Complementary to these results, it has recently been shown that the 
beneficial role of physically manipulating the external environment enhances task 
performance in physics education (Stull, Hegarty, Dixon, & Stieff , 2012). In a set 
of experiments, university-level physics students had to translate one type of dia-
gram into another, called a diagrammatic translation task, which requires spatially 
translating the model into the other model‘s particular perspective. In all three 
experiments it was found that students‘ translation accuracy of one 2D represen-
tation into another was promoted by active use of a concrete 3D model during 
25 
 
the task (a classic ball and stick manipulative). Importantly, only the active physical 
use of the 3D model, as opposed to mere perception of the model, promoted 
task performance. In line with Kirsh and Maglio (1994), it was explained that the 
concrete model aids students in externalizing spatial rotation operations (Stull et 
al., 2012). 
A critical note of concern, however, is that based on these data one can-
not fully disentangle the role of self-guided physically manipulating objects from 
the visual input that this process also generates. Even though seeing the end state 
arrangement (Martin & Schwartz, 2005) or the model (Stull et al., 2012) was not 
beneficial for learning, it is possible that watching someone else dynamically struc-
turing the materials would produce the same learning benefits (for a review of 
the effectiveness of observational learning in educational contexts, see Van Gog & 
Rummel, 2010; for the effectiveness of observing someone else exploring a prob-
lem space, see Osman, 2008). Nevertheless, active skillful manipulation of these 
materials might in itself form the basis for performing similar cognitive tasks in 
the absence of the manipulatives, but this remains an open empirical question. 
Martin and Schwartz (2005; Experiment 3) further explored whether 
there is an interaction between prior knowledge and environmental structure in 
instances of physically distributed learning. As a highly structured learning envi-
ronment in the context of solving fraction-problems pie wedges were used since 
these already have a part of whole partition, whereas tiles were used as unstruc-
tured materials. It was found that children performed more correct partitions in 
solving fraction addition problems for which they had high prior knowledge when 
materials were structured compared to unstructured materials. In contrast, per-
formance on multiplication problems for which children had low prior knowledge 
was unaffected by structure of the environment. They suggested that this finding 
indicates that a more mature understanding of the task allows for repurposing 
the environment more flexibly, with performance on low familiar tasks being 
more dependent on the environment‘s stability for action. However, they also 
raise a very interesting concern. That is, although a highly structured environ-
ment can aid problem solving, it might prevent learners from developing their 
own interpretation of how to solve a problem. 
Indeed with children learning fraction additions in three sessions over a 
period of a week, it was found that those who had learned with pie wedges 
showed a lower ability to transfer skills to other manipulatives than children who 
had used tiles (Experiment 4 and 5). Martin and Schwartz (2005) explain this find-
ing in that pie wedges‘ structure gives the learner a part-of-wholes-interpretation 
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―for free‖, presumably preventing children to learn how to make and interpret 
such groupings and whole structures by themselves. Simply put, externalized 
cognitive operations might in some instances reduce the necessity to understand 
its function (e.g., that pieces are part of a whole).   
  Although research cited above already offers considerable evidence that 
Embedded Cognition is an important factor for learning, a more recent example 
shows that possibilities for physical interaction indeed change the learning trajec-
tory. In a set of experiments Manches, O‘Malley, and Benford (2010), sought to 
find out whether qualitative differences in manipulation predicted children‘s prob-
lem-solving strategies in a numerical partitioning task. In this task children are 
asked to provide all the different ways in which a certain amount can be com-
bined (e.g., the number of ways seven can be recombined [e.g., seven and zero, 
zero and seven, six and one, five and two, et cetera]). In the first study reported 
by Manches and colleagues (2010), children ranging from five to seven years old 
were first asked to solve a partitioning problem without manipulation of any ma-
terial (no material condition), and to subsequently solve two additional partition-
ing problems with paper and pencil (paper condition) and physical blocks (physi-
cal condition; order of physical and paper condition was counterbalanced). It was 
found that children provided significantly more unique solutions in the physical 
condition as opposed to the no material- and the paper condition. Qualitative 
observations were made that could explain this difference in terms of particular 
affordances that physical manipulatives have. For example, bimanual manipulation 
allowed for moving multiple blocks at a time and/or keeping track of block‘s loca-
tions through haptic sensation, which was not possible in the other conditions.  
In the second experiment it was investigated how the affordance of bi-
manual manipulation might have constrained particular use of strategies. It was 
predicted that when children ranging from four to seven years old are instructed 
to manipulate only one object at a time (constraint condition) it would lead to 
different strategies as compared to children in a no constraint condition. Indeed, 
it was found that strategies differed dependent on whether manipulation was 
constrained. For example, reversing combinations (e.g., five and two into two and 
five) is much easier to perform when manipulating multiple objects at once than 
serial one-by-one manipulation. In the third study this effect was replicated for a 
portion of the sample in a slightly different set-up. The constraint condition was 
now set-up as a virtual manipulative (children could click-and-drag only one virtu-
al object on the screen). Taking the results together, this study suggested that 
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with unconstrained physical manipulation come particular affordances that shape 
the trajectory of young children‘s learning of numerical partitioning. 
Importantly, however, unconstrained physical manipulation has also been 
shown to be sub-optimal for learning (Stull, Barrett, & Hegarty, 2013). Stull and 
colleagues (2013) let students interact with a Tangible User Interface (TUI) that 
was designed to combine affordances of virtual and physical manipulatives. The 
TUI included sensorimotor features that are typically afforded by physical ma-
nipulatives, such as stereo-depth cues and a direct manipulation interface (see 
Stull et al., 2013, for details). The only features that differed from a physical mod-
el were I) the shape of the tangible interface and its virtual representation (mo-
lecular model) were not the same, and II) interactivity was constrained such that 
the students could only rotate the model around the axis of a single molecular 
bond. Note that physical manipulatives allows for rotations around an indefinite 
number of axes. In these experiments, learners had to perform a diagrammatic 
matching task, which involved manipulating the model to match the orientation of 
a particular 2D molecular diagram. Although accuracy levels were the same for 
both model types, the physical manipulative condition was significantly slower in 
completing the task (in comparison to the TUI). This higher efficiency in the TUI 
condition was ascribed to the constrained interactivity of the TUI which automat-
ically focused students on the most task-relevant interactions. Indeed, additional 
analysis revealed that students who first worked with the TUI performed less 
irrelevant bond-rotations in comparison to students who had worked with physi-
cal manipulatives first. As such constrained interaction might aid in learning to 
efficiently solve problems in similar unconstrained situations. 
A final example for the way in which interaction possibilities may change 
learning comes from a study reported by Antle (2012) and Antle, Droumeva, and 
Ha (2009). In this study interaction styles emerging from different manipulatives 
were investigated in the context of a Jigsaw Puzzle Task with dyads of children 
ranging from seven to ten years old, using either traditional physical manipulatives 
(PM), mouse-based virtual manipulatives, or a TUI. The TUI was a tabletop pro-
totype with normal puzzle pieces; action was mapped through an infrared camera 
that allowed for audiovisual feedback when a piece was correctly placed. By cal-
culating relative measures for interaction style to account for single versus multi-
ple input differences (for details, see Antle, 2012; Antle et al., 2009) it was shown 
that the PM and TUI conditions, which allowed for bimanual manipulation, result-
ed in more time spent performing epistemic actions. For example, grouping cor-
ner-, edge-, or same-color pieces into piles. Furthermore, it was found that more 
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direct actions were taken in the PM and TUI condition as opposed to mouse-
based virtual manipulatives. Although the design of this study does not allow for 
empirically rigorous conclusions about performance or learning (as Antle, 2012 
concurs), it does, together with findings from the previous studies, suggest that 
properties of the interaction may shape the way in which cognitive processes and 
learning might unfold. However, based on these studies it is hard to derive clear 
design guidelines regarding unconstrained interactive richness. 
Intermediate Discussion: Embedded Cognition and  
Manipulatives 
 
In the previous section it was shown that manipulatives afford possibilities for 
reducing internal computational load through interaction. Furthermore, such pos-
sibilities are quite easily and automatically incorporated into learning behaviors. 
Arguably the most important contribution of the Theory of Physically Distributed 
Learning and the empirical evidence that supports it, is that although learning en-
vironments that are pre-structured and thus constrained may reduce problem 
solving steps and improve task performance, this reduction of task-load does not 
necessarily benefit transfer of learning. Children who learned to solve fraction 
problems with pie-wedges, in comparison to learning with tiles, were less able to 
transfer this knowledge to other materials that did not already have this part-of-
wholes interpretation in its structure. Schwartz and Martin (2006) make the 
analogy with research on Dienes's (1973) base-ten blocks; children who become 
increasingly efficient to operate base-10 blocks for problem solving become de-
pendent on (or ―symbiotically tuned‖ to) these materials for its efficiency, under-
performing in transferring this skill in the absence of these materials (e.g., iso-
morphic symbolic tasks; see Resnick & Omanson, 1987). The tentative lesson we 
might draw from this is that design of manipulatives should at times allow for self-
discovery rather than pre-constrained problem solving when transfer of learning 
is the goal. As such, embedded learning might at times unfold best when it is 
learner-centered as opposed to being completely accommodated by the envi-
ronment. 
A further implication is that specific perceptual and interactive properties 
of manipulatives that might afford embedded learning stand in relation to the kind 
of bodily actions the learner can perform (Gibson, 1979). In the studies by Martin 
and Schwartz (2005) and Manches and colleagues (2010) it was shown that physi-
cality of materials solicited specific patterns of interaction that led children to 
discover interpretations necessary for understanding the particular problem. ―So-
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licited‖, in that children were simply drawn to the affordance of re-arranging the 
blocks and not driven by a pre-conceived end-state in mind. This arguably shapes 
the learning trajectory in that it leads to what Schwartz and Martin (2005) call 
―mutual adaptation‖; adaptations to the environment further influence adapta-
tions to children‘s interpretation.  
To elaborate on this, the role of perceptual properties in embedded 
learning might be indirectly related to possibilities for interaction. The research 
discussed above provides insights on how perceptual richness affects learners‘ 
perception of possibilities for action (e.g., objects being physical rather than virtu-
al). This can be appreciated by a modified interpretation of what Gray and Fu 
(2004) call hard- and soft constraints. That is, manipulatives have specific properties 
that make only certain actions possible (hard constraints). For example, consider 
a mouse-based virtual interface that only allows for uni-manual manipulation, or a 
pie-wedge that only allows for re-arranging parts in pre-set wholes. However, 
manipulative perceptual properties also determine which behavior given the pos-
sibilities is likely to be solicited (soft-constraints). For example, Manches and col-
leagues (2010) reported that children who were instructed to manipulate physical 
blocks one at a time had difficulty not to use two hands or manipulate multiple 
blocks. This resonates with a host of behavioral and neurological evidence on 
motor-affordances that has shown that perceptual properties of objects unreflec-
tively solicit particular action-repertoires (Gibson, 1979; Snow et al., 2011; 
Symes, Ellis, & Tucker 2007; Van Elk, Van Schie, & Bekkering, 2014). In sum, 
whether an object is perceived to be easily manipulable impinges on the natural 
behavior it solicits from the learner. 
Therefore, there is a case to be made that perceptual richness might im-
pinge on how learners typically interact with the learning environment. As Dour-
ish (2001) notes, ―because we have highly developed skills for physical interaction 
with objects in the world - skills for exploring, sensing, assessing, manipulating, 
and navigating - we can make interaction easier by building interfaces that exploit 
these skills‖ (pp. 206). Therefore, suggesting that ―physicality is not important‖ in 
manipulatives and rather their ―manipulability and meaningfulness make them ed-
ucationally effective‖ (Sarama & Clements, 2009, p. 148) might be at times mis-
guided and involves an artificial distinction; perceptual richness may drive percep-
tions of manipulability.  
The tentative conclusion we like to make up to this point is that contrary 
to the ―moderate view‖ emphasis that perceptual and interactive richness of ma-
nipulatives can hinder learning, it should also be considered as an important 
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source of learning. That is, perceptual and interactive richness may invite learners 
to interact in a certain way with the environment and therefore effectively embed 
learners‘ cognitive activities. In the final discussion we connect these insights with 
those from the upcoming review on Embodied Cognition, and discuss implica-
tions and suggestions for future research. 
Embodied Cognition 
 
Embodied Cognition holds that the format of cognition is sensorimotor 
or modal based instead of symbol-based (i.e., amodal; Barsalou, 1999, 2008; for 
an overview see Svensson, 2007). Furthermore, whilst the cognitive system might 
be disembedded and primarily dependent on internal cognitive processes in some 
cases, Embodied Cognition suggests that sensorimotor information made availa-
ble during previous interactions is reused for internal cognitive processing. Thus 
Embedded Cognition emphasizes an ongoing ―on-line‖ interaction with the envi-
ronment whereas Embodied Cognition primarily focuses on how the body shapes 
disembedded or ―off-line‖ cognition.  
Embodied Cognition is therefore especially suitable for explaining how 
learning with manipulatives might impinge on cognitive activity in the absence of 
manipulatives (e.g., mathematical notations; mental arithmetic). The classic per-
spective on cognition (Fodor, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1972) holds that transfer-
ring knowledge learned in one situation to another is dependent on establishing a 
set of complex symbolic rules. According to this view, knowledge resides in a 
rule-governed semantic system that needs to be decontextualized from immedi-
ate sensorimotor states and the environment. In contrast to this traditional ap-
proach, the Embodied Cognition framework attempts to provide a more contin-
uous explanation of perception and action on the one hand, and cognition on the 
other, by suggesting that cognition is constituted in sensorimotor experiences. 
More specifically, knowledge is derived from sensorimotor coded routines stored 
within a generalized system that was originally developed to control an organ-
ism‘s motor behavior and perceive the world around it (Anderson, 2008; 
Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Svensson, 2007).  
  Currently there is a great deal of interest from educational psychology in 
the notion of Embodied Cognition (Black, 2011; Calvo & Gomila, 2008, ch. 18; 
De Vega, Glenberg, & Graesser, 2008; Goldstone & Barsalou, 2005; Kiefer & 
Trumpp, 2012; Lindgren & Johnson-Glenberg, 2013). Often cited in this literature 
is Barsalou‘s (1999, 2008) perspective on Embodied Cognition, the Perceptual 
Symbol Systems Account. This perspective provides a fine-grained account of 
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how knowledge might be embodied. In this account concepts are grounded in the 
re-activation of specific neural patterns in multiple modalities (e.g., motor system, 
visual system, et cetera) that were activated during previous interactions with the 
environment. These activation patterns are suggested to be captured in a single 
multimodal representation: a Perceptual Symbol (Barsalou, 1999). 
Perceptual Symbols are not holistic or necessarily conscious vehicles of 
thought. Rather, Perceptual Symbols can selectively capture schematic aspects of 
sensorimotor regularities occurring in interaction that become stored in long-
term memory (Goldstone & Barsalou, 2005). This allows for schematic extrac-
tions of perceptual but also introspective states that can be recombined in imagi-
nation. As such, concepts that are not readily available in the environment (e.g., a 
hammer made of pudding) might still be grounded in sensorimotor states by 
mashing the sensorimotor concept of hammer and pudding. Furthermore, it is 
held that perceptual symbols of very abstract concepts (e.g., truth, love) still rely 
on complex combinatorics of perceptual states (see also Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; 
Lakoff & Núnez, 2000). Importantly, in lieu of the principle of activation spread, 
particular sensorimotor states induced during interaction can trigger activation of 
Perceptual Symbols that activate stored sensorimotor information from previous 
experiences such that for example seeing a hammer induces modality specific 
simulations of the weight of the hammer. 
There is increasing evidence that cognitions are intimately tied to the 
sensorimotor system (e.g., Kiefer & Trumpp, 2012; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; 
Svensson, 2007). Indeed, the sensorimotor system has been found to be implicat-
ed in thought processes as diverse as reading, mental arithmetic, problem-solving, 
and conversely, semantic areas are often implicated in sensor-motor interactions 
suggesting that both systems are intimately related (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glen-
berg et al., 2008; Martin, 2007; Nathan, 2008). To give an example, research 
shows that merely reading words that have olfactory, gustatory, or motor conno-
tations (e.g., garlic, jasmine, salt, sour, kick, pick) as opposed to neutral words, 
activates brain regions that are involved in smelling, tasting and moving (Barrós-
Loscertales et al., 2011; Gonzales et al., 2006; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 
2004). Furthermore, when subjects are mentally processing numbers, activation 
of motor-areas associated with finger-movements is consistently found (Andres, 
Seron, & Oliver, 2007; Roux et al., 2005; Zago et al., 2001). In sum, the current 
state of the literature suggests that knowledge-representations are intimately tied 
to the sensorimotor system, which raises the need to understand how the cogni-
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tive system draws from sensorimotor information that emerges during interac-
tion with the environment. 
 
 Embodied Cognition and Manipulatives 
In this section we give a representative overview of research on manipu-
latives that specifically claims to be, or in our view seems to be, relevant to Em-
bodied Cognition. We review three streams of research on transfer that provide 
varying degrees of support for either an Embodied Cognition perspective or the 
more moderate view mentioned in the introduction that seems to suggest that 
abstraction is hampered by perceptual and interactive richness.  
Transfer by internalizing sensorimotor information 
The first line of research is well aligned with the Embodied Cognition 
perspective and shows that transfer of learning is simply internalization of sen-
sorimotor information that is initially provided by the manipulative. To give a 
striking example: moderately advanced abacus users maintain high arithmetic ca-
pabilities during mental calculation in the absence of an abacus by ―manipulating‖ 
what seems to be a mentally projected abacus. Such users often apply finger ma-
nipulations as if the abacus is physically accessible. Interestingly, expert abacus 
users even perform better in mentally manipulating as opposed to physically ma-
nipulating the abacus (Hatano, Miyake, & Binks, 1977; Hatano & Osawa, 1983). 
This suggests that having had a very high number of sensorimotor experiences 
with the abacus, can instantiate fully mental simulations without external support 
needed to maintain it. Importantly, the contention that non-verbal sensorimotor 
representations underlie mental calculation of abacus-users has recently been 
strengthened: performance of mental calculation in normal subjects is inhibited by 
verbal interference, whereas for trained abacus-users no interference effects are 
found (Frank & Barner, 2012). 
Furthermore, a recent study showed that participants who had learned 
with either a physical or virtual abacus performed equally well in recognizing 
number representations of an abacus presented on paper; however, virtual aba-
cus-trained participants performed worse on a transfer task that required more 
complex arithmetic operations with a physical abacus in comparison to partici-
pants who had trained with a physical abacus (Flanagan, 2013). Relatedly, in a 
study by Flusberg and Boroditsky (2011) on mental rotation it has been found 
that sensorimotor experience with objects that are difficult to manipulate actually 
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hindered effective mental rotation of those objects, whereas easily manipulable 
objects promoted mental rotation. These studies show that sensorimotor simula-
tions that underlie cognition are very sensitive to the experiences afforded by 
manipulatives. As such, if we understand transfer of learning as learning to think 
without manipulatives it does not necessarily involve decontextualization, but 
rather internalization of sensorimotor routines. 
This development of internalized embodied knowledge seems to be a 
gradual process; that is, learners slowly dis-embed their mental activity from the 
environment. An obvious example is when children stop using finger-gestures to 
count. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, abacus users that have an intermediate 
level of expertise often use gestures to support their thinking whilst experts do 
not need such support for their mental calculations, which suggest a kind of tran-
sition state between relying on purely external to internal recourses. In a similar 
vein intermediate chess players perform better at thinking through moves (with-
out manipulating the pieces) when a chess-board is present. In contrast, chess 
masters do not need external support in their mental chess-playing (Chase & Si-
mon, 1973). A relevant study that provides insight on when external support is of 
importance comes from Kirsh (2009) in which subjects played a mental tic-tac-
toe game with the experimenter. It was found that external perceptual support 
of a sheet with a matrix depicted on it as opposed to providing no support, a 
blank sheet, aided performance. However, this external support was only benefi-
cial when the tic-tac-toe game was complex (4x4 matrix), and especially for sub-
jects who scored low on spatial ability. Thus, this study suggests that external 
support is especially helpful when computational load is high, and this depends on 
whether the subject is effective of performing those computations internally (e.g., 
spatial ability; Kirsh, 2009). This might characterize how novices become experts. 
External structures are gradually internalized, and internalization being dependent 
on the learners' ―representational stability‖ (Hutchins, 2005), that is, the ability to 
mentally stand in for external structures. For example, as demonstrated above, 
being low on spatial cognition - signifying a difficulty to produce a stable repre-
sentation - leads to a higher need to lean on external support (Kirsch, 2009). In-
terestingly, the use of hand gestures can also be seen as an instance of external 
support to maintain representational stability (Chu & Kita, 2011; Chu, Meyer, 
Foulkes, & Kita, 2013; Radman, 2013).For example, it has been found that fre-
quency of spontaneous use of gestures is correlated with having low ability in 
spatial imagery and rotation (Chu et al., 2013). 
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Taking these results together, from an Embodied Cognition perspective it 
can be argued that actively learning with manipulatives, can establish sensorimo-
tor routines that are internalized (i.e., embodied); without the need to invoke 
symbolic rules as expertise develops. Thus in these specific cases interaction vs. 
thinking with a manipulative does not rely on a concrete to abstract shift; both 
modes of cognitive performance rely on the same representational format (sen-
sorimotor routines), wherein increasing computational load is put on the brain as 
the learner is required to dis-embed cognitive activity (e.g., mental calculations). 
Transfer by actually or mentally simulating text or science scenarios 
The second line of research focuses on attaining conceptual and narrative 
understanding of texts and science-materials through manipulatives. In these cas-
es the role of grounding a concept in sensorimotor experiences has been studied 
(Glenberg, Goldberg, & Zhu, 2011; Glenberg, Gibson, Goldberg, & Zu, 2012; 
Glenberg, Gutierrez, Levin, Japuntich, & Kaschak, 2004; for a review see De Kon-
ing & Van der Schoot, 2013). For example, in several experiments by Glenberg 
and colleagues (2004) first- and second-grade children read a text and manipulat-
ed toy-figures that referred to, and offered a way to enact, the scenario of the 
text. It was found that children enacting the text scenarios (compared to only 
reading them), were better at story recall, making inferences from the story, and 
in their understanding of spatial relations mentioned in the story. Furthermore, 
having had practice with physical manipulation of toys, children who had to re-
enact the scenario mentally through imagination showed similar improvements. 
Importantly however, it has been found that positive effect of manipulatives for 
text comprehension can be attained by virtual manipulatives as well (Glenberg et 
al., 2011) and simply watching someone else enact the story can equally benefit 
learning (Marley, Levin, & Glenberg, 2007; Marley, Szabo, Levin, & Glenberg, 
2011). 
 As Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) argue, these results suggest that under-
standing of text arises through simulating the scenario‘s content. Manipulatives 
offer a way to ground the scenario‘s content directly, as such promoting simula-
tion processes that underlie text comprehension (Glenberg et al., 2004). Similar 
findings are obtained in science education, in which the role of physical versus 
virtual manipulatives has been studied extensively (T. De Jong, Linn, & Zacharia, 
2013; Olympiou & Zacharia, 2012; Triona & Klahr, 2003; Triona, Klahr, & Wil-
liams, 2005; Zacharia & Constantinou, 2008; Zacharia, Loizou, & Papaevripidou, 
2012; Zacharia & Olympiou, 2011). 
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For example, Zacharia and Olympiou (2011) investigated experimenta-
tion with heat and temperature by undergraduate students who interacted with 
either physical or virtual materials or both and were tested for conceptual learn-
ing through assessment of pre-test and post-test. In the physical condition the 
materials consisted of normal beakers, waters, hotplate et cetera, whereas virtual 
materials consisted of 2D approximations of those materials that could be ma-
nipulated with a mouse. It was found that participants learned equally across con-
ditions (for an earlier study obtaining similar results see Zacharia & Constantinou, 
2008). In another study, undergraduate physics students learned the workings 
and conceptual underpinnings of simple electrical circuits, such as voltage, and 
parallel vs. series circuits. In the critical conditions, during a 15-week physics 
course students either learned through concrete physical materials or interactive 
computer simulations thereof (Finkelstein et al., 2005). It was found that students 
learning with physical versus virtual materials performed worse on a test of con-
ceptual understanding, as well in their evaluations of a set-up with physical mate-
rials.  
These and other studies (Klahr et al., 2007; Triona & Klahr, 2003; Triona 
et al., 2005) consistently show that in many cases physical manipulatives are re-
placeable by virtual ones without learning costs. Based on this research it has 
been suggested that null (and negative; e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2005) results con-
cerning physicality seems to contradict ―the embodied nature of cognition [that] 
would seem to suggest that type of materials [i.e., whether they are physical or 
virtual] would influence student‘s learning‖ (Triona et al., 2005, pp.1). In similar 
vein, in a recent review on the role of physical and virtual manipulatives in labora-
tory education it was suggested that physical laboratories should promote learn-
ing by offering ―…tactile information that, according to theories of Embodied 
Cognition, fosters development of conceptual knowledge‖ (T. De Jong et al., 
2013, pp.305). 
Importantly, however, if one indeed takes the position that previous find-
ings (including research on text-comprehension) contradict with Embodied Cog-
nition4, one must have a clear understanding of what Embodied Cognition would 
predict in a particular context. Unfortunately, in all the previously reported stud-
ies it is not clearly explained why physical as opposed to virtual beakers, short 
springs, or toys would aid conceptual understanding, besides the broad but sim-
                                                          
4 It is important to note this is a possible position that can be drawn from the results, 
not necessarily a position that all the authors of the previously reported studies take.  
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plistic claim that tactile or multimodal experiences should aid conceptual learning 
(T. De Jong et al., 2013; Triona & Klahr, 2003; Zacharia & Olympiou, 2011). 
What would a proper or more moderate reading of Embodied Cognition 
predict in these research contexts? Firstly, it cannot be denied that learners un-
derstand a physical beaker differently if one has haptic vs. no haptic experience 
with it, perhaps even producing richer multi-modal simulations when thinking 
about it. However, there is no reason to assume that this information aids ―learn-
ing‖ of the sort assessed in these experiments. In a recent study in physics learn-
ing it was shown that Embodied Cognition does allow one to make more fine-
grained predictions concerning the role of physicality. The researchers predicted 
based on Embodied Cognition that physical rather than virtual manipulatives 
would positively affect kindergartners‘ learning, but only for those who had an 
incorrect preconception of mass before the learning phase, such as the incorrect 
conception that a heavier object would go up on a beam balance. This was fur-
ther explained that if a concept of mass and its effect on a balance beam is incor-
rectly or simply not instantiated in experience, additional physical experience be-
comes more important. Children were pre-assigned on the basis of whether they 
knew what a beam balance does to either the incorrect or correct pre-
conception group, and were then further subdivided in a physical manipulative 
condition with real weights and balance beam vs. virtual manipulative condition in 
which children learned with a computer simulation of weights and beam balance. 
In line with the predictions it was found that only children with an incorrect con-
ception of mass in relation to the beam balance showed learning gains from phys-
ical materials. This can be explained by the fact that children with correct pre-
conceptions already had a good understanding of mass (grounded in previous 
haptic experiences), and therefore had no additional relevant information to gain 
from learning from physical rather than virtual manipulatives. These and other 
results seem to show that sensorimotor information can indeed be important for 
learning (Black et al., 2011; Morris, Tan, Barbagli, Chang, & Salisbury, 2007; 
Reiner, 1999; for an overview see Sigrist, Rauter, Riener, & Wolf, 2013). 
As such, these examples show that Embodied Cognition would only pre-
dict that learning a particular concept through sensorimotor experience is im-
portant for those concepts that draw on that information for understanding of a 
particular concept. For example, mass must be grounded multi-modally simply 
because mass cannot be easily determined by the visual modality alone (e.g., two 
objects might look the same but vary in weight). This directly aligns with the find-
ing that text comprehension is promoted by virtual manipulatives to the same 
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extent as by physical ones (Glenberg et al., 2011). For example, we would only 
predict an effect of physical and interactive richness when the text involves in-
formation not readily attainable through the visual modality alone. An example of 
such a scenario could be a protagonist that has to choose between two treasure 
cases that look the same, but weigh differently or one that is locked and the oth-
er can be opened. Furthermore, when increasing the quantity or complexity of 
these visually unattainable features (providing that they are not already grounded 
in previous experiences; Zacharia et al., 2012) one would predict that physical 
manipulation becomes beneficial to text-comprehension. 
Transfer by replacement  
The final stream of research we present here seems to entail greater 
problems for Embodied Cognition. This research involves manipulatives that hold 
the ―task of ﬁguring out that one thing is intended to represent another, that the 
meaning and importance of the symbol lie in its relation to its referent.‖ (Uttal et 
al., 2009, pp. 157; see also Uttal et al., 1997). 
This line of research has shown that perceptually rich physical objects can 
actually hinder performances in cases where the manipulative stands-in-for some-
thing else (DeLoache 1987, 1991, 2000). In these studies children ranging from 
two to three years old have to obtain a toy hidden in a room. Children must do 
this by watching the experimenter hide a toy in a 3D reconstructed model of the 
room accompanied with the instruction that the real toy is hidden at the same 
place as in the model. It has consistently been found that children perform worse 
with 2d representations rather than perceptually rich and realistic 3D mock-ups 
at retrieving the toy in the real room (DeLoache, 1987, 1991). Furthermore, a 
glass plate put in front of the child - which prevents solicitations of acting on the 
model - actually improves inferential performance in contrast to a model that can 
be interacted with (DeLoache, 2000).  
Although not about manipulatives directly, but often presented as rele-
vant to the domain of manipulatives, are findings from studies that show that 
learning abstract (mathematical) relations and extending them onto novel but 
principally isomorphic situations is promoted when it is instantiated in a more 
abstract form as opposed to a concrete, or perceptually rich form (De Bock, De-
prez, Van Dooren, Roelens, & Verschaffel, 2011; Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003; 
Goldstone & Son, 2005; Johnson, Reisslein, & Reisslein, 2014; Kaminski et al., 
2009; Kaminski, Sloutsky, & Heckler 2008; Kaminski, Sloutsky, & Heckler, 2013; 
Sloutsky et al., 2005). For example, although concrete (cupcakes) in comparison 
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to abstract (circles) instantiations were better for learning a mathematical rela-
tion (fractions), transfer of learning was higher for kindergartners who learned 
with the arbitrary symbolic instantiations (Kaminski et al., 2009). In another well-
known study of Kaminski and colleagues (2008) similar results were found show-
ing that although concrete instantiation resulted in the highest performance on 
problem-solving, transfer of learning in which the same mathematical relation had 
to be deduced was hampered by concrete instantiations (also see Kaminski, 
Sloutsky, & Heckler, 2013). Importantly, although concrete-to-abstract might 
prove to be a leap too far when there is too much emphasis on the concrete, it 
has recently been shown that such a symbolic leap may sometimes best unfold in 
steps, fading concreteness into abstract forms (Fyfe, McNeil, Son, & Goldstone, 
2014; Goldstone & Son, 2005; cf. Johnson et al., 2014; McNeil & Fyfe, 2012; 
Scheiter, Gerjets, & Shuh, 2010). For example, in a problem-solving task in which 
the proportion of different trees had to be discovered it was found that by grad-
ually morphing realistically visualized trees into less detailed green squares led to 
reliable learning benefits as compared to a generic text based format (Scheiter et 
al., 2010). 
According to the Dual Representation hypothesis (DeLoache, 2000), in-
hibited performance with concrete objects can be explained by the fact that sub-
jects have to attain a dual representation: the concrete object in its own right, 
and its referent. Perceptual richness, therefore, may simply incline participants 
towards treating the situation as one single concrete instance, as one representa-
tion. Indeed for some researchers this explains why learning from some manipu-
latives (e.g., Dienes base-ten blocks; Resnick & Omanson, 1987) is notoriously 
difficult to translate into formalized forms (Uttal et al., 1997). Thus, it is suggest-
ed that manipulatives should be designed to be like symbols when they refer to 
some higher-order else, avoiding perceptually rich and real world characteristics 
(Uttal et al., 1997).  
Intermediate Discussion: Embodied Cognition 
In this section we made the case that transfer of learning does not neces-
sarily rely on a concrete-to-abstract shift. We have presented three lines of re-
search on transfer with manipulatives that seem to lead to different results on 
whether such a claim can be maintained. 
Firstly, there are those situations in which thinking in the absence of ma-
nipulatives remains true to a sensorimotor format, which seems to be the case 
with mental calculation with abacus-trained users. We suggest that learning in this 
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respect depends on the gradual internalization of sensorimotor routines. It is of-
ten gradual in that the learner slowly loses its dependence on external props 
(from full dependence of the environment, to projection with bodily resources 
[gestures], solely visual projection et cetera). As such, in lieu of the ―concrete-
ness fading‖ (Goldstone & Son, 2005), it can be argued that transfer of learning 
from manipulatives often involves gradual fading of the interaction with the envi-
ronment, making place for internal sensorimotor simulations, the speed of inter-
nalization being dependent on the learners capability of having ―representational 
stability‖ to stand in for external goings-on (Hutchins, 2005; Kirsh, 2009).  
The second line of research, with evidence from science education and 
reading comprehension, showed that the tenet of Embodied Cognition that con-
cepts are grounded in sensorimotor experiences has been implicitly and unduly 
interpreted as learning should benefit from grounding concepts and procedures 
in the kind of perceptual richness that unfolds in real-world practices (cf. T. De 
Jong et al., 2013; Klahr et al., 2007; Triona & Klahr, 2003; Triona et al., 2005). 
Moreover, the kind of assessment of learning in studies that we have cited above 
are not, and perhaps should not be, sensitive to the kind of perceptual richness-
differences between physical and virtual environments that Embodied Cognition 
does acknowledge. Indeed, for Embodied Cognition learning from a physical la-
boratory or virtual laboratory would result in different lived experiences and as 
such would have different multi-modal associations when thinking about the 
learned context. However, for Embodied Cognition-driven experimental educa-
tional psychologists the challenge is to be sensitive to sensorimotor information 
that allows the Perceptual Symbol (i.e., concept) ―to do its work‖ in the context 
of a task. Needless to say, physical and virtual manipulatives‘ properties vary 
deeply in the sensorimotor information they can provide. Important to note, is 
that much of the research on science education as discussed above has been ag-
nostic to studying the affordances that come with Embedded Cognition which are 
undoubtedly relevant for the science education domain (e.g., ordering objects in 
3-D space as to determine which procedure comes first; for example see Kas-
tens, Liben, & Agrawal, 2008). In sum, this line of research seems to suggest that 
a more moderate reading of Embodied Cognition would be appropriate, wherein 
perceptual and interactive richness in and of itself is not something that promotes 
learning, but is contextually dependent on the learning content being constituted 
on multi-modal information. 
The third stream of research seems to be on par with the moderate view 
that transfer of learning is hampered by perceptual richness (De Bock et al. 2011; 
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Goldstone & Sakamoto 2003; Goldstone & Son 2005; Kaminski et al., 2008, 2009, 
2013; Sloutsky et al., 2005). Although such research might not fall in the domain 
of manipulatives (e.g., Kaminski et al., 2008), it has been argued that manipulatives 
have similar disadvantages if the adage of maximal perceptual richness is main-
tained (e.g., Uttal et al., 1997). We think this line of research cannot easily be 
dismissed and weakens in these particular cases the more simplistic reading of 
Embodied Cognition wherein more sensorimotor information is better. 
Indeed we would suggest that with abstract learning goals we should 
treat manipulatives as what Andy Clark calls Surrogate Situations (Clark, 2005, 
2008). In Surrogate Situations cognition is to some extent decontextualized from 
the environment since it goes beyond the immediate environment, but not dis-
embedded5, since the environment still provides a concrete surface that allows 
for deploying sensorimotor routines (e.g., just-in-time sensing; Ballard et al., 
2001). Indeed, Nathan (2012) recently suggested that the research by Kaminski 
and colleagues (2008) does not show that interaction with materials hampers 
symbolic inferences (see however Deloache, 2010). Clark (2005) similarly argues 
that it is important to retain possibilities for interaction, but keep non-essential 
detail low as to avoid ―gravitational pull‖ of sensorimotor distractions (e.g., au-
tomatic visual attention cues). For example, it has recently been shown with chil-
dren who have to judge relations of sameness and difference are best able to do 
this when labels and objects are used that have an ―optimal vagueness‖ (Son, 
Smith, Goldstone, & Leslie, 2012). Optimally vague to be recognized as something 
familiar but not too perceptually rich to avoid what Andy Clark might call the 
―gravitational pull of perception-action routines‖ (see also Markman & Gentner, 
1997). That is, a vague or schematic as opposed to a concrete instantiation of 
objects that have a sameness relation are more easily generalized to other ob-
jects that share this sameness relation.  
Thus we might speculate that manipulatives for abstract thinking should 
be considered as ―manipulable symbols‖ that still allows for the affordances that 
are related to Embedded Cognition but are minimally rich in perceptual detail. 
Indeed, it has been found that even in highly symbolic environments learners 
draw on perceptual features, such as (self-induced) spacing in algebraic expres-
sion, that guide their problem-solving strategies (see Landy & Goldstone, 2007). 
For example, in an expression of 8 x 4 + 6, it is found in line with the syntactic 
structure that ―8 x 4‖ is often written with less space between the symbols in 
                                                          
5 Note that Clark (2005) uses ―disembodied‖ here. We use disembedded as to con-
sistently make a distinction between embeddedness and embodiment. 
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comparison to 4 + 6 as to denote a grouping order. As such Landy and Gold-
stone (2007, p. 2038) suggest that spatial relations in the algebraic expression 
serve ―to ground the abstract relationships they express in more immediately 
available sensorimotor relationships‖. Interestingly, this use of space is highly 
similar to epistemic actions performed by Tetris players (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994) as 
spacing allows the task to be structured as to reduce computational load. 
Conclusion 
Most scientific discourse shows cyclical and reactionary patterns of pro-
gress - continually recycling and tempering theories in light of new findings. While 
early promoters of manipulatives, such as Montessori or Pestalozzi, held that un-
constrained, self-guided, manipulation of physical objects would automatically im-
press complex ideas upon the mind (Page, 1991), in more recent literature such 
views are equated with ―magical hopes‖ (Ball, 1992) or ―folk psychology or vague 
theory‖ (Triona & Klahr, 2003, pp. 171). Indeed, research seems to indicate that 
more moderate claims about the role of perceptual and interactive richness are 
warranted, which has been important for furthering our understanding of learning 
with manipulatives (Brown et al., 2009; Kaminski et al.,, 2009; McNeil & Jarvin 
2007; Sarama & Clements, 2009; Sherman & Bisanz, 2009; Uttal et al., 1997). 
However, in this paper we have in turn made the claim in light of Embedded Em-
bodied Cognition that the current moderate view is also to some extent mis-
guided if it is not negotiated with findings we have provided in this review. 
  The research reviewed here from an Embedded Cognition perspective 
firstly suggests that learners quite naturally draw on external support from the 
environment to alleviate cognitive load (e.g., Ballard et al., 2011; Kirsh & Maglio, 
1994). Secondly, learners are affected by subtle changes in the environment that 
influence the ease of attaining information either internally or externally (e.g., 
Gray & Fu, 2004; Risko et al., 2013). Thirdly, embedded learning can be con-
strained by manipulatives that impose a certain course of action (e.g., Martin & 
Schwartz, 2005; Stull et al., 2012) whereas self-guided problem solving strategies 
can be effective, but seem to be moderated by the perception of possibilities for 
action on manipulatives (e.g., Antle, 2012; O‘Malley et al., 2010; Stull et al., 2013). 
However, it is not yet clear how manipulatives can be designed in such a 
way that these different processes are optimally supported, especially in relation 
to each other. In other words, based on the evidence reviewed here, it is not yet 
possible to derive clear instructional design guidelines. As such, one of the chal-
lenges for research on Embedded Cognition and manipulatives is to determine 
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how perceptual and interactive properties alter both the way interaction can oc-
cur (hard constraints) as well as how these properties impinge on learners‘ likely 
course of action given the possibilities (soft constraints). Tangible User Interfaces 
seem well-suited for addressing such questions, as they provide a plethora of 
possibilities in maintaining physical interaction that can be related to perceptual 
properties in digital learning environments (Manches & O‘Malley, 2012; O‘Malley 
& Fraser, 2004; Shaer & Hornecker, 2010). Another important research question 
is how differing numbers of affordances that elicit external as opposed to internal 
learning strategies relate to long-term memory representations that are the 
source of transferring knowledge in the absence of manipulatives.  
Current research reviewed here from an Embodied Cognition perspec-
tive seems to indicate that successful transfer of learning, in which the goal of 
manipulatives is to structure thinking in the absence of those manipulatives, does 
not necessarily involve decontextualization from perceptual and interactive con-
straints of manipulatives (e.g., Frank & Barner, 2012). In the research discussed 
here, it became clear that embedded interactions become embodied and aid in 
off-line thinking. We have further made the case that this often occurs gradually, 
wherein external support is faded out when expertise develops6 and is dependent 
on the internal representational stability that the learner can maintain (e.g., Hata-
no et al., 1977; Hatano & Osawa, 1983; Kirsh 2009). As such an interesting pre-
diction to be tested in future research would be that it is important for transfer 
of learning that learners have enough sensorimotor experience with a manipula-
tive to be able to think without it. Interestingly, research seems to indicate that 
internal representational stability is promoted when interaction is easy (Flanagan 
& Boroditsky, 2013), suggesting that ease of manipulability affects ease of internal-
ization.  
Nevertheless, it has also become clear that whether Embedded Embod-
ied Cognition can help make relevant predictions also depends on the learning 
goals and the assessment of whether these have been attained. In line with a 
moderate view, perceptual richness is not beneficial to learning when the as-
sessed learning outcomes do not depend on multimodal information (e.g., Glen-
berg et al., 2011; Triona & Klahr, 2003). In fact it can be argued that much of the 
research reviewed here, actually shows that perceptual richness might hamper 
making abstract inferences (e.g., Kaminski et al., 2009). On a speculative note we 
have argued that manipulatives might still be important for learning abstract rela-
                                                          
6
 Important to note, this depends on whether expertise is defined as a disembedded 
cognitive capability. 
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tions since they provide the learner with external support, and that current re-
search should focus on how embedding learners in manipulable but not percep-
tually rich learning environments (i.e., surrogate situations). 
Although theories of Embedded Embodied Cognition might be a suitable 
starting point for research on these open questions and enjoys empirical support 
to weaken moderate claims presented in the introduction, an important short-
coming of the current perspective in terms of educational implications is that giv-
en the current state of the literature it is difficult to provide guidelines for how 
manipulatives should be designed. Yet, an important educational implication we 
can take home from the Embedded Embodied perspective is that mouse-based 
virtual manipulatives, which reduce perceptual and interactive richness compared 
to physical manipulatives or tangible user interfaces, do not necessarily optimize 
the learner‘s cognitive load either. Furthermore, it has recently been argued by 
Nathan (2012) that research that shows that perceptually rich representations 
might not be suitable for bringing across abstract symbolic relations, should not 
lead educators to adopt the view that learning should go ―without exposure to 
perceptually rich stimuli‖ since it ―robs learners of opportunities to learn how to 
recognize deep structure and ﬁlter out irrelevancies‖ (Nathan, 2012, pp. 137). 
We would make a similar argument that educational design and research should 
focus on ways to expose learners to a range of interactive possibilities from 
which efficient externally mediated problem-solving strategies might arise.  
To end with a theoretical note, the Embedded Embodied perspective, as 
opposed to a moderate view, attempts to provide an account of how the central 
aspect of manipulatives, that is, what sensorimotor information they provide, is 
beneficial for learning. Learning from manipulatives is always sensorimotor in na-
ture - i.e., it always involves some degree of bodily interaction of the learner with 
the environment, if not, it ceases to be a manipulative. Indeed, when ―subtract-
ing‖ learning with manipulatives from learning with other materials such as texts 
or non-interactive instructional animations, we will always be left with perceptual 
and interactive richness as the key residual difference at the side of manipulatives. 
Thus, any perspective that seeks to guide instructional design of manipulatives 
should specify how the body in action affords processing of information not easily 
maintained with other learning materials and how this relates to long-term 
knowledge representations. In our opinion, the research reviewed here suggests 
that while more research is clearly necessary, the Embedded Embodied Cognition 
perspective provides a more promising starting point than a moderate view for 
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furthering our understanding of how perceptual and interactive richness might aid 
learning.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Does (non-)meaningful sensori-motor engagement promote 
learning with animated physical systems?* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter has been accepted for publication as Pouw, W. T. J. L., Eielts, E. 
C., Van Gog, T., Zwaan, R. A., & Paas, F. (in press). Does (non-)meaningful 
sensori-motor engagement promote learning with animated physical systems? 
Mind, Brain & Education.   
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Does (non-)meaningful sensori-motor engagement promote 
learning with animated physical systems? 
 
Previous research indicates that sensori-motor experience with physical systems 
can have a positive effect on learning. However, it is not clear whether this effect 
is caused by mere bodily engagement or the intrinsically meaningful information 
that such interaction affords in performing the learning task. We investigated (N 
= 74), through the use of a Wii Balance Board, whether different forms of physi-
cal engagement that was either meaningfully, non-meaningfully or minimally relat-
ed to the learning content would be beneficial (or detrimental) to learning about 
the workings of seesaws from instructional animations. The results were incon-
clusive, indicating that motoric competency on lever problem solving did not sig-
nificantly differ between conditions, nor were response speed and transfer per-
formance affected. These findings suggest that adult‘s implicit and explicit 
knowledge about physical systems is stable and not easily affected by (contradic-
tory) sensori-motor experiences. Implications for embodied learning are dis-
cussed. 
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Introduction 
How does practical experience with physical systems (e.g., gear systems, 
levers) affect learning about its mechanisms? For example, does our experience 
with riding a bicycle contribute to our understanding of the working of mechani-
cal parts (e.g., gear systems) of a bicycle? The answer to this question is relevant 
for educational practices in science education, as it dictates whether learning 
about physical systems should be grounded in concrete physical experiences next 
to abstract formalisms (Nathan, 2012; Pouw, Van Gog, & Paas, 2014). According 
to embodied learning theories, understanding of abstract principles relies upon 
the structural relations that emerge in bodily interaction with the environment 
(e.g., Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998; Lakoff & Nunez, 2000; Pouw et al., 2014). If 
this is correct, effective design of digital learning environments at times involves 
providing possibilities for bodily interaction. 
Previous research indeed indicates that bodily interaction while learning 
or working with physical systems may in some cases promote understanding (e.g., 
Han & Black, 2011; Schönborn, Bivall, & Tibell, 2011; Zacharia Loizou, & Pa-
paevripidou, 2012). Such findings may prove informative for guiding applications 
of computer-based technology in education, such as Tangible User Interfaces 
(TUIs; e.g., Manches & O‘Malley, 2012; Marshall, Price, & Rogers, 2003). TUIs are 
characterized by the combination of physical and virtual objects, running in real-
time, and allowing for physical interactions between the users and virtual objects 
that are typically afforded by interactions with real non-virtual objects (Daponte, 
De Vito, Picariello, & Riccio, 2014). For example, the Nintendo Wii Balance 
Board can be used for continuous full-body physical interaction with virtual objects 
that can simulate complex affordances with non-virtual objects (e.g., snowboard-
ing). However, it is as yet unclear whether positive effects of bodily interactions 
with physical systems on understanding are promoted by the particular structural 
relations between agent and environment that emerge during physical interaction, 
or by the motivational processes that are affected by physical engagement (e.g., 
Bivall, Ainsworth, & Tibell, 2011; Han & Black, 2011; Wiebe, Minogue, Jones, 
Cowley, & Krebs, 2009).  
In this study participants learned about a class 1 lever (a lever where the 
fulcrum is in the middle and the effort and resistance on opposite sides; e.g., a 
seesaw) through physical engagement with a Nintendo Wii-Balance Board (here-
after: Wii Board)1. Their physical engagement with the Wii Board was either min-
imally, meaningfully, or non-meaningfully related to the underlying principles of 
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the physical system. This allows for studying not only whether, but also how bodily 
interaction supports learning of mechanical concepts.  
 
Physical Engagement and Learning 
 
 There is increasing empirical evidence that physical engagement with 
learning materials can be an effective learning practice in for example mathemat-
ics, reading comprehension, and science education (e.g., Fyfe, Mcneil, Son, & 
Goldsone, 2014; Glenberg, Gutierrez, Levin, Japuntich, & Kaschak, 2000; Kiefer & 
Trump, 2012). This research is informed by theories of embodied learning which 
suggest that learning and applying knowledge involves the effective re-use, simula-
tion, or reactivation of sensori-motor experiences (for an overview see Pouw et 
al., 2014). 
Strong evidence for embodied learning comes from the field of gesture 
research, which has shown that actively producing, imitating, or enacting gestures 
during word-learning (and retrieval) enhances memory (-retrieval) as opposed to 
more passive control conditions (e.g., Kelly, McDevitt, & Esch, 2009; Macedonia 
& Klimesch, 2014; for an overview see Macedonia & Kriegstein, 2012). These 
findings are explained by the idea that the use of gestures during word-learning 
enriches the conceptual understanding with multi-modal information. This en-
richment of the conceptual understanding is held to consist of a higher degree of 
associations with the concept‘s relevant modality-specific information (motor, 
haptic, spatial, etc.), which aids in the prevention of memory-decay and the re-
trievability of the concept (e.g., Macedonia & Kriegstein, 2012). Going beyond 
word-learning, it has been found that gesturing (vs. not gesturing) during learning 
of science-related texts improves learners‘ ability to make inferences about the 
learning content (Cutica & Bucciarelli, 2013; Cutica, Iani, & Bucciarelli, 2014).  
A deeper analysis of the gesture literature shows that gesturing during 
learning is not effective merely by virtue of activating the sensori-motor system, 
but the meaningfulness of gestures seems to be important too. For example, it 
has been found that gesturing during word-learning is only beneficial to memory 
when these gestures bear an iconic relation with the meaning of the word (e.g., 
moving hand up and down to depict ‗hammering‘) as opposed to gestures con-
sisting of movements that are not concretely related to the semantic content of 
the word (e.g., Macedonia & Knösche, 2011; Kelly et al., 2009; see also Cook, 
Yip, & Goldin-Meadow, 2012). Thus, the gesture literature suggests that bodily 
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activity might only aid learning when it is meaningfully related to the learning con-
tent.  
 
Embodied Learning and Science Education 
 
We are interested in how active bodily activity might aid learning of prin-
ciples underlying physical systems, a central learning topic in science education. 
To date, there are only few quantitative experimental studies on the precise role 
of bodily engagement in this context (e.g., Bivall, Ainsworth, & Tibell, 2011; Han 
& Black, 2011; Johnson-Glenberg et al., 2014; Olympiou & Zacharia 2012; Kontra, 
Lyons, Fischer, & Beilock, 2015; Schönborn, Bivall, & Tibell, 2011; Triona & Klahr 
2003; Wiebe et al., 2009; Zacharia & Constantinou, 2008; Zacharia, Loizou, & 
Papaevripidou, 2012; Zacharia & Olympiou, 2011). Next we will only address 
findings that focus on concepts such as force and mass as these are central con-
cepts for understanding the dynamics of a class 1 lever. 
A demonstration of the benefit of recruiting sensori-motor processes in 
science concept learning is offered by a study of Bivall and colleagues (2011). 
They show that conceptual understanding of the structure of a bio-molecular 
model improved when learners were offered haptic feedback during the training-
phase. More precisely, learners were either engaging with a haptic device that 
simulated the repulsive and attractive forces of the molecules, or engaging with 
the same haptic device but with the haptic force-feedback disabled. Engaging with 
the haptic device with force feedback bolstered the learning outcomes from pre- 
to post-test (for similar results see Schönborn et al., 2011). It was suggested that 
haptic feedback during instruction afforded learners the opportunity to off-load 
visual working memory onto the sensori-motor system (Bival et al., 2011; 
Schönborn et al., 2011). Furthermore, haptic feedback provided the learner with 
information about repellant and attractive forces directly, while that had to be vis-
ually inferred in the no-haptic feedback condition. 
In a comparable study, fifth-graders learned the workings of simple me-
chanical gear devices through different degrees of sensori-motor engagement 
(Han & Black, 2011). Subjects in the control condition observed the unfolding of 
the simulation, whereas in the other two conditions participants controlled the 
spinning of the gears with a joystick (kinesthetic condition); in the third condition 
the joystick control was augmented with force-feedback (force-kinesthetic). Par-
ticipants in the two kinesthetic conditions shower higher learning gains than par-
ticipants in the control condition. Han and Black (2011) suggested that the kines-
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thetic experience allowed participants to re-enact the relevant haptic information 
related to force as to actively compare it to visual information presented during 
the task.  
In another study concerning workings of levers it was investigated 
whether providing learners (ages 11-14) with haptic feedback during training 
would benefit learning performances as opposed to learners who only received 
visual information during training (Wiebe et al., 2009). In the first part of the 
training participants set up the position of the lever‘s fulcrum and applied a num-
ber of weights. Subsequently the program generated a second lever (with differ-
ent position of the fulcrum and different number of weights). Participants were to 
judge which of the two levers (self-constructed vs. program-generated) required 
the highest amount of force to lift the weights. The participants in the haptic 
condition were also allowed to ―feel‖ the amount of weight needed to lift the 
weights by using a device which produced haptic feedback. It was found that 
learning performance in terms of declarative or conceptual knowledge did not 
differ between the haptic and visual condition. In fact, participants in the visual 
condition outperformed those in the haptic condition in judging which lever re-
quired the highest amount of force.  
There are indications, however, that the learning impact of physical en-
gagement with objects or interfaces might be dependent on prior knowledge. For 
instance, in a study by Zacharia and colleagues (2012) kindergartners learned 
about the role of mass and its effects on a balance beam (class 1 lever) by either 
physically interacting with a balance beam or a virtual equivalent programmed on 
a computer. Prior to the training it was assessed whether children already pos-
sessed the correct conception that heavier objects placed on one side will pivot 
the balance beam. It was found that only children with an incorrect preconcep-
tion benefited in terms of learning outcomes from physically interacting with a 
balance beam. This finding suggests that if learners already have an understanding 
of how mass relates to the balance beam they can assess mass based on percep-
tion alone and no additional sensori-motor information is needed to allow them 
to perceive mass directly (through kinesthetic feedback).  
The previous results suggest that sensori-motor activity can be beneficial 
to learning underlying principles of physical systems. However, it should be noted 
that some of these studies did not find beneficial effects (Wiebe et al., 2009), and 
that some of the studies were very low powered (Bivall et al., 2011; Schönborn 
et al., 2011; Wiebe et al., 2009) to moderately powered (Zacharia et al., 2012); 
the study by Han and Black (2011) was an exception, it included a high number of 
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participants. Even if we sidestep the issue of robustness of some of the previous 
findings, the design of the previous studies cannot rule out that bodily engage-
ment only affects the motivational processes of the learner (e.g., Jones et al., 
2006). Most studies leave open the possibility that sensori-motor activity affects 
learning performance indirectly through affecting motivation and experiences of 
immersion, instead of by providing meaningful information about the learning con-
tent. As research on gesture and learning shows, it seems likely that only mean-
ingful physical engagement would promote learning, but it cannot be ruled out 
that it is the physical engagement as such (and the structural relations that are 
picked up) had indeed benefited learning in those studies. Therefore, the aim of 
the present study was to address how enriching the learning content with senso-
ri-motor information affects learning. 
 
The Present Study 
 
To study how enriching the learning content with sensori-motor infor-
mation affects learning, we manipulated the meaningfulness of the structural rela-
tions between physical actions on the Wii Board and the instructional animations 
of the learning content (i.e., mechanical principles of class 1 levers; a seesaw). 
Participants were assigned to one of three conditions. In the first, subjects were 
given a meaningful embodied training, in which they learned to balance a seesaw 
across several trials, by applying force on the Wii Board that matched the num-
ber and position of the weights that acted as counterforce on the seesaw (mean-
ingful condition). In the second condition, subjects were given a similar training, but 
in this condition the forces that needed to be applied on the Wii Board to bal-
ance the seesaw were non-meaningfully correlated with the number and position 
of the weights that acted as counterforce (non-meaningful condition). Yet, in this 
condition participants did apply force on the congruent side of the seesaw. Thus 
while participants pushed a seesaw down on the congruent side, the force need-
ed to push the seesaw into balance was not consistently (i.e., non-meaningfully) 
related with the number of weights placed on the seesaw. These conditions were 
compared with a third, minimal condition, in which participants merely provided a 
small push that started an animation of a seesaw balancing out. Thus, importantly, 
participants in all three conditions are using the Wii-Board to interact with the 
instructional animation, which allows us to eliminate some of the motivational 
effects on performance that might arise from the use of the Wii-Board and from 
having the animation respond to an action by the learner. 
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Not only do we explore whether meaningful physical experiences may 
support learning, we also assess whether non-meaningful physical experiences 
(i.e., acting with incorrect relations with the learning principle) hamper learning. 
After all, if knowledge is indeed grounded in action as embodied theories of 
learning have it, then we might also predict the opposite, namely physical experi-
ences that are incongruent with the learning principle should hamper learning. 
This is a novel question that allows us to further gauge the degree to which 
knowledge of physical systems (i.e., levers) is affected by sensori-motor experi-
ence.  
To assess the broad aspects of learning afforded by sensori-motor inter-
action, we used three different performance measures: a reaction-time task 
(henceforth RT-Task), a transfer task, and a motor task. The RT-task relied 
heavily on visual perceptual experiences; it assessed speed and accuracy of judg-
ing whether a depicted seesaw should balance out or pivot given the weights and 
their position. The transfer task relied more on deliberate reasoning; it measured 
the accuracy of judgments about more complex class 1 lever concepts (e.g., in-
terconnecting seesaws, varied fulcrum positions). The motor task relied purely 
on motoric knowledge; it assessed whether participants were able to physically 
enact the correct amount of force to balance a seesaw when provided with a 
non-interactive picture of a seesaw.  
This motor task provides us with a novel and exploratory way to assess 
whether knowledge of mechanical systems can be partly assessed in the way sub-
jects enact the solution of the problem as opposed to tasks that are procedurally 
very different in nature (pushing a button; i.e., RT-task and the transfer task). Es-
sentially, it allows us to assess whether our learning manipulations differentially 
affect whether participants know how to physically balance a seesaw (motor task) 
as opposed to knowing that a seesaw balances out under particular conditions 
(RT- and transfer task; Ryle, 1945). 
To assess cognitive load and motivation differences, we also included 
subjective attitudes (mental effort, interest, difficulty) towards the learning-phase 
and test-phases as to check for possible mediating effects of motivation (interest) 
and experienced difficulty. Participants‘ reports of the interest of the learning 
phase are of special concern to the present study, as it provides a way to assess 
whether there were motivational differences across conditions. 
We hypothesized that participants in the meaningful condition would 
outperform participants in the minimal and non-meaningful condition on all per-
formance tests. We also hypothesized that the non-meaningfully embodied in-
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structional animation (i.e., non-meaningful condition) would actually hinder per-
formance on these tasks as compared to the other conditions, as it provides in-
terfering sensori-motor information.  
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 92 Dutch university students participated in the present study 
for course credit or 10 euros. Unfortunately, due to a programming error for 15 
participants the Wii-Board data were lost (meaningful = 4, non-meaningful = 5, 
minimal = 6). Additionally, one participant (non-meaningful) was excluded from 
the analyses for not following the instructions correctly (participant employed 
two hands instead of one to push on one side of the WiiBoard). This resulted in 
data of 76 participants for the analyses (37 males [48.68%]; age range = 18 to 25, 
M = 21.32, SD = 2.112; 93.4% right handed, as determined by Oldfield, 1971), 
who were randomly distributed among 3 conditions in a between-subjects design: 
meaningful (N= 26), non-meaningful (N = 25) or minimal (N = 25).  
 
Materials 
Instructional animations 
The voice-over and textual instructions and self-report questions were 
programmed in ActionScript 3.0 and the animations were designed in Adobe 
Flash Professional CS 5.5 (see http://www.charlyeielts.nl/wbb/materials.html or 
https://osf.io/ebjvm/). The Wii Board communication was handled by the WiiFlash 
Actionscript API and WiiFlash Server developed by Joa Ebert and Thibault Imbert 
(http://wiiflash.bytearray.org/). 
Prior to this study we assessed whether adults were affected in perfor-
mance in one of our main learning measures (reaction time task) by comparing 
the effect of only observing the instructional animation as opposed to receiving 
no instructional animation. This was to ensure that adults are still receptive to 
training about class-1 levers. In this pilot-study with adults (N = 78; 52.6% female; 
Age M = 33.47, SD = 12.29, with 83.4 % reporting having had college experience) 
using Amazon's Mechanical Turk we used the exact instructional materials de-
signed for this study but without possibilities for physical interaction. This pilst 
showed that the animations were effective for learning (57.24 %, SD = 19.4% ac-
curacy on the reaction-time task) as compared to no instruction (69.26%, SD = 
20.4%), t (76) = -2.644, p = .010, Cohen‘s d = .602 [large effect]). No effects were 
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obtained for solving speed on the RT-task, t (76) = -0.945, p = .348, Cohen‘s d = 
0.218. 
 
Introductory instructional animation 
Before the manipulation phase, each participant viewed a short non-
interactive instructional animation of 190 seconds with a Dutch female voice-
over, in which the different concepts involved in the operation of a lever were 
introduced (introduction phase). The introduction phase presented the seesaw 
and its components (fulcrum, left arm, right arm), and the concepts of load, force 
and balance. This introduction phase further focused on the mechanical principle 
of levers. The mechanical advantage principle explained in this animation involved 
the concept that force can be amplified by increasing the distance from the ful-
crum.  
 
Manipulation: Interactive instructional animation 
In the manipulation phase, participants had to perform 24 interactive 
study trials in which they had to return a tilted seesaw to a state of balance using 
the Wii Board7.  
Before each of these trials a fixation cross was displayed and subjects 
were instructed not to apply any force on the Wii Board. The experiment would 
automatically start when the subjects employed force that did not deviate more 
than 0.2 lbs from the calibration values for longer than 500 ms, which ensured 
that every study trial started from a rest position. At the beginning of each trial a 
seesaw was presented that could be divided into 9 even sized parts with the ful-
crum placed in the middle. In each trial, the seesaw was either tilted left or right 
with one weight (either small [one cube] or large [two cubes]) placed on one 
side of the seesaw. In half of the trials a load of one blue cube was tilting the see-
saw and in the other half, a larger load of two blue cubes stacked on top of each 
other tilted the seesaw. The animation was designed such that the large weight 
was exactly two times the volume of the small weight. Participants were instruct-
ed to return the seesaw to balance by employing a required amount of force on 
                                                          
7 Before the experiment the participants engaged in a calibration session: After a 3 se-
cond countdown, pressure data of sensors on both sides were recorded for the duration 
of 5 seconds at a sampling rate of 60 Hz. For each side of the Wii Board, the average 
recorded force on that side was subtracted from force values resulting in a new calibrat-
ed force value for each sensor (minus the weight of the hands in rest-state). This ensured 
that the interface only reacted when participants actively engaged with the Wii Board. 
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the opposite arm of the seesaw. The location on the seesaw where the required 
force should be applied was marked by a yellow highlight around the edges of the 
area. When subjects applied the correct amount of pressure on the Wii Board, 
the seesaw would react and the arm carrying the counter-weight would be lifted 
from the ground and the cube representing the participant‘s administered force 
would grow to the correct size to establish balance. The animation would stop if 
a state of balance was reached.  
The required force to balance a seesaw differed across conditions. For 
the meaningful condition, the required pressure for small weights was 5 lbs, with 
a range of 4 to 6 lbs and 10 lbs for large weights with a range of 9 lbs to 11 lbs. In 
the non-meaningful condition, the force requirements of 5 lbs and 10 lbs were 
randomized for the small and large weights, so that there was no structural corre-
lation between amount of weight and counterweight to achieve balance across 
trials. In both the meaningful and non-meaningful condition, the seesaw would go 
out of balance at the force side if the upper bound of the accepted range of em-
ployed force was exceeded. If the applied force was lower than the required min-
imum, the seesaw would return to its initial state. In the minimal condition, the 
animation would simply play if participants prompted it to start by shortly apply-
ing a small amount of pressure (>0.3 lbs) on both sides of the Wii Board. Im-
portantly, when the seesaw was in balance, participants in the meaningful and 
non-meaningful motor conditions had to continue employing the appropriate 
amount of force for 2 seconds before the experiment proceeded to the next tri-
al. In the minimal condition, the experiment would automatically proceed to the 
next trial 2 seconds after the seesaw reached a state of balance.  
 
Test Tasks 
Reaction-time task 
We developed a three-choice reaction-time task programmed in E-Prime 
(henceforth RT-task) to assess participants‘ accuracy (number of correct re-
sponses) and efficiency (reaction-time) in assessing class 1 lever‘s mechanics. In 
this RT-task participants were shown a seesaw that was either in balance or tilted 
to the left or right. In each trial one or two blocks are presented on each side of 
the seesaw on deferring distances from the fulcrum. The size and location of the 
weights varied across the 45 trials. Subjects had to determine which way the see-
saw should be tilted given the presented weights, regardless of the current state 
of the seesaw (i.e., pivoted to left/right or balanced). Subjects responded with a 
keyboard by pressing ―P‖ if the seesaw should be tilted to the right, ―Q‖ if it 
56 
 
3 
should be tilted to the left and SPACE if the seesaw should be in balance. Sub-
jects were instructed to respond as fast as possible. Thirty-two trials of the forty-
five consisted of a situation where the principle of mechanical advantage was rel-
evant, meaning a weight was closer or further from the fulcrum than the opposite 
weight (see Figure 1 for an example).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  45 trials 
Figure 1. Example of two reaction time trials, after each response a fixation cross 
would appear intermittently. 
 
Transfer task 
The transfer task consisted of a total of 12 trials consisting of a 3-choice 
judgment task. Participants were prompted to think as long as they needed to 
produce the correct answer. The trials required participants to judge whether a 
seesaw in a set of several interconnected see-saws and differing positions of the 
seesaws‘ fulcrum, would pivot to the right, to the left or would stay balanced (see 
Figure 2). Also 4 trials involved the judgment of the amount of force needed to 
balance two seesaws in which participants had to judge which arm of the avatar 
needed to exert the most amount of force to balance the seesaws. 
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Figure 2. Example of one transfer task trial. Participants were asked to ―Judge 
whether the right seesaw (‗rechterwip‘) pivots to the left, remains in balance, or 
pivots to the right‖. 
Motor task 
In the motor task participants had to determine the amount of force that 
needed to be employed to balance a seesaw that was statically presented, by ap-
plying the force on the Wii Board (22 trials). These trials were identical to the 
practice trials in the study phase, with the exception that the seesaw could not 
be controlled via the Wii Board (i.e., it remained a static picture). During each 
trial participants would employ force for 1500 ms. During the trials we assessed 
the amount of weight applied by the participant over a 1000 ms period (sampling: 
60Hz) for 22 trials and sampled force-values from 500 ms onward (thus 500 to 
1500 ms). We decided not to sample the first 500 ms of force-employment as we 
were interested in the moment participants reached a stable force-employment. 
This allowed us to gauge participants‘ ability to correctly judge the different levels 
of force that should be employed for balancing the seesaw.  
 
Self-Report Questions 
Mental effort, difficulty, interest 
As an indication of experienced mental effort, perceived difficulty, and 
experienced interest during the learning phase and after each of the test phases 
(RT-task, transfer task, motor memory task) participants answered on a 5-point 
scale ―How much mental effort did you invest during the learning phase [or RT-
task, transfer task, motor-Task]‖ (mental effort; 1 = ‗very low mental effort‘, to 5 
= ‗very high mental effort‘), ―How difficult did you find this task‖ (difficulty; 1 = 
‗not difficult, to 5 = ‗highly difficult‘), and ―How interesting did you find this task‖ 
(interest; 1 = ‗not interesting‘, to 5 = ‗very interesting‘). 
  
right seesaw 
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Physical effort 
Amount of physical effort invested in completing the interactive anima-
tion trials (―how much physical effort did you exert during this task‖ on a 5-point 
scale (1 = ‗very low effort‘ to 5 = ‗very high effort‘). 
Handedness 
Using a modification of the Oldfield (1971) Handedness questionnaire 
participants reported hand-dominance for several manipulative situations (e.g., 
writing, brushing teeth, etc.) on a 5-point scale (1 = very left hand dominant, to 5 
= very right-hand dominant). We computed the mean responses and categorized 
left (right) handedness for means lower (higher) than 3.  
Prior knowledge self-report 
Prior knowledge of the learning material (―Before this experiment I was 
knowledgeable about levers‖; 1 = not knowledgeable, to 5 = very knowledgea-
ble). We also checked whether participants had a physics background obtained in 
secondary school (0 = no, 1 = yes).  
Demographics 
Participants reported after the experiment their age, gender, and study 
program, and were allowed to comment on the nature of the experiment. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were informed that they would start with a training phase 
and would subsequently perform several learning-tests. First, participants were 
seated at a table on which a Wii Board was mounted. The chair‘s height and el-
bow supports were adjusted such that participants‘ hands rested on the Wii-
board and the elbows had a 90-degree angle. The Wii Board was first calibrated 
to the participant‘s resting state. During the calibration procedure, participants 
positioned their left and right hand on the corresponding side of the Wii Board 
with their hand placed on a marker that represented the location of the pressure 
sensors in the Wii Board for either side. It was stressed that the subjects should 
only rest their hands on the Wii Board and should not apply any pressure on the 
Wii Board during the calibration. In order to familiarize participants with the Wii 
Board controls, they performed a short training sequence before the experiment. 
The training consisted of four different cubes that changed color if the participant 
gave the correct amount of pressure on the Wii Board. The different levels of 
pressure corresponded to the ones used in the experimental procedure. If the 
pressure exceeded the required force, the color of the cube would overflow and 
participants were instructed to apply less pressure. Participants then watched the 
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introductory instructional animation and subsequently proceeded to the interac-
tive instructional animation, which they interacted with in a meaningful-, non-
meaningful, or minimal manner depending on their assigned condition. During the 
training-phase, the study time (time needed to balance the seesaw in the 24 tri-
als) was recorded by the software, as this was likely to vary across conditions as 
a result of the experimental manipulation. After this interactive training-phase 
participants reported exerted physical effort. Subsequently participants per-
formed the RT-task, Transfer task, and Motor task (in that order). After the 
training phase and test phases participants reported their experienced mental 
effort, difficulty of task, and interest in task. Finally, participants answered ques-
tions concerning gender, age, prior-knowledge, handedness, physics-background 
as reported above.  
 
Data Analyses 
Accuracy and RT-scores for the transfer task and RT-task lying outside 
2.5 SD of the overall-mean were replaced with the overall mean (will be reported 
in the results if applicable). 
Reaction-time task 
The number of correct answers on 45 trials (performance range: 0-45) 
was taken as a measure of accuracy and the mean reaction-time (in ms) on cor-
rect trials as a measure of speed.  
Transfer task 
The number of correct answers on 12 trials was taken (performance 
range: 0-12).  
Motor task 
We obtained two outcome measures from the motor task. Firstly we 
provide the different trajectories for the applied force during 1000 ms for the 
two different levels of force (one cube vs. two cubes to balance a seesaw). This 
should give us exploratory information about whether the conditions indeed per-
formed differently; as can be expected since participants learned to balance a 
seesaw with diferring weights. Since we are interested whether participants‘ mo-
tor-performance reflects understanding of the mechanics of a seesaw we used an 
additional ratio-measure which reflects whether participants could correctly dif-
ferentiate between one versus two cubes, that is, one cube should be half the 
force of two cubes. This was done by dividing the mean amount of force given 
for one-cube trials (11 trials) by the mean amount of force for two-cube trials 
(11 trials); when participants indeed were able to correctly differentiate between 
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one versus two cubes the ratio would give ½ value (i.e., .5). The final measure is 
therefore the absolute difference of the correct ratio of .5 and the ratio attained 
by the participants; [
                        
                        
      ; this yields .0 as a perfect score 
(i.e., lower score is better). 
Unfortunately, due to technical issues we failed to administer Wii-board 
data for this particular task for an additional 7 participants, yielding a sample of 68 
participants (meaningful [N = 23] vs. non-meaningful [N = 24] vs. minimal condi-
tion [N = 21]). 
 
Results 
 
Prior knowledge and physics background 
No significant differences (see Table 1 for means) were found across 
conditions (ANOVA) for prior knowledge, F(2, 73) = 2.27, p = .110. This was 
also the case for physics background, F(2, 73) = 1.078, p = .346.  
Wii-board training phase 
Training duration  
The duration of the training phase differed, such that the non-meaningful 
condition (M = 184.50 seconds, SD = 107.15) was longer in duration than the 
meaningful condition (M = 133.79 seconds, SD = 27.56) and the minimal condi-
tion (M = 95.12 seconds, SD = 73.26). As is evident, variances were not equal 
across groups (Levene‘s α < .001). To test whether the differences in training-
phase duration were significant we performed a Kruskal-Wallis analysis with 
pairwise comparisons. There was a significant overall effect of condition on dura-
tion, χ2(2) = 37.519, p < .001. Pairwise comparison showed that the non-
meaningful condition and the meaningful condition took longer than the minimal 
condition (minimal vs. non-meaningful condition, χ2 [1] = 5.991, p < .001; mini-
mal- vs. meaningful condition, χ2[2] = 4.126, p < .00). However, the meaningful 
condition did not differ from the non-meaningful condition, χ2(1) = -1.924, p = 
.163.  
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Task load  
See Table 1, column 1 for the means and standard deviations for the re-
ported mental effort, difficulty, interest for the training phase across conditions8. 
One-way ANOVAs only showed a significant effect of condition on difficulty, F(2, 
73) = 11.754, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni) showed that 
the non-meaningful training-phase (M = 2.68) was reported to be significantly 
more difficult than the minimal training-phase (Mdifference = -1.20, p < .001), and the 
the meaningful training-phase (Mdifference = -.72, p = .014). The meaningful training 
phase did not differ on difficulty from the minimal training phase (Mdifference = -.48, 
p = .164).  
Physical effort 
Reported physical effort during the training-phase in the minimal condi-
tion (M = 1.88, SD = 0.93) the meaningful (M = 2.35, SD = 1.06), and the non-
meaningful (M = 2.56, SD = 1.16) did not differ, F(2, 75) = 2.738, p = .071).  
RT-task 
Accuracy 
We replaced outliers (outside 2.5 SD range from the mean) with the 
overall mean (n = 2). Overall accuracy was 80.04% (M = 36.02 correct responses 
out of 45, SD = 3.26), with the meaningful condition scoring 80.05% (M = 36.23 
[/45], SD = 2.83), the non-meaningful condition scoring 79.56% (M = 35.80 [/45], 
SD = 3.30), and the minimal condition scoring 80.00% (M = 36.00, SD = 3.73); 
also see Figure 3a. A one-way ANOVA yielded no significant differences across 
conditions, F(2, 75) = .109, p = .897, ηp2 = .003. An additional Bayesian analysis 
for the effect of motor-involvement condition on accuracy yielded    (  |    
.986 (Masson, 2011). This probability indicates a 98.6% likelihood that motor-
involvement condition (meaningful, non-meaningful, minimal) does not affect ac-
curacy on the RT-task. Following guidelines by Kass and Raftery (1995), this in-
formation criterion is strong evidence for the absence of an effect of motor-
involvement on accuracy. 
Furthermore, in our pilot study with adults on Mechanical Turk, those 
participants (N = 43) who did not view an instructional animation had a consider-
ably lower accuracy score on the RT-task (57.24 %) than participants (N = 35) 
who did view animations (but without opportunities for interaction) in the pilot 
study (69.26 %) and participants in the present study where overall accuracy was 
                                                          
8 These analyses were performed on the complete sample of 90 participants, as they 
did not include Wii-Board data of the training phase. 
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80.04%. In sum, the pilot study data suggest that the instructional animations used 
here contribute to learning. 
Reaction Time 
No outliers outside the 2.5 SD range from the mean were found. The 
average reaction-time in ms for correct trials (see Figure 3b) for the meaningful 
condition (M = 2152.83, SD = 489.45), the minimal condition (M = 2396.02, SD = 
857.29) and the non-meaningful condition (M = 2717.07, SD = 1202.200) showed 
unequal variances across condition (Levene‘s α < .001). We performed a Kruskal-
Wallis analysis with pairwise comparisons which yielded no significant overall ef-
fect of condition on reaction-times, χ2(2) = 1.860, p = .395.  
Task load 
See Table 1, column 2 for the means and standard deviations for the re-
ported mental effort, difficulty, and interest on the reaction-time task across 
conditions. ANOVAs showed no significant overall main effects of condition on 
these self-report measures regarding the RT-task. Furthermore, there were no 
significant correlations of self-report measures with performance on the RT-task.   
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Figure 3a, b. Number of correct trials and reaction times for correct trials (ms) 
for the meaningful, non-meaningful, and minimal condition. Error-bars indicate 
standard errors. For number of correct trials (RT-accuracy, Figure 3a) we have 
added the results of a pilot study performed on Mechanical Turk where partici-
pants did not receive instructions. 
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Transfer Task 
Accuracy  
No outliers outside 2.5 SD range from the mean were found. Overall 
mean accuracy (see Figure 4) was 52% (i.e., a mean of 6.24 correct responses out 
of 12, SD = 1.6); meaningful (M = 6.54 [%], SD = 1.363), non-meaningful (M = 
5.84 [50.00%], SD = 1.625), and minimal condition (M = 6.32 [50.00%], SD = 
1.77). A one-way ANOVA yielded no significant differences across condition, F(2, 
73) = 3.24, p = .258, partial ηp2 = .034. An additional Bayesian analysis for the ef-
fect of motor-involvement condition on transfer task accuracy yielded 
    (  |    .954 (Masson, 2011). This probability indicates a 95.4% likelihood 
that motor-involvement condition (meaningful, non-neaningful, minimal) does not 
affect accuracy on the transfer task; which can be considered strong evidence for 
the absence of an effect of condition (Kass & Raftery, 1995).  
 
Figure 4. Number of correct responses on the transfer task for the meaningful, 
non-meaningful, and minimal condition. Error-bars indicate standard errors. 
Task Load  
See Table 1, column 3 for the means and standard deviations for the re-
ported mental effort, difficulty, and interest on the transfer task across condi-
tions. ANOVAs showed no significant overall main effects of condition on these 
self-report measures regarding the transfer-task. With regard to overall correla-
tions between self-report measures and performance on the transfer task we 
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only found a significant correlation between experienced interest and accuracy 
on the transfer task, such that more reported interest resulted in higher perfor-
mance, r = .292, p = .011. 
 
Motor-memory Task 
 Figure 5 shows the mean force-responses for one-cube (grey) and two 
cube trials (lock) plotted over time (1 second) with 95% CI‘s. As can be qualita-
tively inferred from the graphs, there is a considerable difference in participants 
motor-responses in the minimal condition as compared other conditions. This is 
not surprising as participants in the minimal condition were trained to give a 
short push on the Wii-Board to balance the seesaw, which is reflected in this task 
as well. Namely, participants in the minimal condition gave a short but large force 
response as compared to the other conditions.  
However a more interesting pattern seems to have emerged if we con-
sider that only participants in the meaningful condition were trained to motori-
cally differentiate between forces of one vs. two blocks as the forces in the non-
meaningful condition were not consistently related to the weights. Further con-
sider that, participants in the control condition only gave one force-response 
with both hands that did not covary with one vs. two blocks. Interestingly, the 
figures seem to indicate that, indeed, the non-meaningful condition motorically 
differentiated less between one versus two blocks as compared to the meaningful 
condition. Moreover, the participants in the minimal condition - although not mo-
torically trained to differentiate between weights - did seem to transfer their 
knowledge motorically, as indicated by the distances between curves.  
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Ratio Measure 
To test whether these differentiations for force-responses for one vs. 
two-cubes trials were significant we obtained a ratio-measure as described in the 
method section. As is shown in Figure 6 the participants in the Meaningfully-
EC(M = .3026, SD = .156) performed better (a score of 0 being perfect) in differ-
entiating between one-cube- versus two-cube forces as compared to non-
meaningful(M = .362, SD = .125), and minimal condition (M = .354, SD = .163). 
However, a one-way ANOVA yielded no significant differences across condition, 
F(2, 78) = 1.091, p = .342, partial ηp2 = .032. An additional Bayesian analysis for 
the effect of motor-involvement condition on ratio measure on the motor-
memory task yielded     (  |    .956 (Masson, 2011). This probability indi-
cates a 95.6% likelihood that motor-involvement condition (meaningful, non-
meaningful, minimal) does not affect motor-knowledge as reflected by the ratio 
measure (which can be considered strong evidence for the absence of an effect of 
condition, Kass and Raftery, 1995). 
 
Figure 6. Ratio-measures as a measure of motor-competency to differentiate be-
tween force-for-one-cube vs. force-for-two-cubes trials. A score of 0 means a 
perfect score, meaning that participants‘ mean force given for two cube trials was 
twice the force compared to one cube trials. 
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Task Load 
See Table 1, column 4 for the means and standard deviations for the re-
ported mental effort, difficulty, and interest of the motor task across conditions. 
ANOVAs showed no significant overall main effects of condition on these self-
report measures regarding the motor task. Overall correlations between self-
report measures and performance, showed that those with that found the task 
more difficult (r = -.267, p = .028) and more interesting performed (r = -.263, p = 
.030) better on the motor-task. 
 
Discussion 
  
We investigated whether different meaningful- and non-meaningful forms 
of physical engagement with instructional animations concerning the workings of 
class one levers affects unreflective (RT-task), reflective (transfer task), and mo-
toric (motor task) competency on problem-solving. The results showed that ei-
ther a training-phase in which participants learned how to physically balance a 
virtual seesaw (meaningful condition), a training in which participants physically 
balance a seesaw but with inconsistent weight mapping (non-meaningful condi-
tion), or a training phase in which participant merely activated the playing of an 
instructional animation through a minimal physical engagement (minimal condi-
tion), did not differently affect performance on RT-task or the transfer task.  
Participants in the minimal condition did have different motoric judgments 
of the force that needed to be applied to balance a seesaw. This result is not sur-
prising since participants in the minimal condition learned to balance a seesaw 
only through minimal physical engagement (3lbs) whereas the other participants 
consistently or inconsistently learned to balance a seesaw around 5 and 10 lbs for 
one-cube and two-cube forces, respectively. Nevertheless, this result confirms 
that there was some implicit embodied memory of the correct sensori-motor 
dynamics with the seesaw during the training phase. Yet no significant differences 
were found between conditions for the ratio measure, which was designed to 
assess motoric competence in correctly differentiating between one- vs. two-
cube forces over an interval of 500-1500 milliseconds. Interestingly, visual evalua-
tion of Figure 6 shows, participants in the minimal condition show some motoric 
competence (as indicated by differentiation of forces between one versus two 
blocks between 1000-1500 milliseconds after response-onset), which suggests 
that knowledge about the mechanisms of the seesaw learned through non-
motoric means may transfer to motoric competence.  
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Yet, this study has some limitations that might have prevented us to find 
the hypothesized beneficial (negative) effect of the meaningful (non-meaningful) 
training-phase as compared to the minimal condition. Firstly, although the current 
paradigm was explicitly designed to pick up potential small effects of training of a 
non-reflective and automatic sort, it might be the case that the manipulation was 
simply too short to imbue effects of the different training-phases (approximately 
two minutes). Indeed, it could be argued that perhaps especially in learning sen-
sori-motor routines repetition is important to achieve a certain level of compe-
tence (e.g., Marley & Carbonneau, 2014). This can be appreciated by the fact that, 
in contrast to understanding a propositional rule, motor-competence does not 
follow an either-or transition of understanding (cf. Ryle, 1949). Thus, for the 
learner, practice might be a very important factor to pick up information that is 
constituted by the structural correlations that emerge during interaction, or in 
simpler words, embodied learning takes time. 
Another limitation of the present design is that we could have obtained a 
more sensitive measurement by including a pre-test. For example, Zacharia and 
colleagues (2012) showed that children that had correct conceptions of mass and 
its effect on a balance-beam were not benefiting from physically engaging with 
learning materials. It is thus possible that the learners‘ degree of competence af-
fect whether physical engagement is beneficial for learning; unfortunately the pre-
sent design fails to take this into account.  
Additionally, it might be argued that the null-findings actually show that 
the more passive training (i.e., minimal condition) was more efficient for learning 
than the other forms of physical engagement. After all, participants in the minimal 
condition had a significantly shorter study time as compared to the meaningful 
and non-meaningful condition. Unfortunately this is difficult to assess. However, 
the reason why the embodied instructional animations took longer is that partici-
pants had to acquire competence in wielding the Wii-board (for example, during 
the training phase participants often over-pushed and then stopped pushing alto-
gether to begin all over again). As such it can be argued that participants in the 
physically engaged conditions were actually performing several tasks at once, and 
were thus in another respect hindered to study the materials.  
Methodological issues aside, given that previous research (with children 
and adults) does not consistently find a potential beneficial role of augmenting 
instructional animations with sensori-motor information (Bivall et al., 2011; 
Schönborn et al., 2011; Wiebe et al., 2009; Zacharia et al., 2012), it might be the 
case that learning how to do something physically is not always necessary to know 
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that a mechanical device works such and so. In other words, perhaps learning the 
workings of levers can be done entirely through visual information alone in the 
current task (i.e., the actions participants performed in the meaningful condition 
were not relevant). In fact, it might have worked the other way around. Know-
ing-that informs how to motorically balance a seesaw, as indicated by the appar-
ent motor competence of participants in the minimal condition. Indeed it has 
been argued, that when visual information is present and usable to understand a 
particular task at hand, haptic information - even when it provides extra infor-
mation - will not necessarily be used next to visual information (Driver & Spence, 
1998; Klatzky & Lederman, 2002). Moreover, it may be the case that integrating 
haptic information with visual information produces additional cognitive load 
which counteracts potential beneficial effects of extra-visual information provided 
by haptic interaction (Skulmowski, Pradel, Kühnert, Brunnett, & Rey, 2016). Yet, 
it is important to note that on our reading of most theories on embodied learn-
ing (for an overview of such theories see Pouw et al., 2014) the current actions 
performed with the virtual seesaw would be relevant for further reasoning with 
seesaws. Namely, learning to judge the force needed to balance a seesaw motori-
cally corresponded lawfully (in the meaningful condition) with the visual infor-
mation (i.e., the number of blocks, in combination with the position of the blocks 
on the arms of the seesaw, lawfully corresponded to the force that needed to be 
applied by the participant on the relevant arm). Although of course, it cannot be 
excluded that a more natural correspondence of action and perception (say in-
teracting with an actual seesaw) would have provided different results. Neverthe-
less, the visual information presented in the motoric training sessions directly 
corresponded with the visual information provided in the subsequent perfor-
mance RT- and transfer tasks. Embodied learning theories prescribe that after 
motoric experiences further visual encounters with similar situations are laden 
with previous multimodal associations and become in fact part of reasoning with 
such visual information (e.g., Barsalou, 1999). If the current data reflect a true 
null-effect, it thus seems to suggest (for the present context) that these multi-
modal associations predicted by embodied learning theories are a) either not es-
tablished after a short motoric training or/and thus b) not used for further rea-
soning. 
Additionally, it might be that basic concepts such as weight and mass are 
learned early on in childhood, and thus need not be provided with extra infor-
mation anymore. In other words, certain basic concepts are already grounded in 
physical experiences. For example, in the current task, since participants were 
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able to differentiate between one cube and two-blocks separately, as well as the 
position of the blocks through visual information alone, it might have rendered 
the motoric information redundant for the participant. As such, grounding sci-
ence content in physical experiences is only necessary if it adds something oth-
erwise unknown to the learner (e.g., Pouw et al., 2014; Zacharia, 2012). Howev-
er, the idea that participants‘ knowledge is still grounded in physical experiences 
is less informative to address the current results given the finding that partici-
pants were not affected by contradictory physical experiences provided in the 
non-meaningful training-phase. Furthermore, we should highlight (as reported in 
the method section and results) that we performed a pilot test using instructional 
animations about class-1 lever problems wherein we did find large performance 
effects of animation versus no animation on the RT-task with adults. Additionally, 
as reported in the results section, in the pilot study it was already established 
that providing participants with a similar but non-interactive instructional anima-
tion leads to better performance (69.26%) on the RT-task than no animation 
(57.24%). If we consider that as a baseline for the current study (see Figure 3a) in 
which participants interacted with the animation, we see that the present sample 
performs much better on that same task (80.04%). This suggests that the instruc-
tional animations are effective for improving performance compared to no train-
ing, and therefore, that the current lack of differences between conditions cannot 
be explained merely by poor learning effectiveness (i.e., floor effect) of the in-
structional animations. Furthermore, with regard to the fast decision making that 
was required in performing the RT-task competence (as compared to the trans-
fer task), competence is likely to be a matter of small degrees which we believe 
would be affected by our manipulation in the present context (if there were an 
actual effect). 
How should we relate the present null-findings to other positive findings 
in the literature (e.g., Han & Black, 2011; Kontra et al., 2015)? We believe the key 
difference is that the present study differs from previous studies on learning sci-
ence concepts through physical interaction as we manipulated the lawful infor-
mation that physical interaction affords, as opposed to contrasting different 
modes of physical interaction (e.g., mouse-based versus haptic manipulation, e.g., 
Skulmowski et al., 2016; Zacharia et al., (2012); no manipulation vs. haptic manip-
ulation, e.g., Han & Black, 2011, Kontra et al., 2015). As such we aimed to ex-
clude effects that can be attributed to different modes of physical interaction. Of 
course, this is not to say that previous studies that revealed an effect of different 
modes of physical interaction cannot be attributed to the lawful information that 
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is afforded by these different modes of physical interaction. In fact, if embodied 
learning theories are correct, positive effects of physical interaction should be 
explained in terms of meaningful correspondences with the learning content 
(Pouw, van Gog, & Paas, 2014). Yet, if our interpretation of the current (unex-
pected) results is on track, caution is advised when attributing effects of physical 
interaction based on meaningful correspondences that may exist between action 
and science concepts. Therefore, future research could focus more on manipulat-
ing structural information that emerges out of perception and action loops (by 
loosening or tightening the correspondence between action and its perceptual 
correlates) rather than manipulating the perception-action loop altogether (i.e., 
manipulating the mode of interaction). 
In sum, the current findings are interesting as it shows that physical expe-
riences in adults are not readily or easily integrated with the knowledge schemas 
of the kind that allows one to solve the performance tasks reported here. This 
resonates well with findings regarding physics misconceptions, which show that 
incorrect knowledge schemas are not easily altered by concrete counterevidence 
(Duit & Treagust, 2012). Thus future research could focus more on longer bodily 
training, and more specifically how this affords learners meaningful information 
(rather than mere physical engagement) that is not provided by the visual modali-
ty alone. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Augmenting instructional animations with a body analogy to 
help children learn about physical systems* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter has been This chapter has been accepted for publication as 
Pouw, W. T. J. L., Van Gog, T., Zwaan, R. A., & Paas, F. (2016). Augmenting 
instructional animations with a body analogy to help children learn about phys-
ical systems. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 860. 
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Augmenting instructional animations with a body analogy to 
help children learn about physical systems 
 
We investigated whether augmenting instructional animations with a body analo-
gy would improve 10-13 year old children‘s learning about class 1 levers. Chil-
dren with a lower level of general math skill who learned with an instructional 
animation that provided a bodily analogy of the physical system, showed higher 
accuracy on a lever problem-solving reaction time task than children studying the 
instructional animation without this body analogy. Learning with a body analogy 
led to slower reaction times, but did not affect accuracy and solving speed on a 
transfer task as compared to learning without this body analogy. These results 
suggest that providing children with a body analogy during animation study pro-
vides a stepping-stone for understanding abstract principles of a physical system. 
  
77 
 
Introduction 
Instructional animations (from hereon: IA) are increasingly implemented 
in educational environments (Chandler, 2009). The value of animated over static 
visualizations for instruction can be intuitively grasped: IA offer the learner direct 
pick-up of process related information (i.e., information that interacts with time, 
such as causality and motion), which must be inferred from static visualizations 
(Spanjers, Van Gog, & Van Merriënboer, 2010). Surprisingly, empirical results 
concerning the effectiveness of IA are not as encouraging as these intuitions 
would predict. For example, in the instructional domain of physical systems (e.g., 
gears, electrical systems etc.), although visual presentation benefits learning over-
all (as opposed to non-graphical instructions), findings regarding the effectiveness 
of animated versus static visualizations are mixed (Hegarty, Kriz, & Cate, 2003).  
Based on the mixed results Tversky, Bauer-Morrison, and Bétrancourt‘s 
(2002) concluded: ―The many failures to ﬁnd beneﬁts of animation …calls for 
deeper inquiry into information processing of animation‖ (p. 255). This was taken 
to heart, and later studies have suggested that the main problem with learning 
from dynamic visualizations is that it imposes a high cognitive load on working 
memory from the learner due to information transience inherent to dynamically 
changing visualizations (Ayres & Paas, 2007a, b). To be effective, it is argued, the 
negative effects of transience in IA need to be counteracted, for instance, by 
means of cueing, or segmentation (Spanjers et al., 2010). 
There is one type of task, however, for which IA consistently seem bene-
ficial for learning compared to static visualizations even without measures to 
counteract transience. Namely, a meta-analysis (Höffler & Leutner, 2007) showed 
a small effect size of learning gains in animated vs. static visualizations under the 
condition that the instructional content involves learning bodily routines (e.g., 
origami, assembly, knot tying). It has been suggested that because human move-
ment is automatically and efficiently processed by the cognitive system (we will 
return to this in the next section), the transience inherent in IA depicting such 
tasks may be counteracted (Van Gog, Paas, Marcus, Ayres, & Sweller, 2009).  
Indeed, evidence is accumulating that the human cognitive system is dis-
tinctively attuned to the body, the body of others, and its possibilities for interac-
tions (e.g., Amorim, Isableu, & Jarraya, 2006; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 
1996). For example, neuropsychological evidence suggests that perceived human 
body parts are distinctively processed in particular areas of the brain (extrastriate 
body area; Peelen & Downing, 2007) as compared to perceived body parts of 
non-human animals (Peelen & Downing, 2007). Moreover, human bodies are 
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readily mapped onto one‘s own body schema (Semenza & Goodglass, 1985; Van 
Gog et al., 2009). For instance, mental rotation of shapes represented as a body 
is performed faster than mental rotation of inanimate objects (Amorim et al., 
2006).  
Therefore, in the present paper we investigate whether augmenting IA 
with a body analogy improves learning about non-human movement content 
(originally proposed by De Koning & Tabbers, 2011). Specifically, we investigate 
whether the effectiveness of IA might be improved by augmenting the learning 
content (in this study: class 1 lever problems) with a body analogy. We hypothe-
size: by meaningfully mapping a physical body on a physical system during instruc-
tion, a less cognitively demanding route of knowledge-transfer might be created 
(as opposed to learning about inanimate objects). ―Less demanding‖, as learners 
readily map bodily actions on their own body schema. Moreover, learners are 
very familiar with forces acting on the body, which can be used as an analogy for 
forces acting on physical systems.  
There is evidence already that the body can be mapped on physical sys-
tems. For example, when children or adults convey their knowledge about a par-
ticular topic they often use gestures that are meaningfully related to the topic‘s 
content (e.g., Garber & Goldin-Meadow, 2002; Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 2002; 
Goldin-Meadow, & Momeni-Sandhofer, 1999; Hutchins & Nomura, 2007). Im-
portantly, gestures do not simply mirror what is expressed in speech. Rather, 
gestures can accommodate and complement what is expressed verbally with idio-
syncratic information expressed in gesture alone. For instance, in a study by Pine, 
Lufkin, and Messer (2004) co-speech gestures that emerged when children ex-
plained the workings of a class 1 lever (balance beam) were analyzed (see also 
Pine & Messer, 2000). To solve lever (e.g., a balance-beam) problems children 
must attain knowledge about the effects of I) weights, II) distance of the weight 
from the fulcrum, and III) the positioning of the fulcrum. About one-third of the 
children (5 to 9 years) explaining the solution to a balance-beam problem pro-
duced gesture-speech mismatches. Children verbally explained the solution to 
the problem in terms of one property (e.g., I; talking about the weights on the 
beam), while concurrently expressing another (more advanced property) in ges-
ture (e.g., III; expressing the position of the fulcrum in gesture). Even more re-
markably, those children that produced mismatches as compared to those that 
did not, were more likely to improve on pre- to post-test measures of learning. If 
knowledge about physical systems develops in sensori-motor modalities as re-
search on gesture suggests, augmenting the learning content with sensori-motor 
79 
 
stimuli might improve learning (Höffler & Leutner, 2007; Van Gog et al., 2009; 
Pouw, Van Gog, & Paas, 2014).  
Yet, it seems to be the case that augmenting IA about physical systems 
with sensori-motor information may be suitable for some but not for others 
(Zacharia, Loizou, & Papaevripidou, 2012; for an overview see Pouw et al., 2014). 
For example, kindergartners‘ learning about balance beams improved when they 
were given opportunities to physically interact with a balance beam (class 1 lev-
er), but only when they possessed an incorrect preconception of how a balance 
beam works (Zacharia et al., 2012). This suggests that especially those with in-
complete understanding of a physical system are aided by additional body-
analogous information. Therefore, it is important to take into account learners 
cognitive predispositions when investigating the instructional potency. 
 
Present study 
 
In the present study primary school children learned from IA about a class 
1 lever (a seesaw). The workings of levers can be considered as a classic context 
to test children‘s conceptual and procedural learning processes about physical 
systems (Dixon & Dohn, 2003; Karmiloff-Smith, & Inhelder, 1974; Pine et al., 
2004). We designed an IA (duration 6.5 minutes) in which relevant concepts for 
understanding the working of a seesaw were demonstrated, such as weights, bal-
ance, fulcrum, and mechanical advantage. Half of the sample was confronted with 
a ‗body analogy IA‘ in which a transparent body was projected onto the seesaw 
(see Figure 1: body-analogy condition) and the other half were given the same IA 
without this body analogy (control condition). The body provided an analogy of 
the concept of mechanical advantage: objects placed further from the fulcrum 
(analogy: joint) will exert more force than objects placed closer to the fulcrum. 
Furthermore, if similar weights are put at similar places on the arm they will feel 
equally heavy (balance) or when they are located at different places, they will not 
feel equally heavy (disbalance). 
 Learning performance was assessed through a three choice reaction-time 
task that assessed accuracy and speed of determining whether a seesaw will pivot 
to the left or the right, or will balance out, given different configurations of the 
weights, and the positions of the weight relative to the fulcrum. Additionally we 
confronted children with a similar three-choice transfer task that consisted of 
new concepts, such as interconnecting seesaws, or replacement of the fulcrum.  
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We hypothesized that the body analogy (BA) condition as compared to 
the control condition would show better learning overall (i.e., higher accuracy, 
faster solving speed on the test tasks). Importantly, to minimize individual cogni-
tive differences between conditions we semi-randomly assigned conditions based 
on general math scores of the children. We used children‘s math scores as they 
are closely related to learning about physical systems, and have been found to 
strongly correlate with their visuospatial working memory capacity (e.g., Van der 
Ven, Straatmeier, & Jansen, 2013), which directly relates to issues of cognitive 
load associated with instructional animations (Ayres & Paas, 2007a, b). Per explo-
ration we also investigate whether general math skill interacted with the effec-
tiveness of the conditions, as it might be an important cognitive predisposition for 
learning in the current domain. We also measured subjective experiences of cog-
nitive load, by asking children to rate how much mental effort they invested and 
how difficult they found the tasks. In addition, we asked them to rate how inter-
esting they found the tasks, which could give an indication of differences in cogni-
tive engagement. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 This study was conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the ethical 
committee of the institute of psychology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. All 
children participated based on parental informed consent, where information 
about the study was provided two weeks prior to the experiment and parents 
were given the opportunity to withdraw their child from participating. A total of 
74 Dutch primary school children (3 classrooms from 2 separate schools) were 
tested (mean age, 12.49, SD = 0.54; Range 10-13; 51.4 % female). The two IA-
conditions were: control (N = 36, 52.8% female) vs. body analogy (BA; N = 38, 50 
% female). Children were pseudo randomly assigned (see Table 1 for frequencies) 
to condition by matching for level of general math skill as measured by the na-
tional standardized Cito math test or (in one school) an equivalent standardized 
test that assigns the children to comparable levels of skill as the Cito test does. 
From highest to lowest, these are: A (highest 25%), B (next 25%), C (next 25%), 
D (next 15%) and E (lowest 10%). This test was taken within the school-semester 
year in which the experiment took place, and the children‘s scores were provid-
ed by the schools. 
 
 
81 
 
 Control Condition BA condition 
A 7 8 
B 12 12 
C 7 8 
D 8 7 
E 2 3 
Total 36 38 
Table 1. Number of participants per condition and general math skill. 
Materials 
Instructional animations 
The IA9 were designed in Adobe Flash Professional CS 5.5. The voice-
over and textual instructions were programmed in ActionScript 3.0 (IA‘s can be 
downloaded at http://charlyeielts.nl/bodyanalogy/materials.html). The IA consisted 
of an introduction to the basic concepts of class 1 levers narrated by a female 
voiceover and explained with a dynamic visualization of a seesaw. In the first part 
of the IA (3.5 minutes), basic concepts such fulcrum, left and right arm of the 
seesaw, (dis)balance, weights, and mechanical advantage was introduced. 
Throughout the instruction no explicit information was provided about formulas 
related to the constructs. For example, mechanical advantage was explained by 
showing a balanced seesaw in a mechanical advantage state, with the voiceover 
instruction informing learners that: ―The heavy weight is twice as heavy as the 
lighter weight, but the seesaw is still in balance! This is because the distance of 
the heavy weight is two times closer to the fulcrum than the lighter weight‖ (for 
further instructions see http://charlyeielts.nl/bodyanalogy/materials.html). The 
second part of the IA was not narrated and consisted of 24 trials (3 minutes) that 
                                                          
9 The learning effectiveness of the animations was tested with the reaction time task in 
a pilot-study with adults (N = 78) using Amazon's Mechanical Turk. We translated the 
exact instructional materials designed for Dutch children for the English speaking adult 
sample. This pilot test showed that the animations were effective for learning (accura-
cy on the reaction-time task) as compared to no instruction (t (76) = -2.644, p = .010, 
Cohen‘s d = .602 [large effect]). No effects were obtained for solving speed on the 
RT-task. 
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showed different configurations of weights on varying positions from the fulcrum 
and its effect on the seesaw (tilt left, right, or balance).  
For the BA condition the only difference in the IA as compared to the 
control condition was that a transparent human body was additionally projected 
over the seesaw (i.e., no differences in narrated instruction). Importantly, the 
arms of the projected body moved together with the movement of the seesaw 
(see Figure 1). Only once in the narration (but in both conditions) a reference 
was made to how it would feel to have weights on one‘s actual arms. This refer-
ence was made after the explanation of mechanical advantage, which showed a 
seesaw balancing out with unequal amount of weights (see Figure 1). This was 
done to ensure that children in the BA condition would be more likely to see the 
relevance of the body projected over the seesaw.  
 
Figure 1. A snapshot of the instructional animation in the BA condition (the see-
saw will balance out in this example). 
Reaction-time task 
A three choice reaction-time task was developed (programmed in E-
prime) to assess children‘s accuracy (number of correct responses) and speed 
(reaction-time) in solving class-1 lever problems. The RT task consisted of 45 
trials (and three practice trials) in which children had to judge whether a seesaw 
would balance, or tilt down to the left or to the right. Each trial showed a seesaw 
with one or two blocks on either side of the arms of the seesaw on deferring 
distances from the fulcrum (see Figure 2 for an example). The number and loca-
tion of the weight varied for these 45 trials. Children were required to determine 
which way the seesaw would tilt, or whether it would attain balance, regardless 
of the current state of the seesaw (i.e., tilted to left/right or balanced). We varied 
the initial state of the seesaw randomly as to prevent any spurious effects of the 
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initial state of the seesaw on accuracy and speed. Children responded by pressing 
on a QWERTY keyboard, ―P‖ if the seesaw would tilt to the right, ―Q‖ if it 
would tilt to the left and SPACE if the seesaw would be in balance.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  45 trials 
Figure 2. Example of two reaction time trials. Note that trials were given the ini-
tial state of the seesaw randomly and the children answered with button presses 
what the correct state of the seesaw would be (pivot left, balance, pivot right). 
 
Transfer task 
The transfer task, consisting of 15 lever-problems, aimed to assess chil-
dren‘s ability and solving speed to further apply the principle of mechanical ad-
vantage on new or more complex problems. Twelve problems required children 
to judge what the end-state would be (tilt left, right, or balance) of a particular 
seesaw in a set of two interconnected seesaws, in four of those trials the fulcrum 
was not placed in the center (see Figure 3). The last three problems required 
children to predict how these forces would act on the body (e.g., how heavy a 
block would feel when placed on the arms, or which seesaw needed to be 
pushed down the hardest given a number of weights on the seesaws). 
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Figure 3. Example of three transfer task problems. In the first example (left 
above), children were asked to ―Judge whether the seesaw pivots to the left, re-
mains in balance, or pivots to the right‖. This was the same for the second exam-
ple (right above), but then for the right seesaw. In the third example children 
were asked to ―which weight will feel the heaviest for this person, or will the 
weights feel just as heavy?‖.  
 
Mental effort, difficulty, interest 
 We obtained ratings of experienced mental effort, interest, and per-
ceived difficulty of the instructional animation, RT-task, and the transfer task di-
rectly after completion. Children answered on a 5-point scale ―How hard did you 
need to think to understand the previous video/task‖ (mental effort; 1 = ‗not 
hard‘, to 5 = ‗very hard‘), ―How interesting did you find this previous video/task‖ 
(interest; 1 = ‗not interesting‘, to 5 = ‗very interesting‘) and ―How difficult did 
you find this previous video/task‖ (difficulty; 1 = ‗not difficult‘, to 5 = ‗highly diffi-
cult‘). 
Demographics 
Information on age, sex, and Cito test score of general math skill of the 
children were provided by the schools. 
 
right arm left arm 
left seesaw right seesaw 
left arm 
right arm 
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Procedure  
 Children were tested one or two at a time, in a quiet room at their 
school. If children were tested at the same time the two experimenters ensured 
that children did not face each other directly and that there was enough distance 
between them so that they were not disturbed in any way. Children were seated 
in front of a laptop and were informed that they would watch an instructional 
video and perform two tasks to assess what they had learned. They were subse-
quently asked to put on the headphones so that the experimenter could start the 
video. Subsequently, children performed the reaction-time task and were in-
structed to do so ―as fast and accurate as possible‖. Beforehand, children were 
given three easy practice trials which the experimenter could repeat if needed to 
ensure they understood the task. Subsequently, children were confronted with 
the transfer task that was provided in a booklet and they could solve at their own 
pace (i.e., speed was not emphasized as in the RT test task). The experimenter 
used a stopwatch to assess overall solving speed. Immediately after watching the 
IA, performing the RT, and solving the transfer task, children completed the sub-
jective ratings of effort, interest and difficulty that were printed on a sheet of A4 
paper per task. All children received a small present for their participation (hand-
ed out in class on the last day of testing). 
 
Data Analyses 
Accuracy and RT-scores for the transfer task and RT-task more than 2 
SD from the overall-mean were treated as outliers and were excluded from the 
analysis (reported in the Results section when applicable). 
Reaction-time task  
Performance accuracy was measured by summing the correct answers on 
45 trials (range: 0-45) and speed was measured by computing the mean reaction 
time (in ms) on correct trials.  
Transfer task  
Performance was measured by summing the correct answers on 15 trials 
(range: 0-15) as well as overall solving speed in seconds.  
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Results 
Mental Effort, Difficulty, Interest 
Data are presented in Table 2. T-tests showed no significant differences 
between conditions in self-reported mental effort, difficulty, or interest, on the 
IA, RT-task, or transfer task.  
 
Condition  Instructional An-
imation 
Reaction-Time 
Task 
Transfer Task 
M SD M SD M SD 
Control 
Condition 
Mental Effort 1.81 1.064 2.25 1.05 2.50 1.00 
Interest 3.56 1.319 3.58 1.36 3.69 1.33 
Difficulty 1.92 1.13 2.58 1.16 2.64 1.10 
BA Condi-
tion 
Mental Effort 1.79 .935 2.26 1.155 2.27 1.03 
Interest 3.45 1.350 3.74 1.178 3.26 1.35 
Difficulty 2.11 1.23 2.37 1.08 2.71 1.04 
 
Table 2. Means and SD‘s per condition and task-phase for mental effort, interest, 
and difficulty.  
 
Figure 4. Accuracy scores and standard error per condition and general math 
skills (E = lower and A = higher general math skill). 
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RT-task Performance 
 Accuracy 
The overall accuracy score on the RT-task was 59.91% (M = 26.96, SD = 
5.56). Four participants scored < 2 SDs below the mean (i.e., < 15) and were 
therefore excluded from the analyses (no participants scored > 2 SD). This re-
sulted in an analysis on data of 70 participants, with N = 34 in the control condi-
tion (N = 7 on math skill level A, N = 11 on level B, N = 7 on level C, N = 8 on 
level D, and N = 1 on level E), and N = 36 in the BA condition (N = 8 scoring on 
math skill level A, N = 12 on level B, N = 8 on lebel C, N = 6 on level D, and N = 
2 on level E). Math skill was a significant predictor, F(1, 68) = 17.256, p < .001, 
explaining 19.1% of the variance (based on R2adjusted), with higher math skill result-
ing in higher accuracy, β = .450, t (68) = 4.154, p < .001.  
The effect of condition was assessed by adding condition as a predictor 
for RT accuracy into a stepwise hierarchical regression after math skill. Condition 
was coded as 0 for the control condition and 1 for the BA condition. The overall 
model remained significant, F(2, 67) = 9.417, p < .001, explaining 19.6% of the 
variance in RT-accuracy. Condition was a positive but non-significant predictor 
for RT-accuracy, β = .130, t (67) = 1.208, p = .231. Math skill remained a signifi-
cant predictor, β = .429, t(68) = 4.136, p < .001. 
We further assessed whether general math skill moderated the effect of 
condition by adding an interaction term of condition and math skill into the re-
gression model. This resulted in significant model-fit, F(3, 66) = 8.533, p < .001, 
explaining 24.7% of the variance in RT accuracy. General math skill remained a 
significant predictor, β = .704, t (66) = 4.645, p < .001, and now condition was 
significantly positively related with RT accuracy, β = .230, t(66) = 2.040, p = .045, 
RPartial = .244. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction, β = -.371, t(66) = 
2.346, p = .022, RPartial = -.277, indicating that children with lower math skill were 
more likely to be positively affected by the BA condition (in terms of RT-
accuracy) than those with higher math skill (see Figure 4). 
Speed  
The overall mean reaction time on correct trials was 2791ms (SD = 1331). 
Three additional participants were excluded from the analyses as their data fell 
over 2 SDs above the mean (> 5453 ms; no participants scored < 2 SD). This 
resulted in an analysis on data of 67 participants, with N = 33 in the control con-
dition (N = 7 scoring on math skill level A, N = 10 on level B, N = 7 on level C, N 
= 8 on level D, and N = 1 on level E), and N = 34 in the BA condition (N = 8 
scoring on math skill level A, N = 12 on level B, N = 6 on level C, N = 6 on level 
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D, and N = 2 on level E). Math skill was not a significant predictor, F(1, 65) = 
0.327, p = .569, showing a non-significant relation with speed on correct RT trials 
β = -.071, t (65) = -.572886, p = .569. We added condition together with general 
math skill as a predictor for speed on correct trials into the hierarchical regres-
sion model. The overall model-fit was non-significant, F(2, 64) = 2.878, p = .064, 
math skill remained a non-significant predictor, β = -.083, t (64) = -.0938, p = 
.352, and condition was a positive significant predictor, with children in the BA 
condition being slower on correct trials overall, β = .279, t (64) = 2.325 p = .023. 
To assess a possible interaction effect we entered the interaction term of condi-
tion and math skill into the regression model, this yielded no significant results, 
nor a greater fit of the model.  
 
Figure 5. Mean reaction times and standard error for the RT-task per condition 
and general math skills (E lowest score, A highest score on general math skills). 
Transfer Task Performance 
Accuracy  
The overall accuracy on the transfer task was 49.62% (M = 7.38, SD = 
1.90. Two participants performed < 2 SDs below the mean (< 3.58; no partici-
pants scored > 2SD) and were therefore excluded from the analyses. This result-
ed in an analysis on data of 72 participants, with N = 36 in the control condition 
(N = 7 scoring on math skill level A, N = 12 on level B, N = 7 on level C, N = 8 
on level D, and N = 2 on level E), and N = 36 in the BA condition (N = 8 scoring 
on math skill level A, N = 12 on level B, N = 8 on level C, N = 6 on level D, and 
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N = 2 on level E). A regression analysis showed that math skill was a significant 
predictor of transfer task performance, F(1, 70) = 0.732, p < .01, explaining 8.2% 
of the variance, showing a positive relation with performance β = .308, t (70) = -
.2.706, p < .01.  
We added condition after math skill as a predictor for transfer task per-
formance into the hierarchical regression model. The overall model-fit remained 
significant, F(1, 69) = 3.697, p < .05, now explaining 7.1 % of the variance of per-
formance. Math skill remained a significant predictor, β = .310, t(69) = 2.705, p < 
.01. Condition was not a significant predictor, β = -.403, t(68) = -.403, p = .688. 
We further added an interaction term of condition and general math skills into 
the hierarchical regression model, but this resulted in a model with only non-
significant predictors (p > .246).  
Speed 
The overall mean solution speed on the transfer task was 308 seconds (SD 
= 77.11). Two additional participants were excluded from the analyses as their 
data fell 2 SD‘s from the mean (> 462 seconds; no participants scored < 2SD). 
This resulted in an analysis on data of 72 participants, with N = 34 in the control 
condition (N = 6 scoring on math skill level A, N = 11 on level B, N = 7 on level 
C, N = 8 on level D, and N = 2 on level E), and N = 38 in the BA condition (N = 
8 scoring on math skill level A, N = 12 on level B, N = 8 on level C, N = 7 on lev-
el D, and N = 3 on level E). We first assessed whether math skill predicted over-
all speed on Transfer task in a regression analysis. Math skill was not a significant 
predictor, F(1, 70) = .203, p = .653, math skill β = -.054, t(70) = -0.451, p = .653. 
We added condition next to general math skill as a predictor for speed on trans-
fer task into the hierarchical regression model. The overall model-fit was not sig-
nificant, F(2, 69) = 1.11, p = .335, R2adjusted = .003. Math skill remained a non-
significant predictor, β = -.059, t (69) = -0.496, p = .352, and condition was a non-
significant predictor on solving speed on the transfer task, β = .168, t (69) = 
1.419, p = .160. We obtained no significant results when entering an interaction 
term after math skill and condition. 
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Discussion 
  We investigated whether children‘s learning benefited from augmenting 
an instructional animation (IA) about class 1 levers with a body analogy. It was 
found that when taking general math skill into account as a moderator, this BA 
condition was positively affecting lever problem-solving accuracy on the RT-test 
as compared to the control condition, in which the same instructional animation 
was shown without the body analogy. However, this effect was qualified by an 
interaction, showing that the BA condition improved accuracy on the RT-test for 
children with a lower level of general math skill, and was absent (if not reversed) 
for children with a higher math skill. Finally, no evidence was obtained for per-
formance benefits on the transfer task. 
 As the results are mixed, the question arises whether the body analogy 
was ―analogous enough‖ to be informative for learning. Indeed, there are im-
portant differences between a seesaw and the body analogy. Most notably, the 
body analogy is imperfect, as the body has two joints with independent moving 
arms whereas the seesaw has one fulcrum with movement of the arms that are 
co-dependent. Such (and possibly other) differences might interfere with properly 
understanding mechanics of seesaws. However, there is some information in the 
body analogy that directly corresponds with the mechanics of the seesaw. Name-
ly, there is a one to one correspondence to the difference in weight that would 
be felt when placing blocks on one‘s arm with that of the direction of pivot of the 
seesaw. For example, placing 1 block on the left arm of the seesaw near the ful-
crum and 1 block on the right arm away from the fulcrum will result in a pivot to 
the right due to mechanical advantage. This directly corresponds with the relative 
difference in weight that would be felt when placing 1 block on the left arm near 
the fulcrum (joint) and one block on the right arm away from the fulcrum (also 
due to mechanical advantage). Indeed, in the voiceover of the instructional anima-
tions we emphasized to the learner that this was a relevant correspondence.  
Therefore we speculate that the body-analogous information that was 
present provided a possible means to process the learning content by activating 
implicit motor knowledge, which provided those children that are least receptive 
to learning about abstract content (i.e., those with a lower general math skill) a 
way to ground unfamiliar force-dynamics of the seesaw in familiar force-dynamics 
of the body. In line with observations made by Van Gog and colleagues (2009), 
this grounding would be established through automatic mapping of the model‘s 
body onto one‘s own body. Indeed, it seems that when a rule or process is al-
ready understood, additional grounding in concrete experiences is unnecessary 
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(Zacharia et al., 2012). We further speculate that in the current case children 
benefited from the BA condition when performing the reaction time task because 
they were simulating the force dynamics related to the body (see Van Gog et al., 
2009). This observation is consistent with the reaction time data. Although these 
data need to be interpreted with caution, given that the overall effect of the 
model was not significant, the finding that children in the BA condition were 
slower to respond might suggest that they performed mental simulations during 
the test. Finally, that we did not find a similar effect of condition on transfer task 
accuracy as we did in on the reaction time-task, signals that an efficient strategy 
on one task does not always readily transfer to another. As shown by Dixon and 
Dohn (2007), when solving problems with interconnecting balance beams (also 
included in our transfer task), problem solvers may use more abstract strategies 
(i.e., alternating strategy; see Dixon & Dohn, 2003 for details) than simply judging 
each state of each seesaw to judge its effect on the next connected seesaw. Per-
haps, while judging the forces of a single seesaw like in the RT-task is aided by a 
body analogy through some simulation or inference, this strategy might prove 
inefficient for solving the interconnected seesaw problem as more abstract strat-
egies are more efficient and discovery of these abstract strategies might actually 
be hampered by using a strategy solicited by having learned with a bodily analogy. 
In sum, future research should be sensitive to the kind of strategy a particular 
body analogy solicits, and on which tasks that strategy could be expected to help 
learning. 
Furthermore, in line with findings on the expertise reversal effect (Kal-
yuga, 2007), the accuracy results show that this mental simulation on the reaction 
time test was only helpful for children with lower math ability (lower visuospatial 
working memory capacity) but not helpful, or potentially even detrimental, to 
those with higher ability (working memory capacity). Perhaps those with a higher 
ability did not require additional help to induce rules from physical systems so 
that for them mental simulation during the test task evoked by the body analogy 
is superfluous and possibly distracting process. Perhaps this explains why no ef-
fects on the transfer test were found, as it was more difficult to use one‘s own 
body as an analogy on most of the test items that involved multiple balance 
beams. 
It should be noted that the present study provides more of a demonstra-
tion than an elaboration of how a body analogy can affect learning. Indeed, the cur-
rent design has some shortcomings that prevent such elaboration. For instance, 
although this task was not one taught in school, the possibility cannot be exclud-
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ed that some children had more prior knowledge than others; and our current 
design did not allow for assessing learning gains, as we did not provide children 
with a pre-test. Furthermore, the current results do not allow us to determine 
whether higher learning outcomes of children with lower math scores in the BA 
condition were indeed achieved because cognitive load related to transience was 
counteracted by more efficient processing due to the body analogy. There were 
no differences in mental effort or difficulty ratings between the conditions, but 
this does not necessarily mean that cognitive load imposed by transience was not 
reduced. Perhaps the cognitive capacity that was freed-up by reducing the load 
imposed by transience, was used for processes that were effective for learning, 
thereby resulting in an similar experience in cognitive load. Future studies might 
investigate the underlying cognitive mechanisms in more detail, for instance by 
using continuous and objective cognitive load measures that can be connected to 
events in the animation such as dual task measures that do not interfere with an-
imation processing (e.g., Park & Brünken, 2014) or EEG measures (e.g., Antonen-
ko, Paas, Grabner, & Van Gog, 2010).  
Future research should further focus on a) the potential difference in re-
ceptivity of children with different individual cognitive capacities for learning with 
body analogies, b) the scope of the effectiveness of bodily analogies on other 
physical systems (e.g., gear systems, electrical circuits), or even more abstract 
learning domains such as grammatical or language learning (e.g., Lu, 2011), and c) 
finally the precise cognitive processes underlying this type of learning (e.g., 
Brucker et al., 2014). 
To conclude, despite some limitations, our finding that a relatively simple 
modification of the instructional animation via a body analogy imbued a positive 
effect on performance, especially for those with lower general math skill, is a very 
promising result for future applications in educational practice. 
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Part II 
 
Effects of Manual Activity on 
Problem Solving 
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Chapter 5 
 
Toward a more embedded/extended perspective on the cog-
nitive function of gestures* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter has been published as Pouw, W. T. J. L., De Nooijer, J. A., Van 
Gog, T., Zwaan, R. A., & Paas, F. (2014a). Toward a more embedded/extended 
perspective on the cognitive function of gestures. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 359. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00359 
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Toward a more embedded/extended perspective on the cog-
nitive function of gestures 
 
Gestures are often considered to be demonstrative of the embodied nature of 
the mind (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). In this article we review current theories 
and research targeted at the intra-cognitive role of gestures. We ask the question 
how can gestures support internal cognitive processes of the gesturer? We sug-
gest that extant theories are in a sense disembodied, because they focus solely on 
embodiment in terms of the sensorimotor neural precursors of gestures. As a 
result, current theories on the intra-cognitive role of gestures are lacking in ex-
planatory scope to address how gestures-as-bodily-acts fulfill a cognitive function. 
On the basis of recent theoretical appeals that focus on the possibly embed-
ded/extended cognitive role of gestures (Clark, 2013), we suggest that gestures 
are external physical tools of the cognitive system that replace and support other-
wise solely internal cognitive processes. That is gestures provide the cognitive 
system with a stable external physical and visual presence that can provide a plat-
form to think on. We show that there is a considerable amount of overlap be-
tween the way the human cognitive system has been found to use its environ-
ment, and how gestures are used during cognitive processes. Lastly, we provide 
several suggestions of how to investigate the embedded/extended perspective of 
the cognitive function of gestures. 
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Introduction 
 
Gestures reflect internal cognitive processes. This is arguably the most 
fundamental, uncontroversial, and straightforward assumption in the current lit-
erature concerning gesticulation. Gestures provide a ―window on the mind‖ 
(Goldin-Meadow, 2003), which provides a peek into the ―embodied nature of the 
mind‖ (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). In less metaphorical terms, it is argued that 
gestures are direct outcomes of multimodal, sensorimotor or embodied repre-
sentations that constitute thought processes and speech production. Although 
not all theoretical perspectives on the function and underpinnings of gestures 
suggest a purely sensorimotor based approach to mental representations (see 
Kita, 2000; Krauss, 1998 for alternative views), it is commonly held that activation 
of the motor-system supports speech production and thought, at least when the 
conceptual content is visuospatial in nature (Alibali, 2005). Several perspectives 
on gesticulation (e.g., Kita, 2000; McNeill, 1992; Wesp, Hesse, Keutmann, & 
Wheaton, 2001) have abandoned the view that gestures are merely communica-
tive tools that are elicited after central cognitive processes (e.g., lexical retrieval, 
conceptualization) have taken place (Graham & Argyle, 1975; Kendon, 1994). In-
stead, in these perspectives the motor-system has been upgraded from a mere 
output system to a constitutive system for (some of the) central processes un-
derlying thought and speech production. This resonates well with a wider move-
ment in embodied cognitive science (Shapiro, 2010; Wilson, 2002) in which men-
tal representations are thought to be multimodal (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Svens-
son, 2007) and coupled to the body‘s current state (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). 
In this article we focus on the possible intra-cognitive function of ges-
tures, as opposed to their inter-cognitive or communicative function, which we 
will touch upon only briefly. That is, gestures seem to support internal cognitive 
processes of the gesturer (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 
2001; Marstaller & Burianová, 2013; Morsella & Krauss, 2004; Rauscher, Krauss, 
& Chen, 1996). We argue that the current theoretical ―embodied‖ movement in 
gesture research has fueled the upsurge of inquiry into the beneficial role of ges-
tures in cognitive processes such as speech and visuospatial cognition, but that 
this line of thought is underspecified with regard to explaining how gestures as 
bodily movements aid cognitive processing. In a sense, current perspectives on ges-
tures are still disembodied and too internalistic because they seem to implicitly re-
duce gestures to cognitively trivial bodily outputs of (sensorimotor) neural precur-
sors. 
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We seek to provide a more embodied account of gesticulation on the 
basis of recent philosophical and theoretical appeals within embodied cognitive 
science (e.g., Wilson, 2002) that focus on the possibly embedded/extended role 
of gestures (Clark, 2008, 2013; Kirsh, 1995; Wheeler, 2013), and a review of re-
lated empirical literature (e.g., Gray & Fu, 2004; Kirsh, 2009). This account is 
―more embodied‖ because embedded/extended perspectives traditionally seek to 
provide an anti-internalist perspective on cognition (e.g., Hutchins, 1995a), in 
which cognition is understood as being on-line, that is, being tightly coupled with, 
embedded in, if not extended over, the body and the environment (Shapiro, 
2010). This stands in stark contrast with more internalist notions of embodiment 
that are currently dominating the gesture literature and that focus on decoupled, 
or ―off-line‖ cognition and the sensorimotor nature of mental representations 
(Wilson, 2002). We suggest that the embedded/extended account of the cogni-
tive function of gestures could be successful in explaining how gestures fulfill a 
cognitive function if it makes clear how gestures as self-generated bodily acts gen-
erate and support rather than execute thought processes (Clark, 2013). There-
fore, we focus on the idea that gestures may at times serve as external tools of 
the cognitive system that replace and support otherwise solely internal cognitive 
processes. By reviewing research on the beneficial role of gesture production in 
(visuo-spatial) cognition (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2008; Delgado, Gómez, & Sarriá , 
2011) and connecting the resulting insights with research on embedded cognition 
(e.g., Gray & Fu, 2004; Hutchins, 1995a; Kirsh & Maglio, 1994) we aim to contrib-
ute to a more embedded/extended account of gestures.  
Before we will elaborate on the main goals of this paper, we need to 
point out what this article is not about. First, we do not suggest that current per-
spectives in the gesture literature are incorrect. In fact, our embedded/extended 
perspective is largely complementary to, and in some instances builds on, con-
temporary accounts of the function of gestures we review here. Second, although 
we argue in favor of a more embodied account of gestures and their cognitive 
function, this does not require us to make any additional, more radical, claims 
about the supposed sensorimotor nature of conceptual representations that are 
currently under discussion in the literature (e.g., Arbib, Gasser, & Barrès, 2014; 
Dove, 2010; Zwaan, in press). Third, we will not provide philosophical claims 
about whether gestures should be considered as an extended as opposed to an 
embedded cognitive phenomenon (e.g., Adams & Aizawa, 2001; Clark, 2008, 
2013; Wheeler, 2013). That is, we do not make explicit claims about whether 
gestures as extra-neural events are part of the cognitive process (Extended claim) 
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or whether gestures merely support internal cognitive processes but strictly 
speaking should not be considered as part of the cognitive process (Embedded 
Claim). Rather, we aim to provide an empirical view through the embed-
ded/extended perspective, on the basis of the shared anti-internalist goal of these 
perspectives, by focusing on extra-neural factors that support, shape, and replace 
internal cognitive processes. We suggest that our embedded/extended account of 
the cognitive function of gestures can fill an explanatory gap in the current litera-
ture concerning the possible intra-cognitive role of gestures and is supported by 
extant findings. 
This article is structured into four main sections. The next section re-
views findings that show that co-speech and -thought gestures have a (beneficial) 
cognitive function (primarily in visuospatial cognition). Section three provides an 
overview of some important theoretical perspectives on the role of gestures in 
cognition. We suggest that the current theoretical perspectives on the function 
and underpinnings of gestures leave an explanatory gap concerning how gestures 
as external bodily acts might be conducive to internal cognitive processes. Having 
exposed the explanatory gap, we introduce an embedded/extended account of 
gestures (Clark, 2008; 2013) and provide a new interpretation of the research 
reviewed in the previous section in light of recent research in the field of embed-
ded cognition (Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995; Gray & Fu, 2004; Kirsh, 2009; Kirsh 
& Maglio, 1994; Risko, Medimorec, Chisholm, & Kingstone, 2013). Finally, we 
summarize and discuss our main points.  
The Function of Gesture: Empirical Evidence 
The Inter-cognitive Role of Gestures 
Before we consider evidence for the beneficial or supportive role of ges-
tures for cognitive processes, it is important to acknowledge the evidence for the 
common assertion that gestures fulfill a communicative function. When speakers 
produce gestures, this seems to be intended to increase listeners‘ understanding 
of their message. Indeed, when speaker and listener are face-to-face, more ges-
tures with semantic content are produced than when there is no visual contact 
(Alibali, Heath, & Myers, 2001). Also, when speakers are aware of listeners‘ 
knowledge gaps, they tend to convey the information unknown to listeners in 
both speech and gesture, while they tend to only use verbal information when 
relevant knowledge is already shared between the interlocutors (Holler & Ste-
vens, 2007). These results suggest that speakers adjust their gestures for their 
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listeners‘ benefit. And indeed, listeners‘ comprehension has been shown to im-
prove by speakers‘ use of gestures from an early age on. For example, three to 
five year olds understand indirect requests (Kelly, 2001) and new abstract con-
cepts (Valenzeno, Alibali, & Klatzky, 2003) better when the request is accompa-
nied by deictic (i.e., pointing) gestures. In addition, preschoolers understand 
complex spoken messages better when these are accompanied by representa-
tional gestures (McNeil, Alibali, & Evans, 2000). Moreover, co-speech gestures do 
not only contribute to what is understood, but also to how something is under-
stood. When deictic gestures are used, listeners are more likely to correctly in-
terpret utterances compared to when the utterance was not combined with a 
gesture, suggesting that co-speech gestures play a role in pragmatic understand-
ing. For example, when hearing the utterance ―it‘s getting hot in here‖, people 
were sooner inclined to interpret this as an indirect request (i.e., could you 
please open the window) when the speaker pointed to the window, than when 
the speaker did not point, in which case the listener might interpret the utter-
ance as a mere statement (Kelly, Barr, Church, & Lynch, 1999). All in all, there is 
a great deal of evidence for the contention that gestures fulfill inter-cognitive (i.e., 
communicative) functions (Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 2012). 
The Intra-cognitive Role of Gestures 
There is mounting evidence that gestures fulfill intra-cognitive functions 
in addition to inter-cognitive ones. This is relevant to our present purposes. For 
example, co-speech gestures affect speakers‘ own cognitive processes. Several 
studies have suggested that lexical access is disrupted or promoted when gesticu-
lation is prohibited versus allowed to naturally emerge. When speakers are pro-
hibited from gesturing during speech with spatial content, they are less fluent 
than when gesticulation is allowed, suggesting that lexical access is disrupted 
(Morsella & Krauss, 2004; Rauscher et al., 1996; see however, Hoetjes, Krahmer, 
& Swerts, 2014). Moreover, speech is more fluent when co-speech gestures are 
produced and gesture rates are higher when lexical access is difficult (e.g., during 
the tip of the tongue phenomenon; Chawla & Krauss, 1994). Furthermore, when 
gesticulation is prohibited, the content of speech is less likely to be spatial in na-
ture, suggesting that gestures support speech that is spatial in content (Rimè, 
Schiaratura, Hupet, & Ghysselinckx, 1984). Not only can online speech be influ-
enced by co-speech gestures, these gestures can also have an influence off-line. 
For example, making gestures during the recollection of a previous event, can 
improve retrieval of details of that event compared to when gesticulation is not 
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allowed (Stevanoni & Salmon, 2005). In addition, gesticulation prior to recalling 
previously learned words aids recall performance (De Nooijer, Van Gog, Paas, & 
Zwaan, 2013). 
Gestures primarily arise during the processing of visuospatial information 
(e.g., Alibali et al., 2001; Allen, 2003; Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Seyfeddinipur & Kita, 
2001). For example, people are more likely to gesture when describing visual ob-
jects from memory as opposed to when the object is visually present (Morsella & 
Krauss, 2004; Wesp, et al., 2001; see also Ping & Goldin-Meadow, 2010), alt-
hough gesticulation also occurs in the presence of the to-be described object 
(Morsella & Krauss, 2004). Moreover, gestures occur more often when objects 
are difficult to describe in speech, such as complex, not easily describable draw-
ings (Morsella & Kraus, 2004). Indeed, the emergence of gesticulation appears to 
be related to the cognitive demands of the task (Cook, Yip, & Goldin-Meadow, 
2012; Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Marstaller & Burianová, 
2013; Ping & Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Smithson & Nicoladis, 2014; Wagner, Nus-
baum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004). For example, participants who were given the 
dual task of remembering letters while explaining a difficult math problem, re-
membered more letters when they were allowed to gesture while explaining the 
problem than when they were not allowed to gesture (Goldin-Meadow et al., 
2001). This suggests that gesticulation reduced the working memory load im-
posed by explaining the math problem, leaving more capacity available for per-
forming the secondary task of remembering letters. Gesticulation when describ-
ing a mental rotation problem emerges primarily when describing the task-
relevant rotation itself as opposed to describing the task-relevant static end-point 
of the rotation (Hostetter, Alibali, & Bartholomew, 2011). This finding suggests 
that it is the high spatial cognitive demand, which is arguably higher during dy-
namic spatio-temporal rotation as opposed to describing static spatial infor-
mation, that invokes the use of gestures (see also Smithson & Nicoladis, 2014). 
Furthermore, it has been found that encouraging participants to gesture during a 
mental rotation task enhances their performance (Chu and Kita, 2011). 
The findings described here primarily involved iconic gestures. However, 
even deictic (pointing) gestures occur more often when cognitive demand is 
higher. Infants and young children (between 1 and 2 years of age) sometimes 
point for non-communicative reasons (Bates, Camaioi, & Volterra, 1975; Delga-
do, Gómez, & Sarría, 2009). Furthermore, pointing gestures can aid the regula-
tion of the speaker‘s attention in non-communicative and challenging problem-
solving situations (Delgado et al., 2011). In two studies, children ranging in age 
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from 2 to 4 years old saw a toy being hidden in one of three containers on a ro-
tation table. This was followed by a delay of 45 to 60 seconds during which the 
children either had to remember where the toy was hidden by the experimenter 
(cognitive demand group) or had to wait for the experimenter to retrieve the toy 
for them. During the delay the experimenter left the room. Additionally, the diffi-
culty of the memory task was varied for half of the trials such that the table was 
turned for 540 degrees. Analysis of the video-taped sessions showed not only 
that solitary pointing gestures occurred, but also that they occurred significantly 
more often in the cognitive demand condition than in the waiting condition (alt-
hough no effects were found for task difficulty). A second experiment with chil-
dren ranging from 4 to 6 years old who performed a picture-matching task 
showed that constraining gestures resulted in poorer performance on the task 
than non-constraining gestures, but only for children who habitually pointed in 
the constrained condition, suggesting a cognitively beneficial role of solitary 
pointing gestures. This finding is surprising because deictic gestures have primarily 
been considered as serving communicative functions (Tomasello, Carpenter, & 
Liszkowski, 2007). Additional research on pointing gestures was conducted in the 
context of keeping track of counting. Children, adults, and even primates effec-
tively use the hands in counting objects by pointing and touching gestures as to 
mark counted objects, and synchronize with counting expressed in speech (Alibali 
& Dirusso, 1999; Boyson, Berntson, Shreyer, & Hannan, 1995; Kirsh, 1995). For 
example, participants who were allowed to use their hands for pointing during 
the counting of coins were faster and made fewer mistakes than those who were 
not allowed to use their hands (Kirsh, 1995). Thus, pointing gestures sometimes 
regulate visuo-spatial attentional processes, being especially helpful under high 
cognitive task demands.  
These results converge with a recent correlational study that examined 
whether individual differences in spatial working memory capacity, spatial trans-
formation ability, and conceptualization ability (amongst others) were associated 
with frequency of use of several types of gestures (Chu, Meyer, Foulkes, & Kita, 
2013). Lower scores on all of these variables predicted higher frequency of spon-
taneously produced representational and conduit10 gestures in a natural setting. 
Other evidence is consistent with this pattern. Particularly people with low 
working memory capacity are negatively impacted on a working memory task 
                                                          
10Defined as ―iconic depictions of abstract concepts of meaning and language‖ 
(McNeill, 1985, p.357). 
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when they are not allowed to gesture as opposed to people with high working 
memory capacity (Marstaller & Burianová, 2013). Thus, in addition to the findings 
that gestures emerge during spatial information processing, gestures are also 
more likely to be produced by, and more likely to affect cognitive processes of, 
people with low spatial working memory and information processing ability (see 
also Chu & Kita, 2011). 
Further evidence for gesturing as a compensatory mechanism comes 
from a study by Chu and Kita (2008).The type of spontaneous gestures that par-
ticipants used during a mental rotation task followed a trajectory from external 
to more internalized solution strategies. That is, participants first gestured con-
cretely as if manipulating the object to be rotated and subsequently changed their 
strategy and used their flat hand as stand-in for the object that needed to be ro-
tated. Moreover, frequency of gesture use in aiding a spatial rotation task dimin-
ished over time, suggesting that cognitive operations became gradually internal-
ized. A related phenomenon is that intermediate advanced abacus users use ges-
tures during mental calculation. In the absence of the abacus, trained participants 
apply finger gestures as if manipulating an abacus ready to hand; but as abacus 
users become more advanced, they exhibit a reduced reliance on gestures during 
mental calculation (Hatano, Miyake, & Binks, 1977; Hatano & Osawa, 1983). In 
line with the findings of Chu and Kita (2008) this shows that the use of gestures 
becomes more infrequent as familiarity with the task increases.Moreover, when 
describing the solution of a particular spatial problem, people‘s gesticulation aligns 
with the medium that the problem has been introduced in (Cook & Tanenhaus, 
2009). For example, participants who described solutions of the Tower of Hanoi 
with physical discs as opposed to a computer simulation tended to spontaneously 
produce gestures that aligned with the physical actions performed with physical 
discs. 
Thus, if we consider (a) that working memory capacity is limited, and (b) 
that new tasks often impose a higher working memory demand that diminishes as 
the learner becomes more experienced with a task (e.g., Chase & Ericsson, 1982; 
Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003) then the findings we just reviewed 
suggest that gestures are likely to emerge in novel situations so as to provide the 
cognizer with some kind of external support. We will discuss the nature of this 
external support in our embedded/extended account of the cognitive function of 
gestures. 
Finally, gestures can aid in acquiring a solution during problem solving 
(Alibali, Spencer, & Kita, 2004; Boncoddo, Dixon, & Kelly, 2010; Stephen, Dixon, 
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& Isenhower, 2009). For example, participants were presented with two glasses 
with differing widths and equal heights and were asked to imagine the glasses be-
ing filled with water to the same level. Participants judged whether the water 
would spill when glasses were rotated at equal angles (Schwartz & Black, 1999). 
Participants were able to predict the answer correctly much more often when 
rotating the empty glasses with their eyes closed, compared to when they were 
only allowed to think about the solution (i.e., mentally rotate). Although the pre-
vious study was in a sense a form of direct action (by allowing the objects to be 
manipulated), there is evidence that suggests that gestures, as non-direct manipu-
lations, equally support the use of particular problem-solving strategies. For ex-
ample, a study in which participants were presented with an interlocking gear 
problem (Alibali et al., 2004) found that they judged the direction of movement 
of a gear through different strategies, depending on whether or not gesticulation 
was allowed. When they were allowed to gesture, participants were more likely 
to simulate the rotations of each gear by finger gestures in order to provide the 
solution of the end-gear‘s rotational direction (depictive strategy), whereas par-
ticipants who were prohibited from gesticulation were more likely to achieve the 
solution through the parity rule (direction gear x has the same direction as gear 
x+2). Note that the participants who used the depictive strategy were not better 
at the task than those using the parity rule (Alibali et al., 2004; also see Hegarty, 
Mayer, Kriz, & Keehner, 2005). Indeed, the parity rule strategy is generally con-
sidered to be the most effective strategy (Boncoddo et al., 2010). It is interesting 
in this regard to note that preschoolers are more likely to achieve understanding 
of the parity rule through gesticulation (Boncoddo et al., 2010). That is, pre-
schoolers who used more gestures supporting a depictive strategy, more effi-
ciently acquired a strategy based on the parity principle, in comparison to pre-
schoolers who gestured less. Thus in this particular instance, the repeated use of 
gestures by participants is more likely to lead to discovery of new strategies dur-
ing problem-solving although the use of gestures does not necessarily invite 
learners to adopt the most efficient strategy (see also Stephen et al., 2009).  
The research reviewed here provides evidence that gestures have an in-
tra-cognitive cognitive function for the gesturer. Furthermore, it produces two 
intriguing and related questions that we think need to be answered in a theoreti-
cal account of the cognitive function of gesticulation. First, why do gestures occur 
more often when cognitive demand is high? Second, why are spatial cognitive abil-
ity and working-memory capacity negatively related to the use of gestures?  
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Current Theory About the Origin and Function of Gesture 
In this section we will discuss several prominent accounts that aim to 
elucidate the underlying mechanisms and function of gestures, most prominently 
the Gesture-as-Simulated-Action account (GSA; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) and 
subsequently the Lexical Gesture Process Model (LGP; Krauss, Chen, & 
Gottesmann, 2000), the Information Packaging Hypothesis (IPH; Kita, 2000), and 
the Image Maintenance Theory (IMT; Wesp, Hesse, Keutmann, & Wheaton, 
2001). We evaluate these models directly after summarizing their main points, by 
assessing their explanatory power regarding the question: How do gestures-as-
bodily-acts support cognitive processes? 
We have chosen to address this collection of accounts for several rea-
sons. The GSA account is a prominent contemporary account that attempts to 
integrate the literature of embodied cognition and the literature on gesture into a 
single perspective. Yet, as mentioned in the introduction, it seems that this at-
tempt has resulted in a ―disembodied‖ perspective on gesticulation. The other 
accounts have been very influential in elucidating the cognitive function of ges-
tures. Moreover, they differ significantly from the GSA account but also from 
each other. The result is a representative (but not exhaustive) overview of theo-
ries about the possible cognitive function of gestures.  
Gesture-as-simulated-action (GSA) Account 
The GSA account (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) relies heavily on the insights 
from embodied cognition that representations are based on the sensorimotor 
system (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). This embodied view is 
supported by mounting evidence that perceptuo-motor faculties of the brain are 
activated during concrete but also supposedly symbolic and abstract conceptual 
processes (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Pulvermüller, Moseley, Egorova, Shebani, & Bou-
lenger, 2014). For example, merely reading words that have olfactory, gustatory, 
or motor connotations (e.g., garlic, jasmine, salt, sour, kick, pick) as opposed to 
reading neutral words, activates brain regions that are involved in smelling, tast-
ing, and moving (Barrós-Loscertales et al., 2011; Gonzales et al., 2006; Hauk, 
Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004). 
The GSA approach predicts that cognitive processes, such as conceptual 
processing, co-occur with sensorimotor reactivations. More importantly it is con-
tended that meaningful cognitive processing is dependent on these reactivations 
or simulations of sensorimotor states (Barsalou, 2008; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). 
107 
 
 
Indeed, conceptual processing is hampered when participants are primed with 
inconsistent perceptual or motor information (e.g., Glenberg, Havas, Becker, & 
Rinck, 2005; Kaschak, Zwaan, Aveyard, & Yaxley, 2006). For example, partici-
pants are quicker in verifying the sensibility of sentences (such as ―Andy delivered 
the pizza to you vs. You delivered the pizza to Andy‖) when their response ac-
tions were consistent with the implied motion of the sentences (moving the hand 
forward or backward), whereas they were slower when the movement contrast-
ed with the implied motion (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). As such, it is suggested 
that induced sensorimotor states impinge on conceptual representational states 
since both systems are tightly coupled (Barsalou, 2008). 
Hostetter and Alibali (2008) have suggested that the phenomenon of co-
speech and co-thought gestures fits nicely with the idea that cognitive processing 
depends on activations in the sensorimotor system. In fact, according to the GSA 
account gestures are the bodily realizations (or as they call it, ―visible embodi-
ments‖) of otherwise covert sensorimotor activations. The main question that 
the GSA account aims to address, therefore, is how sensorimotor activations 
come to be reflected in gestures. Hostetter and Alibali (2008, p. 503) first pro-
vide a simple answer: ―Simulation involves premotor action states; this activation 
has the potential to spread to motor areas and to be realized as overt action. 
When this spreading activation occurs, a gesture is born‖. More specifically, the 
GSA account suggests that gestures emerge through sensorimotor re-activations 
underlying thought and speech processing that ‗leak into‘ the motor-executive 
system: 
―As an analogy, we might imagine activation spreading from premotor 
areas to motor areas through a gate. Once the gate is opened to allow 
more activation for one task (speaking), it may be difficult to inhibit other 
premotor activation (that which supports gestures) from also spreading 
through the gate to motor areas, the activation for the simulations ‗rides 
along‘ and may be manifested as a gesture‖ (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, p. 
505).  
Hostetter and Alibali (2008) further propose three underlying factors 
that determine when gestures are likely to occur. First, the strength of the par-
ticular perceptuo-motor activation must surpass a certain gesture threshold for 
actual physical embodiment (i.e., gesticulation) to arise. This activation strength is 
dependent on the degree to which speakers evoke visuospatial imagery during 
conceptual processing. For instance, they argue that the same conceptual content 
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can be processed verbal-propositionally or with visuo-spatial imagery (e.g., in the 
case of route-descriptions), the latter type of encoding being more likely to 
evoke gesticulation (e.g., Alibali et al., 2001; Allen, 2003; Kita & Özyürek, 2003; 
Seyfeddinipur, & Kita, 2001). Second, visuo-motor simulations are likely to evoke 
gesticulation when the conceptual content that is being processed involves an 
action. For example, talking about action is likely to evoke gestures because it is 
dependent on motor-information (Alibali & Hostetter, 2008). Third, it is specu-
lated that the height of speakers‘ gesture-threshold can vary across individuals 
and situations. To illustrate, a higher degree of neural interconnectivity between 
pre-motor and motor areas may lower the gesture threshold of a particular indi-
vidual. Furthermore, inhibiting gesticulation requires cognitive effort and as such 
the threshold might be lowered when cognitive load is high (e.g., Goldin-Meadow 
et al., 2001).  
Explanatory power of the GSA account 
So how does the GSA account answer our question of how gestures-as-
bodily-acts support cognitive processes? First, it is held that speech production 
and thought processes are dependent on the conceptual system recruiting sen-
sorimotor representations. Furthermore, according to Hostetter and Alibali 
(2008), gestures arise from and are dependent on the strength of sensorimotor 
activations. However, the model does not allow the conclusion that gestures-as-
bodily-acts aid cognition, because gestures only execute sensorimotor infor-
mation, they do not produce it. The sensorimotor information that is produced 
(e.g., proprioceptive and visual consequences of movement) does not fulfill a cog-
nitive function in the GSA account. This is indicated by the motor-leakage meta-
phor, as gestures simply ―ride along‖ with sensorimotor activations (Hostetter & 
Alibali, 2008, p. 505) and can be understood as a mere ―outgrowth‖ (Risko et al., 
2013) or ―visible embodiments‖ (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) of internal embodied 
simulations. Thus, the GSA account leaves us with the question why do cognitive 
processes sometimes recruit the body (gestures), as opposed to relying on purely 
internal mechanisms? Furthermore, what is the explanatory power of the GSA 
account in terms of the empirical literature on the cognitive function of gestures 
provided above? Most notably, why is high cognitive demand result in more use 
of gestures. This is explained by the GSA account in ―that inhibiting activation 
from spreading to a gesture requires more cognitive resources than does pro-
ducing the gesture‖ (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, p. 505). From this point of view, 
gesticulation is the default and is simply hard-wired with cognitive processes. By 
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accepting this, we would simply deflate the idea of there being any function of 
gestures as bodily acts, endow the cognitive system with functionally unnecessary 
expenditure of energy (hand-movements), and allow only a negative cognitive 
effect of not gesturing. Although this idea of costly active inhibition may very well 
be a correct explanation for some instances of gesticulation, we think its possible 
scope for explaining the function of gesture is somewhat reduced by the realiza-
tion that possessing a superfluous and energy-demanding gesture system does 
not seem very adaptive or flexible. Moreover, we think that a non-deflationary 
account of the function of gesture is possible and in fact more promising for un-
derstanding the empirical findings on the cognitive function of gestures reviewed 
in this paper.  
Lexical Gesture Process Model  
The lexical gesture process model proposed by Krauss, Chen and 
Gottesman (2000) tries to explain why speech might be facilitated by gesticula-
tion. According to this theory, gestures do not only fulfill a communicative role, 
but may serve to facilitate lexical retrieval on the part of the gesturer as well. 
Gestures that share features with the lexical semantic content of the word will 
facilitate lexical access. Krauss and colleagues (2000) hypothesize that this is the 
case because gesturing results in ―cross-modal priming‖ in which features of the 
concept represented by the gesture can facilitate lexical retrieval. According to 
this Lexical Gesture Process (LGP) account, gesture production draws upon the 
activated representations in working memory that are expressed in speech. The 
assumption is that the content of conceptual memory is encoded in multiple 
ways, and that activation of one representational format can spread to activation 
in another representational format. In this account gestures derive from non-
propositional representational formats (mostly visuo-spatial), as opposed to 
speech, which draws on propositional symbolic formats. LGP further suggests 
that non-propositional information becomes expressed in speech through a spa-
tial/dynamic feature selector that transforms spatially and dynamically formatted 
information into a set of ―abstract properties of movement‖. The abstract speci-
fications are then translated into a motor program by a motor planner. Motor 
systems output the set of instructions from the motor planner and the gestural 
movement is monitored kinesthetically. The motoric features that are picked up 
by the kinesthetic monitor promote retrieval of the concept for speech through 
cross-modal priming. Krauss and Hadar (1999, pp. 21) specify: 
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―the spatio-dynamic information the gesture encodes is fed via the kine-
sic monitor to the formulator, where it facilitates lexical retrieval. Facili-
tation is achieved through cross-modal priming, in which gesturally repre-
sented features of the concept in memory participate in lexical retrieval. 
Of course, it is possible to locate the site of gestural input more precisely 
(e.g., the grammatical encoder or the phonological encoder)‖.  
Explanatory power Lexical Gesture Process Model 
Does LGP allow for a cognitive role of gestures-as-bodily-acts? That is, 
does it answer the question why gestures are produced, and how they are cogni-
tively relevant? An affirmative response is appropriate, although the mechanism 
seems underspecified and unparsimonious. Indeed, when a gesture is outputted 
by the motor-system, the ―kinesthetic‖ feedback that is produced acts as input to 
the formulator (i.e., the grammatical or phonological encoder or both) and can 
then facilitate lexical selection by way of additional cues or ―cross-modal prim-
ing‖. Thus, in this model, motor-information is externalized and is fed back into 
the system to promote lexical retrieval through supporting the processes of the 
―grammatical encoder‖ and the ―phonological encoder‖. Yet the question re-
mains why this motor-information needs to loop out of the brain and then be 
retrieved again by the kinesthetic monitor. According to LGP, gesture will only 
facilitate lexical access when the gesture features match the lexical semantic con-
tent of the concept. Therefore, gestures will only facilitate lexical access when 
the kinesthetic information that was already present in a verbal form is fed back 
into the formulator. Thus it seems that the brain is ―primed‖ with information 
that is already present in the internal system, given that gestures are outputs of 
an already constructed motor program. Thus, it is unclear with what kind of in-
formation the cognitive system is primed. Of course, gestures might indeed fulfill 
this function, but the model currently presented is not very illuminating why and 
how gestures-as-bodily-acts fulfill a cognitive function. So, although LGP also sug-
gests an intra-cognitive role for gestures, it is still difficult to appreciate the added 
value of the kinesthetic information that is fed back into the system with regard 
to cognitive processing.  
Information Packaging Hypothesis 
A third prominent theory in the gesture literature is the Information 
Packaging Hypothesis (IPH; Kita, 2000). This theory proposes that gestures aid 
speech production by breaking images into smaller bits to enhance the verbalize-
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ability of communicative content. A key idea is that there are two modes of think-
ing that tend to converge during the linguistic act. There is analytical thinking as 
opposed to spatio-motoric thinking from which gestures follow, which involves 
the organization of information through hierarchical structuring and involves de-
contextualized conceptual templates. According to Kita, these templates can be 
non-linguistic (in the case of scripts), or linguistic, such as in the case of a lexical 
item‘s semantic and pragmatic specifications. The templates are not multimodal as 
in the case of the GSA account, thus they do not involve ―activation of ‗peripher-
al‘ modules‖ (Kita, 2000, p. 164), yet can be translated into the other mode of 
thinking, which is spatio-motoric thinking. The spatio-motoric mode of thinking 
constitutes gestures and involves information organized in action schemas. Ges-
tures should be considered as actions in a virtual environment, and are derived 
from practical actions. 
A core idea behind IHP is that the two modes of thinking collaboratively 
organize information during speaking. Kita (2000, pp. 163) suggests that (a) ―The 
production of the representational gesture helps speakers organize rich spatio-
temporal information‖, (b) ―Spatio-motoric thinking, which underlies representa-
tional gestures helps speaking by providing an alternative informational organiza-
tion that is not readily accessible to analytic thinking‖ and (c) ―Spatio-motoric 
thinking and analytic thinking have ready access to different sets of informational 
organizations. However, in the course of speech production, the representations 
in the two modes of thinking are coordinated and tend to converge.‖ 
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Explanatory power Information Packaging Hypothesis 
Does IPH have explanatory power of how gestures-as-bodily-acts sup-
port cognitive processes? The IPH does provide a clear account of how gestures 
aid the ―packaging of information‖ given that gestures are considered as the result 
of spatio-motoric thinking that is already internally realized. That is, just like the 
GSA, the IPH seems to regard gestures as mere output of spatio-motoric think-
ing, with the latter having the actual cognitive function (information packaging). 
Even if we allow for a possible different reading of the information packaging hy-
pothesis, in which gesticulation actually supports spatio-motoric thinking, the IPH 
account does not go into any detail about how gestures-as-bodily-acts feedback 
to or support internal cognitive processes to perform the function of spatio-
motoric information packaging.  
Image Maintenance Theory 
The final theory under review here is the Image Maintenance Theory 
(IMT) by Wesp and colleagues (2001). Although this theory is only briefly pre-
sented in an empirical paper it has become an influential view on the cognitive 
role of gestures (Alibali, 2005). Arguably, the main thesis of the image mainte-
nance theory, which is often contrasted with the LGP, is ―that gestures are not 
directly involved in the search for words; rather, they keep the non-lexical con-
cept in memory during the lexical search, a process of data maintenance not un-
like that needed in other problem-solving activities‖ (Wesp et al., 2001, p. 592). 
This is further explained; ―a prelinguisitic representation of spatial information is 
established through spatial imagery and maintenance of these spatial images is 
facilitated by gestures‖ (Wesp et al., 2001, p. 595). Wesp and colleagues (2001) 
base this idea on the idea that spatial information is held in the visuospatial 
scratchpad of working memory (Baddeley, 1986). The items (visuospatial infor-
mation) in the scratchpad decay rapidly and must be rehearsed to be maintained 
in working memory. Just like articulatory loops, gestures serve the function of 
―refreshing‖ the visual scratchpad to sustain activation of the image in working 
memory. Importantly, gestures are therefore not necessary for lexical retrieval 
but may indirectly facilitate it through, ―motoric refreshing‖ of the image (p. 597).  
Explanatory power Image Maintenance Theory 
Does the IMT have explanatory power of how gestures-as-bodily-acts, 
support cognitive processes? The answer is yes, although much is still needed to 
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understand its function. ―Yes‖ because the IMT suggests that the production of a 
physical gesture supports the maintenance of an internal spatial image (a cognitive 
process); without the physical gesture the internal spatial image becomes unsta-
ble and its activation is likely to decay. Yet, Wesp et al.‘s (2001) account does not 
provide sufficient detail beyond this notion. How do gestures refresh motoric 
spatial images? What is the mechanism by which gestures-as-bodily-acts refresh 
motor spatial images? Furthermore, aren‘t gestures redundant given that they 
provide the gesturer with information that is already present in the system that 
outputs the gestures (e.g., visual information)? Although these questions remain 
unanswered, of all the accounts presented here, the IMT is most compatible with 
an embedded/extended account that assumes gestures are cognitively relevant 
because they are bodily.  
Summary of Findings From the Theoretical Overview 
In the previous subsections we have discussed four models that have 
been put forth to explain the underlying mechanisms of gestures. We sought an 
answer to our question: How do gestures-as-bodily-acts support cognitive pro-
cesses? Our review of the literature suggests that the cognitive function of ges-
tures-as-bodily-acts cannot be adequately explained, or remains underspecified, in 
several different theories about the underpinnings and functions of gestures. In 
the GSA account gestures are seen as by-products of sensorimotor activation but 
cease to be supporting cognition the moment they are outputted by the motor-
system. The IPH suggests that gestures help package the spatio-motoric thinking 
during speech, yet this account also assumes that gestures are the result of these 
processes as they are the realizations of spatio-motoric internal processes; they 
are pre-packaged the moment they are externalized as gestures and do no pack-
aging of their own. In the LGP account, the gestures that are produced are fed 
back into the cognitive system to provide it with cross-modal primes. As such, 
gestures, as physical acts, attain a function. Yet, the LGP account is unclear about 
what exactly is primed, or what novel information gestures provide to the sys-
tem, that was not already activated or present. Interestingly, the IMT does seem 
to ascribe a definite cognitive function to gestures by positing that they support 
the maintenance of mental images.  
It is important to stress that our review is aimed at answering a specific 
question that may be different from the questions that the theories we discussed 
were designed to address. We have only considered these theories‘ explanations 
(explanantia) of a particular aspect of gesticulation that we think needs to be ex-
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plained (explanandum), namely how gestures-as-bodily-actions have a cognitive 
function. This means that we do not suggest that the theories under discussion 
are wrong, nor do we suggest that they are incompatible with the upcoming per-
spective; rather the explanantia they offer are not (yet) suitable to cover the ex-
planandum that is the focus of the current paper. In the next section we aim to fill 
this explanatory gap through a more embedded/extended perspective on the 
cognitive function on gestures. 
Towards a more embedded/extended perspective to the cognitive 
function of gestures 
 In this section we attempt to answer the main question of how gestures 
can fulfill cognitive functions. In the following subsection we will briefly introduce 
the embedded/extended cognition perspective (inspired by Clark, 2013), which is 
followed by a representative overview of research in this domain. Subsequently 
we apply the relevant theoretical and empirical findings to the cognitive function 
of gestures, which yields challenges and hypotheses for future research.  
An embedded/extended perspective: Theory and research 
 Embedded/extended cognition is considered part of the broader devel-
opment of embodied cognitive science (Shapiro, 2010; Wilson, 2002) and has its 
roots (amongst others; Gallagher, 2009) in situated cognition (Bredo, 1994), ro-
botics (Brooks, 1991) and the dynamical systems approach to cognition (Chem-
ero, 2009). According to a loose description of ―the‖ embedded/extended per-
spective on cognition (cf. Wilson, 2002), the main thesis is that the cognitive sys-
tem is a coupled brain-body-world system (Clark, 2008; Wheeler, 2007). As such, 
cognition involves an ongoing transaction between current states of the brain, 
body, and the environment (Clark, 2008). Within this view, the classic internalist 
picture of cognition is disputed; thinking is something we do, rather than some-
thing that simply happens within us. Understanding cognition, therefore, requires 
a broader level of analysis that allows the study of how we use our body and the 
world during the unfolding of cognitive processes. For example, Hutchins (1995b) 
analyzed the goings-on of commercial airlines and suggested that a purely inter-
nalist perspective was ill-suited to understand its workings; flying a plane involves 
task-relevant information that is neither fully instantiated in the cockpit, the pilot, 
or co-pilots, it is rather distributed among them and all parts work together (see 
also Hutchins, 1990a). Everyday examples of embedded/extended cognitive phe-
nomena would be, for instance, asking another person to remind you of some-
115 
 
 
thing, using a tall building for navigating your way home, or reducing working 
memory load by taking notes during a conversation. Or in the case of drawing: 
―One draws, responds to what one has drawn, draws more, and so on. The goals 
for the drawing change as the drawing evolves and different effects become pos-
sible, making the whole development a mutual affair rather than a matter of one-
way determinism‖ (Bredo, 1994, pp. 28). 
In philosophy there is a debate on whether states of the body and the 
environment can be considered extra-neural contributors to cognition (Wilson, 
2002), or in a more radical reading, external vehicles of cognition (Clark, 2008; 
Clark & Chalmers, 1998). According to the radical extended perspective, the in-
ternalist view is provoked by the classic thesis that ―If, as we confront some task, 
a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we 
would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that 
part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process‖ (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998, p.8). The less radical thesis, the notion of embeddedness, also 
stresses a tight coupling between the agent and the world and suggests that the 
body and environment can, often in unexpected ways, causally impact cognition, 
yet suggest that the body and the environment are not part of cognition (Adams 
& Aizawa, 2001; Rupert, 2009). Thus the difference between embedded and ex-
tended cognition is whether extra-neural conditions causally impact cognition 
(embedded thesis) or are constitutive of it (extended thesis). As mentioned in 
the introduction, we will side-step this technical debate; for our present purposes 
it suffices to say that we follow the joint anti-internalist approach of embedded 
and extended cognition, which suggests that the cognitive system works in con-
cert with the body and the environment. 
The embedded/extended perspective has given rise to a large amount of 
empirical research on the way the cognitive system uses the body and the envi-
ronment (e.g., Ballard, et al., 1995; Fu, 2011; Haselen, Steen, & Frens, 2000; Kirsh 
& Maglio, 1994; Martin & Schwartz, 2005; Risko, et al., 2013; see also Pouw, Van 
Gog, & Paas, 2014). A seminal study by Kirsh and Maglio (1994; see also Stull, 
Hegarty, Dixon, & Stieff, 2012) found that expert Tetris players make more use 
of epistemic actions; actions that uncover (hidden) information that is cognitively 
demanding to compute. These types of actions are different from actions that 
bring one closer to one‘s goal (pragmatic actions). For example, advanced play-
ers, instead of rotating ‗zoids‘ (i.e., falling block arrangements in Tetris) through 
mental simulation to judge whether it will fit the zoids in the bottom deck, they 
preferred rotating them physically as this allowed a direct matching of orientation 
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and fit. The cognitive operation of rotation to determine a possible fit was thus 
off-loaded onto the environment. 
Another classic study (Ballard et al., 1995; see also Haselen et al., 2000; 
Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997) showed that the cognitive system opts for retrieving 
information just-in-time, thereby minimizing constrains on working-memory. Par-
ticipants were asked to recreate a configuration of colored blocks from a model 
by picking up colored blocks from a resource space and putting them in a work-
space. The model, resource-, and work-space were all displayed in front of the 
participants. Eye-movement data were collected during this task. Participants 
made many switches of eye fixations between the model, work and -resource 
space. This indicated that participants adopt a ‗minimal memory strategy‘ in which 
information is gathered incrementally as opposed to memorized in one fell 
swoop. Instead of memorizing the position and color all at once, participants first 
memorized the color to be searched from the model, then after finding a color 
match in the resource space, looked up the position of the block of the model. 
Thus, information is gathered just in time to minimize working memory con-
straints (see also Cary & Carlson, 1999, who obtained similar results in an in-
come calculation task).  
Yet, findings indicate that the cognitive system does not seem to have an 
a-priori preference for using the environment rather than internal cognitive re-
sources in solving a cognitive problem; which strategy is adopted depends on the 
context. For example, when Ballard and colleagues (1995) increased the distance 
between the workplace and the model, participants were more likely to adopt a 
memory-intensive strategy. This finding resonates with the study by Gray and Fu 
(2004; see also Fu, 2011) in which participants were confronted with the task of 
programming a simulated VCR. In this task, retrieval costs of attaining task-
relevant information were subtly manipulated. That is, the ease of retrieval was 
manipulated in such a way that participants could either acquire the information 
through a simple glimpse or through performing an additional mouse-click to 
make the information available. The cognitive strategy that the subjects chose 
changed as a function of the ease of retrievability. When external information 
was directly accessible, participants primarily relied on retrieving information ex-
ternally. Attaining this ―perfect-knowledge-in-the-world‖ was shown to be a reli-
able strategy, as it reduces the number of mistakes made during the task. Moreo-
ver, when the information was only indirectly available, participants were more 
likely to rely on internal memory, which produced a larger number of mistakes. 
The reason why participants in this condition relied on ―imperfect-knowledge-in-
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the-head‖ was that the internally stored information was more quickly available 
compared to externally available information, as was predicted by a computation-
al model that expressed the amount of time it takes to retrieve or recall infor-
mation. Thus people seem to opt for the quickest problem-solving strategy in 
which the cognitive system ―tends to recruit, on the spot, whatever mix of prob-
lem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result with a minimum of effort‖ 
(Clark, 2008, pp. 13). 
Situational constraints bring about a trade-off decision whether the cogni-
tive system relies on computation performed ―on-line‖ (with the environment) 
or ―off-line‖ (internally) (Wilson, 2002). Relevant in this regard is a recent set of 
experiments conducted by Risko and colleagues (2013) in which participants 
were presented with a varying number of letters that were either presented up-
right or tilted at 45 or 90 degrees. Participants spontaneously rotated their head, 
which indeed seemed to promote readability of tilted presentation of letters. 
Furthermore, participants were more likely to rotate their head when more let-
ters were presented and tilt of the letters was more extreme, indicating that 
head-tilting (which they call external normalization) occurs when the cognitive 
demand of not tilting the head by means of ―internal normalization‖ increases 
(more cognitive effort to read more letters in tilted position, and more extreme 
tilt of the letters). Thus, when internal computational demand increases, an ex-
ternally mediated cognitive strategy becomes more attractive. This was also 
found in a study by Kirsh (2009), in which participants played a mental tic-tac-toe 
game with the experimenter. During the mental tic-tac-toe game participants 
have to keep their own ―moves‖ and those of the opponent, in mind. In the criti-
cal conditions, participants were given a sheet of paper with a tic-tac-toe matrix 
depicted on it or a blank sheet. External support of a tic-tac-toe matrix aided 
participants‘ efficiency of playing the game in comparison to having no support or 
a white sheet. Apparently, participants are able to project the progression of the 
moves on the matrix through visual simulation. This is very similar to chess-
players who think through moves on a chess-board without manipulating the 
board (Kirsh, 2009). Interestingly however, the external support was only benefi-
cial when the tic-tac-toe game was complex (4x4 matrix as opposed to a 3x3 
matrix), and especially for participants who scored low on spatial ability. Thus, 
this study suggests that projection on external support is especially helpful when 
cognitive demand is high, and relatedly, primarily for those who are low in spatial 
cognitive ability. 
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As a final example, the study conducted by Martin and Schwartz (2005) 
shows how active manipulation of the environment may foster learning through 
exploration of the solution space. In two studies, children (nine to ten years old) 
were learning how to solve fraction operator problems (e.g., one-fourth of eight 
candies), using physical tiles and pie-wedges that were movable and in another set 
of trials, using line drawings of pies or tiles which they could highlight and circle 
with a pen. The difficulty that children often experience in this task is that they 
focus on the numerator, leading them to understand ―one-fourth of eight can-
dies‖ to be ―one candy.‖ Martin and Schwartz predicted that physical interaction 
with manipulable objects would increase the chance that children come to inter-
pret that one-fourth of eight means four groups of two because rearranging the 
tiles results in new groupings. Thus they reasoned that the agent and the envi-
ronment mutually adapt each other (as in the case of drawing), where one acts 
without a preconceived goal on the environment which in turn feeds back infor-
mation that might align with the correct solution. Indeed, children performed 
better with manipulable objects than without them (Experiment 1 and 2). Inter-
estingly, presenting the children with the correct organization of tiles did not aid 
understanding; rather the physical open-ended interaction with the environment 
drove understanding and performance on the task (see also Manches, O‘Malley, & 
Benford, 2010). 
Let us summarize. First, the cognitive system makes use of the environ-
ment to distribute computational load but also to enable exploration of a prob-
lem-space that is difficult to enact off-line (i.e., to achieve through purely internal 
computations). Moreover, the cognitive system is not a-priori driven to reduce 
internal computational load by off-loading onto the environment, rather the envi-
ronment is exploited if it offers a cheaper resource than internal means of com-
putation to achieve an acceptable performance on a task (Gray & Fu, 2004). Alt-
hough not conclusive, it further seems that when cognitive demand is high, either 
due to external constraints (higher cognitive load of the task) or internal con-
straints (e.g., low visuospatial cognitive ability) the cognitive system is more likely 
to opt for and benefit from external computational strategies. However, these 
findings do not allow us to draw definitive conclusions about when and how the 
cognitive system trades external with internal computational resources. Thus one 
of the major challenges for research in embedded/extended cognition is to de-
termine which external (e.g., availability of external information) and internal 
(e.g., working memory ability) constraints affect whether and how problem-
solving strategies become externally or internally mediated (Risko et al., 2013). 
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Furthermore, is it possible to identify a trajectory of problem-solving strategies as 
expertise develops? Specifically, does the cognitive system first rely on external 
support—given that it is still ill-equipped to perform stand-alone internal compu-
tations—and are computations increasingly performed off-line when the cognitive 
system becomes more equipped (e.g., because of acquired strategy knowledge or 
chunking mechanisms) to hold task-relevant information internally? Even though 
such questions cannot yet be answered by the embedded/extended cognition 
frameworks, it is not difficult to see the relevance of this framework for gesture 
research; there is a clear analogy between these findings and the findings from 
some of the gesture studies reviewed in the section on ―the intra-cognitive role 
of gestures‖.  
An embedded/extended perspective on the cognitive function 
of gestures 
 Recently, Clark (2008, 2013; see also Wheeler, 2013) provided a purely 
extended perspective on gesticulation. Clark (2013) provides a detailed discus-
sion of why gestures should be seen as constitutive to—as opposed to merely 
causally impinging on—cognitive processes (cf. Wheeler, 2013). Here we only 
briefly address his account to further develop an embedded/extended perspective 
that is able to provide an explanation of the empirical data on the cognitive func-
tion of gestures as well as produce hypotheses and identify challenges for further 
research. 
According to Clark (2013) we should not understand the cognitive role of 
gestures purely in terms of its neural pre- and post-cursors: 
―The wrong image here is that of a central reasoning engine that merely 
uses gesture to clothe or materialize performed ideas. Instead, gesture 
and overt or covert speech emerge as interacting parts of a distributed 
cognitive engine, participating in cognitively potent self-stimulating loops 
whose activity is as much an aspect of our thinking as its result‖ (p. 263).  
Furthermore, he states that: 
―The physical act of gesturing is part and parcel of a coupled neural-
bodily unfolding that is itself usefully seen as an extended process of 
thought.‖ (p. 257) 
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Clark further argues that by producing a gesture, something concrete is 
brought into being (arm posture) that subsequently affects ongoing thinking and 
reasoning. Much like using a notepad, gestures provide a stable physical presence 
that embodies a particular aspect of a cognitive task. We can appreciate Clark‘s 
point if we consider that speech dissolves in midair and working memory allows 
only for a certain amount of thoughts to be consciously entertained. We can ar-
gue that gestures are not only a way to externalize speech and thought content, 
but also allow for temporal cognitive stability that might be more reliable than 
internal means of temporal cognitive extension (e.g., consciously attending to a 
thought to keep in mind). 
Thus the key to an embedded/extended perspective on gestures is the 
view that gestures fulfill a cognitive function because they are bodily. That is, in 
contrast to what the GSA and the IPH propose, gesticulation produces an exter-
nal physical presence that somehow supports internal cognitive processes. Ac-
cording to Clark‘s (2013) purely extended account, this physical presence instan-
tiated in gesture is actually part of thinking itself. Indeed, he thinks that a more 
moderate account of gestures‘ function in which they merely affect inner neural 
cognitive processes is misconstrued. His argument for an extended cognitive un-
derstanding of gestures relies on the appreciation that some crucial forms of neu-
ral activity arise in coordination with gestures, wherein gesture and neural activi-
ty are interdependent in achieving a particular cognitive state. Thus although, in 
some instances ―‘neural goings-on‘ may be sufficient for the presence of some 
cognitive state or the other‖ in other instances gestures, at times, should be giv-
en a genuine cognitive status (p. 261) because ―gesture and speech emerge as 
interacting parts of a cognitive system‖ (p. 263) whereby no meaningful categori-
zation can be made of what should be considered cognitive or non-cognitive on 
the basis of the distinction between inner (neural activity) and outer (gestures). 
How and when do these specific physical conditions fulfill a supporting 
role for a particular cognitive function? It is instructive to compare the research 
from the embedded/extended cognition tradition with research on the cognitive 
function of gesture. We need to reconsider the research by Kirsh and Maglio 
(1994), which showed that expert Tetris players operate on the environment to 
alleviate internal computational load (epistemic actions). Determining where a 
zoid fits is not dependent on internally computed rotations of the zoid, but is 
achieved by actual rotation of the zoid. In mental rotation tasks in which partici-
pants have to judge whether a 3-d zoid matches one out of several 3-d zoids de-
picted in different rotational angles (classic S-M cube task; Shepard & Metzler, 
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1971), participants use gestures to aid in their judgments (Chu & Kita, 2008; 
2011). We would submit, that gestures in this case are epistemic actions that re-
veal information that is hidden (since the 3-d zoids do not rotate by themselves) 
and difficult or more costly to compute internally. Chu and Kita (2008) also 
found that when participants first approach the mental rotation task they are 
more likely to use hand-movements as-if actively rotating the block. We would 
speculate that in this case gestures fulfill the function of providing a physical plat-
form that supports the internal representational stability (a term earlier used by 
Hutchins, 2005) of a rotating 3-d zoid (see also Pouw et al., in press). In this case 
the zoid is visually ‗projected‘ into the hands (Kirsh, 2009) and is manipulated as if 
it were actually in the hand. In this case the hands offer a reliable external sup-
port for performing the cognitive function of rotating the projected 3d-zoid 
through gestures. Furthermore, using pointing gestures to keep track of some-
thing in the environment similarly produces a reliable physical attentional marker 
that alleviates internal attentional tracking processes (e.g., Delgado et al., 2011; 
Kirsh, 1995). This might also be the case with abacus users doing mental calcula-
tions that perform gestures on, what seems to be, a mentally projected abacus 
(Hatano et al., 1977; Hatano & Osawa, 1983). In this case physical gesticulation 
seems to be preferred by these users as opposed to internally simulating changes 
on the abacus. We would argue that because gestures allow a stable external 
physical presence, they support internal representational stability of the dynami-
cally changing abacus during calculation. In line with Kirsh (2009), we argue that 
in these cases the cognitive system seems to be neither purely off-line nor on-
line; rather, it uses partly environmental resources (e.g., gestures) and internal 
cognitive resources (e.g., visual simulation) to perform a task. Gestures are es-
sentially a way to put on-line extra-neural resources into the mix of problem-
solving resources. 
Another possible embedded/extended function of gesture is exploration 
of a problem space. Schwartz and Martin (2005) found that manipulation of ob-
jects promoted the understanding of fraction-operating principles. Relevantly, 
gesturing might sometimes allow the gesturer to become aware of structural 
correlations that would be difficult to generate through internal computation. For 
instance, this seemed to be the case in the rotating-gear problem, in which the 
number gestures used that simulated each rotation of a gear predicted the dis-
covery of a more efficient problem-solving strategy that involved pick-up of the 
regularity that each gear N+2 rotates in the same direction (Delgado et al., 
2011). 
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With regard to when gestures emerge to fulfill an embedded/extended 
function, the research that we have discussed in the domain of embed-
ded/extended cognition has another interesting alignment with the gesture litera-
ture. We can summarize both streams of findings in one converging main princi-
ple:  
When the costs of internal computation are high, either induced by external 
constraints (higher cognitive demand of the task; more cost of retrieving infor-
mation from the environment) or internal constraints (e.g., lower working 
memory ability) the cognitive system is more likely to adopt, if cheaply availa-
ble, an externally supported problem-solving strategy; be it the environment or 
gestures (Cook et al., 2011; Goldin-Meadow, et al., 2001; Gray & Fu, 
2004; Kirsh, 2009; Marstaller & Burianová, 2013; Ping & Goldin-Meadow, 
2010; Risko et al., 2013; Smithson & Nicoladis, 2014; Wagner et al., 
2004).  
 
In other words, ―cognitive processes ﬂow to wherever it is cheaper to 
perform them‖ (Kirsh, 2010, p. 442). Understood in this manner, it is not surpris-
ing that people who are describing a physical object tend to gesture less when 
the object is present as opposed to absent (Morsella & Krauss, 2001), since the 
task-relevant information is cheaply available in the environment. Or that ges-
tures are more likely to be used to lighten the cognitive load when pressure is 
put on internal computational system (cognitive demand of the task) (e.g., Gold-
in-Meadow, 2001; Smithson & Nicoladis, 2014). 
This embedded/extended perspective on the cognitive function of ges-
tures, leads to several testable questions and further challenges for future re-
search. 
First, an interesting avenue for further research is to determine how 
changes in the external constraints—such as the cognitive demands of a task—
and in the ease of availability of external resources, changes the likelihood of ges-
turing. For example, one could devise a mental rotation task in which participants 
can rotate a 3d-zoid either through a mouse, by using gestures, or solely by in-
ternal strategies. According to the present perspective, if we manipulate the 
speed in which the 3d-zoid can be manipulated by a mouse, we would predict 
that participants are more likely to use gestures when the manipulation takes 
more time (as relative cost decreases). Another, more unorthodox manipulation 
would be to put varying weights on the wrists of participants, which may induce 
costs in terms of energy expense, leading participants to an earlier adoption of an 
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internal solution strategy. Many more constraints could be considered to assess 
the trade-off decision between internal and external resources that the cognitive 
system seems to make. 
Second, gesture use evolves (Chu & Kita, 2008). When the task is more 
familiar, hand-gestures evolve from ―as-if manipulations‖ to a stand-in-for relation 
of the 3d-zoid by means of a rotating flat hand, eventually eliminating the use of 
gestures altogether. In a similar vein, when abacus users become more advanced 
they tend to use less and less gestures during mental calculations. Indeed, it 
seems that gestures itself are costly to perform, and contrary to the GSA ac-
count, may under certain circumstances hinder performance (De Nooijer, Van 
Gog, Paas, Zwaan, in press), or learning (Post, Van Gog, Paas, & Zwaan, 2013) 
relative to other strategies. Interesting in this regard, is research that suggests 
that different types of body-movements have their own cognitive load (or come 
with particular cognitive costs) and may at times be traded for less costly bodily 
movements. That is dancers who rehearsed a dance-routine performed better 
when they rehearsed through ―marking‖ (minimal movements and use of gestures 
to stand in for full-out movements) as opposed to rehearsing the routine full out 
(Warburton, Wilson, Lynch, & Cuyckendall, 2013). Thus, it seems that under cer-
tain conditions, gestures, once cheap resources to think with, become relatively 
costly in comparison to, and are therefore traded in for, purely internal strate-
gies. This raises several questions. For example, do gestures help in the internali-
zation process? Thus, are embedded/extended solution strategies shaping the 
way internal computations are performed? 
Relatedly, when the cognitive system has a lower ability to produce in-
ternal object rotations (i.e., low spatial cognitive ability) it will rely more on ex-
ternal resources such as gestures (e.g., Chu, Meyer, Foulkes, & Kita, 2013; 
Marstaller & Burianová, 2013). An important research question that relates to 
this idea is whether people who score ―low‖ on spatial cognitive ability test are 
actually only scoring low on mental spatial cognitive ability, and may not under-
perform when gestures are allowed. Indeed, when gesture is prohibited people 
who are low in working memory perform only more poorly on a mental rotation 
task with no performance deficits in the gesture condition, suggesting that they 
can fully compensate with external problem-solving strategies (Marstaller & Buri-
anová, 2013). Furthermore, consider findings that prohibiting gesturing has a neg-
ative effect on performance. Seen in this light, this negative effect of not gesturing 
may not arise because it imposes cognitive load, and thereby imposes constraints 
on cognition (as proposed by the GSA account), but precisely because the prohi-
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bition to gesture withholds the cognitive system from the use of external re-
sources in the performance of a task. Thus, whereas the GSA account suggests 
that not-gesturing imposes a cognitive load since the agent has to prevent auto-
matic activations of gestures, we propose that the prohibition of gesturing takes 
external bodily resources away from the agent and drives the agent to rely exclu-
sively on internal computational processes. This is an important empirical ques-
tion that future research should address, as it is both related to how we should 
define and measure cognitive abilities, as well as to the particular cognitive func-
tion of gestures. 
A more fundamental question that currently remains unanswered in the 
embedded/extended perspective on gesturing is what type of information is being 
made available through gesturing. Is it the proprioceptive, kinesthetic, haptic 
and/or visual consequences of movement that allow gestures to support cognitive 
processes? Or both, as these systems are tightly coupled (e.g., Radman, 2013)? 
For example, it is well-known that the visually impaired people use gestures 
(Iverson, 1998). Do they still benefit from gestures through proprioception or 
other consequences of movement? Clark (2013) raised a similar question in rela-
tion to patients with a rare disease that leads to loss of proprioception; yet these 
patients are still able to gesture quite naturally (see Gallagher, 2005).Would ges-
tures still fulfill an embedded/extended cognitive function for such patients 
through visual feedback? This question is somewhat harder to address since the 
disease is, luckily, quite rare. An interesting avenue for research therefore would 
be to interfere with the information that gestures might provide as to identify 
factors that might underlie the embedded/extended cognitive function of ges-
tures. For example, obstructing visibility of one‘s own gestures, by putting a 
screen at the level of the shoulders (Gallagher, 2005). Thus the current challenge 
for the present account is to provide an account of what information gestures 
produce that might be supportive for cognitive processes. 
Conclusion 
 By means of our review of the empirical literature we have tried to as-
sess explanatory power of current theories with regard to the question of how 
gestures might fulfill cognitive functions. Although all the accounts we have ad-
dressed here claim that gestures indeed fulfill a cognitive function, we have shown 
that in these accounts, this claim often does not refer to gestures, but rather to 
their neural precursors. Importantly, there are accounts that suggest that ges-
tures fulfill the cognitive role of priming or activating internal action representa-
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tions (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, & Beilock, 2010; Kraus, 1988), yet we think the rea-
son why bodily movements fulfill this function is not clearly stated and seems to 
differ from the embedded/extended cognitive function we have identified here. 
We have tried to analyze the cognitive functions of gestures, by integrating the 
literature of embedded/extended cognition with the gesture literature. There is a 
considerable amount of overlap between the ways cognizers have been found to 
use their environment as well as how gestures support cognitive processes. Alt-
hough further research into the exact mechanisms of embedded/extended func-
tions of gestures is necessary, we put forth the notion that gestures provide the 
cognitive system with a stable external, physical, and visual presence that can 
provide a platform for thought. 
 Importantly, we should stress two related concerns that apply to the 
current proposal. First, it is evident that the embedded/extended view on ges-
tures, as presented here, does not address the full gamut of gesticulation. We 
have primarily focused on co-thought gestures in problem-solving contexts in-
stead of for example beat gestures, or gestures that primarily emerge in commu-
nicative contexts. Therefore, at this point we remain agnostic to whether all ges-
tures fulfill an embedded/extended cognitive function (for the gesturer). Indeed, 
extant ―alternative‖ theories that we have addressed here may very well be com-
plementary to our proposal. These theories are complementary to our proposal 
in that they might address cognitive functions and underpinnings of gestures that 
we have not addressed here. For example, it is possible that gestures emerge 
from action-related motor simulations that are activated during visuo-spatial cog-
nition (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) with the added proposal that the bodily exter-
nalizations of these motor simulations have a cognitive function themselves of the 
kind we have proposed here. Thus although we maintain that current theories in 
the gesture literature are not very suitable to address why gestures-as-bodily-acts 
might fulfill a cognitive function, our proposal does not deny any explanatory 
power of these theories regarding other aspects of the nature and cognitive func-
tion of gestures. 
Secondly, it is clear that gestures have a developmental trajectory and 
primarily emerge in intersubjective contexts (e.g., Iverson & Thelen, 1999; Liz-
kowski, Brown, Callaghan, Takada, & de Vos, 2012; McNeill, 1992; Tomasello, 
2008). As such, the current embedded/extended account of the cognitive func-
tion of gestures is still presented in an ―ontogenetic vacuum‖ and is still rather 
individualistic. Although this is a concern that needs to be addressed in future 
work, there is much room for exploring how the embedded/extended function of 
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gestures might be related to developmental and social dimensions. For example, 
Iverson and Thelen (1999) have provided a detailed account of how the hands, 
mouth and the brain should be regarded as one dynamical system; more specifi-
cally of how these components become entrained throughout development. Alt-
hough they focus primarily on the way language and gesture become constitutive-
ly interdependent, the kind of gestures that have been the focus of this paper 
(gestures in problem-solving contexts) can be scaffolded onto their developmen-
tal account as another way of how ―perception, action, and cognition can be mu-
tually and flexibly coupled‖ (Iverson & Thelen, 1999, p. 37). On the other hand, 
how does our account relate to the intersubjective context in which gestures 
most often emerge? It would fare well with appeals coming from embodied cogni-
tive science which suggest that an important way humans achieve interpersonal 
understanding is not from a spectatorial third-person stance, but rather from an 
interactive and second-person stance (e.g., Anderson, Richardson, Chemero, 
2012; De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher, 2010; Pouw 
& de Jong, submitted; Schilbach et al., 2013). In these approaches interpersonal 
understanding involves ―know-how that allows us to sustain interactions, form 
relations, understand each other, and act together‖ (De Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 
442), instead of two brains trying to predict each other‘s mental contents 
through observation alone. In such a portrayal of intersubjectivity, gestures are 
always already considered as having an embedded function for both the gesturer 
and the interlocutor since gestures are co-constitutive of the social coordination 
itself. To put it another way, in social interaction gestures are a non-neural com-
ponent that is part of an organism-organism-environment coordinative structure 
(Anderson et al., 2012). The challenge for further work is to show how non-
social embedded/extended gestures that we have focused on here might develop 
from these social contexts. 
In closing, our aim with this article to point out the necessity of under-
standing the role of the body in thinking. We tried to accomplish this by develop-
ing an embedded/extended perspective on the cognitive role of gestures. In this 
perspective, the body is not a trivial output-appendage of the cognitive system 
but an important component thereof. The body is a resource with particular 
qualities that is recruited in the coordination of cognitive processes. This per-
spective intended to promote research that tries to further address when, why, 
and how gestures are recruited during cognitive processes.  
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Chapter 6  
 
Problem solving is supported by co-thought gestures when 
task complexity is high and visual working memory  
capacity is low* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been submitted for publication as Pouw, W. T. J. L, Eielts, C., 
Van Gog, T., Zwaan, R. A., & Paas, F. (2016). Problem solving is supported by co-
thought gestures when task complexity is high and visual working memory capacity is 
low. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
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Problem Solving is Supported by Co-thought Gestures when 
Task Complexity is High and Visual Working Memory  
Capacity is Low 
 
Research into co-thought gestures, which arise during problem solving in silence, 
without communicative intent, holds great promise for furthering our under-
standing of the nature of gesture. We investigated whether co-thought pointing 
gestures during mental problem solving support subsequent performance in a 
Tower of Hanoi and a chess task. Congenial to the idea that gestures offer new 
or improved embodied cognitive resources that may support internal cognitive 
resources, we found that gesturing benefited problem-solving performance under 
conditions of high cognitive load; when tasks were more complex, for partici-
pants with a lower visual working memory capacity. An interaction effect of ges-
ticulation on problem solving with regards to spatial working memory capacity 
was not obtained. In conclusion, the current study provides evidence that co-
thought pointing gestures, either performed under instruction or spontaneously 
produced, aid in problem solving (as compared to no gesture support) under 
conditions of high cognitive load. 
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Introduction 
Hand-gestures, such as pointing to objects or acting on imagined objects, 
do not only arise in communicative contexts, but also in a wide variety of proce-
dural learning or problem-solving tasks, such as counting coins (Kirsh, 1995), 
mental rotation tasks (Chu & Kita, 2008), mental abacus calculations (Brooks, 
2014), tracking moving items in space (Delgado, Gómez, & Sarriá, 2009), solving 
fraction problems (Zurina & Williams, 2011), route-learning (e.g., Logan, Lowrie, 
& Diezmann, 2009; So, Ching, Lim, Cheng, & Ip, 2014), and rotating gear prob-
lems (e.g., Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011; Stephen, Dixon, & Eisenhower, 
2009). These non-communicative gestures produced without speech, are re-
ferred to as co-thought gestures. The fact that co-thought gestures spontaneously 
occur without communicative intent, strongly suggests that the cognitive function 
of gestures may go beyond support of (communicative) speech processes (Chu & 
Kita, 2016; Pouw, de Nooijer, van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, 2014). Yet, despite their 
revealing nature of the possible function(s) of gesture, they have been largely ne-
glected in the study of gesture.  
Most research designed to investigate the cognitive function of gestures 
has focused on co-speech gestures; hand-gestures that are synchronized with and 
meaningfully related to speech (e.g., Cook, Yip, & Goldin-Meadow, 2012; Goldin-
Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Marstaller & Burianová, 2013; for 
review see Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010). Such research has revealed that 
participants who gesture while explaining a solution of a math or physics problem 
perform better on a concurrent secondary task (e.g., remembering strings of let-
ters or 2-d spatial coordinates) than when participants are inhibited to gesture. 
This research suggests that gesturing participants have more cognitive resources 
available than participants who are inhibited from gesturing. 
If gestures do indeed provide resources to think with, then how do they 
do so and what do these resources consist of? With regards to co-speech ges-
tures it is hypothesized that they support semantic processing (e.g., Cook, Yip, & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2012). For example, during verbal explanation of a solution of 
some problem, some of the information that needs to be communicated can be 
more efficiently conveyed by depicting it through gesture as opposed to convey-
ing it in analog format through speech. As such, distributing communicative con-
tent over multiple modalities would reduce speech processing load for the 
speaker (Cook et al., 2013).  
Yet co-thought gestures occur in the absence of speech or communica-
tive intent, and may therefore shed light on an entirely different cognitive func-
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tion of gesture. Research on co-thought gestures during mental rotation tasks 
(Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011, 2016) has shown that when confronted with the task of 
judging whether two objects presented under different orientations are the same 
or not, problem solvers produce gestures as-if actually rotating the object to 
match the target object. Not only are these gestures produced when problem 
solvers verbally explain how they solve the problem; they also arise when con-
fronting the problem in silence and even occur when silent speech processes are 
inhibited by a secondary task (Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011, 2015). 
Importantly, these co-thought gestures are not merely epiphenomenal, 
because they are consistently found to boost mental rotation performance com-
pared to not gesturing (Chu & Kita, 2011). In similar vein, other studies have 
found that co-thought gestures such as pointing and tracing can improve perfor-
mance on route learning or tracking moving items in space as compared to not 
gesturing during such tasks (e.g., Delgado et al., 2009; Hegarty, Mayer, Kriz, & 
Keehner, 2005; Logan et al., 2014; Macken & Ginns, 2014; So et al., 2014).  
Thus, co-thought gestures too seem to provide the gesturer resources 
to think with, but these resources do not seem to relate to (communicative) 
speech processing, as co-thought gestures do not co-occur with speech or com-
municative intent. So what function do co-though gestures fulfill and how? The 
embedded/extended account of gesture puts forth a non-speech related cognitive 
function of gestures (Pouw et al., 2014). Namely, gestures produce stable visual 
and proprioceptive sensory consequences that can be used to think with. As 
such, gestures, as external bodily movements, embed and extend internal cogni-
tive resources that allow the cognitive system to solve problems in new or im-
proved ways. For example, producing action-like gestures during mental rotation 
produces kinematic regularities (normally co-occurring with actually rotating an 
object) that can be used by the gesturer to predict the consequences of such a 
rotation. The visual and proprioceptive information produced by the gesture is 
either not yet available, or more costly to simulate internally, and therefore aids 
in solving the mental rotation problem (see also Pouw & Hostetter, in press). 
This is a central prediction of the embedded/extended account of ges-
ture: gestures are more likely to be used, and more likely to positively affect the 
cognitive system when internal cognitive means alone (e.g., working memory 
processes; mental imagery processes) are insufficient or inefficient for the task at 
hand. This idea aligns with a number of findings on co-speech gestures (see Pouw 
et al., 2014 for a review). Namely, speakers who have lower visual or verbal 
working memory capacity are more likely to use gestures when they talk than 
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speakers with higher capacity (Chu, Meyer, Foulkes, & Kita, 2013; Gillespie, 
James, Federmeier, & Watson, 2014). When speakers are confronted with com-
plex visually distracting information when telling a story, they are more likely to 
gesture than with simple information (Smithson, & Nicoladis, 2014; see also Mel-
inger & Kita, 2007). And gesturing during explanation of a math problem allevi-
ates cognitive load, but only for those gesturers who have a relatively lower ver-
bal working memory capacity (e.g., Marstaller & Burianová, 2013; see Galati, 
Weisberg, Newcome, & Avraamides, 2015 for similar findings in a spatial do-
main). In sum, when cognitive load is high, either because of the complexity of 
the task or because of limited availability of internal cognitive resources, gestures 
are more likely to be adopted and more likely to support cognitive processing 
and problem solving. 
In contrast to co-speech gestures (e.g., Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) it is still 
unknown under which conditions co-thought gestures arise (Chu & Kita, 2016). 
Although there is some evidence that co-thought gestures are more likely to 
arise when task complexity is high (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2008; Logan et al., 2009) it is 
not clear how they relate to the availability of internal cognitive resources such 
as working memory capacity. Therefore, we conducted two experiments to in-
vestigate when co-thought gestures are used and how they affect performance, 
under varying conditions of cognitive load. 
 
The Present study 
We investigated when co-thought gestures were produced during mental 
problem solving and whether producing such gestures would affect problem-
solving performance. Specifically, we compared effects of instructed and sponta-
neous gesturing to ‗spontaneous‘ non-gesturing11 on performance on problems of 
varying complexity. According to the embedded/extended account of gesture, the 
spontaneous use of co-thought gestures, as well as an effect of such gestures on 
performance, is most likely when cognitive load is high; that is, with tasks of high-
er complexity and for individuals with relatively lower visual and spatial working 
memory capacity. These particular working memory capacity measures have been 
shown to be predictive of co-speech gesture frequency (Chu et al., 2013). 
                                                          
11 i.e., no explicit inhibition of gesture is taking place, to ensure that a positive effect of 
gesturing on performance would actually be due to the production of gesture, rather 
than constitute a negative effect of having to inhibit automatic gesture production; see 
e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011, Exp. 2 & 3; Cook, Yip, & Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Goldin-
Meadow et al., 2001; Wagner, Nusbaum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004). 
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We tested this hypothesis using two different problem-solving tasks: the 
Tower of Hanoi (TOH; often used in gesture research, e.g., Trofatter, Kontra, 
Beilock, & Goldin-Meadow, 2015)12, and chess (not yet studied in gesture re-
search), thereby providing an opportunity for conceptual replication within the 
study. Both TOH and chess problem solving have been found to positively and 
substantially correlate with visuospatial working-memory capacity (Robbins et al., 
1996; Zook, Davalos, Delosh, & Davis, 2004), which is important for testing our 
assumptions regarding cognitive load in these tasks. The effects of gesturing on 
both tasks were investigated consecutively, with the same participant sample and 
a similar design.  
We hypothesized that (1) participants should make more co-thought ges-
tures under high cognitive load conditions as determined by task complexity (i.e., 
higher complexity = higher load), visual and spatial mental working-memory 
(lower capacity = higher load), and the combination of task complexity and work-
ing memory (gesture likelihood hypothesis); and (2) co-thought gesturing (spon-
taneous and instructed) should positively affect mental problem-solving perfor-
mance (as evidenced by speed and efficiency of subsequent actual performance) 
on both problem-solving tasks (TOH and chess) in comparison to non-gesturing, 
under high cognitive load conditions as determined by task complexity (i.e., high-
er complexity = higher load), visual and spatial mental imagery ability (lower ca-
pacity = higher load), and the combination of both (gesture effect hypothesis).  
 
General Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 76 Dutch university students participated in this study in partial 
fulfillment of course requirements or for a financial compensation of 7.50 euros 
(about 8.30 USD). One participant had to be excluded from the entire study due 
to a technical malfunction during the working memory capacity tasks. For the 
TOH, two additional participants had to be excluded from the sample as they did 
                                                          
12 It is important to note that although there are findings that gestures affect (or are 
affected by) solving the Tower of Hanoi (Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Cook & 
Tanenhaus, 2009; Garber & Goldin-Meadow, 2002; Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010; 
Trofatter et al., 2015) these studies are not diagnostic for present purposes as they 
have focused on iconic co-speech (as opposed to co-thought) gestures. Additionally, 
when performance was object of study, it was assessed between physically different 
TOH tasks, making the task performance dependent on (secondary) manipulative fea-
tures of the problem-solving task (the weights of the discs), not on the primary prob-
lem-solving content (Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010; Trofatter et al., 2015). 
134 
 
6 
not comply with the gesture instruction. This resulted in a total sample of 73 for 
the TOH (41.1% men, Mage = 20.60, SD = 2.06, age range 18 to 31 years). Be-
cause of delays in programming the chess task, 16 participants had already partic-
ipated in the TOH study before the chess task experiment was added to the pro-
cedure. Moreover, in addition to the one participant mentioned above, four oth-
er participants had to be excluded due to malfunctioning of the video or the task 
program. As a consequence, the total sample for the chess task consisted of 55 
participants (31.9% men, Mage = 20.47, SD = 2.19, age range 18 to 31 years).  
Participants were assigned randomly to one of the two conditions (in-
structed gesture vs. gesture allowed), under which they performed both TOH 
and chess tasks. Nine participants reported (when asked) that they had played 
the Tower of Hanoi in the past, but they were equally divided across conditions, 
χ²(1) = .123, p = .725. There were no differences between conditions for self-
reported knowledge of chess, t(53) = -.980, p = .332 . 
Materials 
Visual working memory capacity: Visual Patterns Test 
 The Visual Patterns Test (VPT; Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, & Wilson, 1997) is a 
measure for visual working memory capacity. An adaptation of the VPT was used, 
which was developed (and kindly provided to us) by Chu and colleagues (2013). 
Participants were shown a matrix, in various patterns, wherein half of the cells 
(i.e., squares of 15 mm × 15 mm) were colored black. Each pattern was displayed 
for 3 seconds, after which all the squares turned white and each square was la-
beled with one unique letter. Participants indicated the pattern of black squares 
by naming the letters of the corresponding squares out loud in a non-specific or-
der. The VPT consisted of 25 trials, with blocks of 5 trials per difficulty (from 
seven to 11 black squares). Before the start of the task participants were provid-
ed with two practice trials (3 and 4 black squares, respectively). If participants 
failed to recall all the letters, it was scored as an incorrect response. After five 
consecutive incorrect responses within one block of trials the experimenter 
stopped the task.  
Spatial working memory capacity: Corsi Block Task 
Spatial-sequential working memory capacity was measured with the Corsi Block 
Task (from here on CBT; Corsi, 1972), as used by Chu and colleagues (2013). In 
each trial (20 trials), nine empty irregularly placed squares (15 mm × 15 mm) 
were displayed on the computer screen. One square at a time turned black for 
one second, with an inter stimulus interval of 500 ms between each transition. 
The first block of five trials consisted of a sequence of five squares turning black, 
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with each subsequent difficulty level adding one black square to the sequence (the 
fourth block sequence thus consisted of eight squares turning black). After the 
last square in the sequence turns black, a letter appeared in the center of each 
square. The participant reported aloud the letters in the correct order, following 
the order of the squares turning black. If the participants failed to recall all the 
letters in the correct order, the trial was scored as an incorrect response. After 
five incorrect responses in one block of trials the experimenter stopped the task. 
Tower of Hanoi  
The Tower of Hanoi (TOH) consisted of a wooden structure with a rec-
tangular base (17 cm tall, 50 cm wide, 1cm deep) with three evenly spaced pegs 
(13.5 cm tall, 1 cm in diameter) mounted on top. The ‗easy‘ version of the task 
consisted of three wooden discs (size disc 1: 7.5 cm in diameter; size disc 2: 7 cm 
in diameter; size disc 3: 6.5 cm in diameter) and the more complex version of the 
task of four discs (size disc 4: 6 cm); all discs were 1 cm in height. They were ini-
tially stacked on the left most peg, and could be placed on the other pegs during 
the problem-solving process. When participants took longer than 300 s to solve 
either of the two trials, the trial would be aborted. 
Chess Problem-solving Tasks 
Chess rules tutorial. Participants were provided a short animated tuto-
rial on the computer about a set of five chess rules that helped prepare partici-
pants to solve the problem-solving task. The tutorial was designed specifically for 
participants with little if any knowledge of chess. The tutorial was self-paced and 
participants proceeded to the next stage of the tutorial by clicking a ―Next‖ -
button. The total duration of the tutorial is approximately 10 minutes. The in-
structions covered rules regarding the alternate turn taking in chess, the allowed 
movement of the rook, bishop and knight pieces, and the ability to capture a 
chess piece of the other color. Each of these rules was presented separately.  
Chess rules knowledge test. Participants performed a chess knowledge 
task where they had to indicate all the squares to which a chess piece is allowed 
to move by selecting them on the chessboard using mouse clicks. This was per-
formed for the rook, the knight, and the bishop separately. The purpose of this 
task was to ensure that participants were sufficiently familiar with the chess rules 
required to perform the problem-solving task. Once participants were able to 
exclusively select all the correct squares they automatically proceeded to the 
square selection task for the next chess piece. If participants repeatedly failed to 
select the correct squares, the experimenter verbally repeated the movement 
rule of the chess piece, until the participant selected the correct squares.  
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Chess problem-solving task. For each of the three tasks, participants 
were presented with two chessboards shown on the computer screen (see Fig-
ure 1). The chessboard on the left represented the start state and the chess 
board on the right indicated the end state. Three (low complexity), four (medium 
complexity) and five (high complexity) solving steps were required to transform 
the start state into the end state. For each task, there was only one correct solu-
tion. The time for mental preparation varied across the different levels of com-
plexity (30 s for the 3-step problem, 60 s for the 4-step problem, and 150 s for 
the 5-step problem). Ending the mental preparation phase, participants were cued 
by an auditory tone to start solving the task. The chess pieces of the begin state 
could be moved across the chessboard by clicking on them with the left mouse 
button and dragging them to another square on the board. The chess pieces 
were placed on the selected square by releasing the left mouse button. Every 
placement of the chess piece was permitted, even when it was an invalid chess 
move. The board state would be automatically reset to the begin state after the 
maximum number of moves (3, 4 or 5) was exceeded and the solution was incor-
rect. Once participants correctly solved the problem, they automatically pro-
ceeded to the next task. When participants were unable to solve the task within 
300 s, the task was aborted and they automatically proceeded to the next task. 
 
Figure 1. Board composition in the medium difficulty task, with the start state on 
the left and the end state on the right. 
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Self-report Questions 
Mental effort, difficulty, interest. We obtained an indication of experi-
enced mental effort, perceived difficulty, and experienced interest, after each 
problem-solving trial because experienced effort and difficulty should be affected 
by task difficulty as well as working memory resources (Paas & van Merriënboer, 
1993), whereas interest is assessed to check that this would not differ (and 
therefore might explain hypothesized differences) among groups. These indica-
tions were obtained via self-reports after each problem-solving trial on a 5-point 
rating scale (see Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van Gerven, 2003): ―How much 
mental effort did you exert during the task? (mental effort; 1 = ‗very low mental 
effort‘ to 5 = ‗very high mental effort‘), ―How difficult did you find this task‖ (dif-
ficulty; 1 = ‗not difficult‘ to 5 = ‗very difficult‘), and ―How interesting did you find 
this task‖ (interest; 1 = ‗not interesting‘ to 5 = ‗very interesting‘). 
Prior knowledge and experience. Before the start of the experiment 
participants rated their knowledge and experience with chess on a 5-point scale 
with the anchors 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). Participants also reported previ-
ous experience with the TOH (yes or no). 
 
Procedure 
Before the start of the experiment, participants consented to being vid-
eo-recorded during the experiment. Participants were tested individually with the 
experimenter present in the room (but they could not see the experimenter 
while they were working on the tasks). The order of the working memory capac-
ity tasks was counterbalanced such that in both conditions half of the participants 
started with the spatial working memory task (CBT), whereas the other half 
would start with the visual working memory task (VPT). During the working 
memory tasks, participants had to respond verbally to each trial after which the 
experimenter would start the next trial. Responses were immediately scored on 
a scoring-sheet by the experimenter, and were also recorded on video.  
After participants completed both working memory capacity tasks, the 
experimenter started the instructions for the TOH. Firstly, they were told about 
the end goal: getting the arrangement of discs on the outer left peg on the outer 
right peg, in the same order. Then they were told about the two constraints: I) 
only one disc at a time may be moved from one peg to another and II) a larger 
disc cannot be placed on a peg that already contains a smaller disc. After each 
instruction the experimenter verified whether subjects understood the instruc-
tions (they were asked to verbally repeat the rules). Participants were informed 
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that before solving the TOH as fast as possible, they would mentally plan the 
moves without manipulating the TOH for 150 s (the TOH was placed just out-
side arms reach: 90 cm from the participant). Participants were told that they 
should find and rehearse the correct moves repeatedly during this phase. Half of 
the participants were additionally instructed ―to gesture, in other words, to think 
with your hands during this mental planning phase in a way that suits you‖ (ges-
ture instructed condition). During this instruction the experimenter also per-
formed a quick demonstration of a typical index pointing-gesture, which consist-
ed of pointing movements directed at the TOH pegs. Thus participants were 
cued to use pointing gestures in the instructed gesture condition, but could ges-
ture in a way that suited them. The other half of the participants did not receive 
any gesture instructions (gesture allowed condition). Participants first solved the 
easier 3-disc TOH, after which they reported mental effort invested in the task, 
perceived task difficulty and their interest in the task. Subsequently, the same 
routine was repeated (i.e., mental problem-solving phase followed by physical 
solving phase) for the more complex 4-disc TOH.  
After completion of the TOH tasks, instructions of the chess tutorial 
were started. Participants performed these exercises at self-paced tempo and 
were allowed to ask questions about the content of the tutorial. Upon complet-
ing the chess knowledge task, the experimenter would start the instructions for 
the chess problem-solving task. The task was preceded by an example of the so-
lution to a simple 2-step example of the task. After the experimenter verified 
that the subjects understood the instructions and had no more questions, the 
planning phase for the first problem-solving task was started. Note that partici-
pants continued under the same condition as they had been assigned in the TOH 
phase. The instructions for the gesture instructed condition were repeated. After 
each planning phase participants were prompted with a short tone to notify them 
that they could solve the chess trial using the mouse to click-and-drag pieces. 
Directly after each of the three chess trials, participants were prompted to re-
spond to the self-report questions on experienced mental effort, difficulty of the 
task and interestingness of the task. After the experiment, participants filled out a 
questionnaire including demographic questions (age, sex, study program, prior 
experience with the task) and questions about what they thought was the pur-
pose of the experiment. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.  
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Scoring and data analysis  
Visual Patterns Test 
The final score was the proportion of the correct responses out of all 25 
trials (higher proportion approximates higher visual working memory capacity). 
Corsi Block Task 
The final score was the proportion of the correct responses out of all 20 
trials (higher proportion approximates spatial visual working memory capacity). 
Tower of Hanoi 
For each of the two problem-solving trials we obtained solving speed and 
number of solving steps, with lower solving speeds and lower number of solving 
steps reflecting a higher performance. For the 3-disc TOH and the 4-disc TOH 
the minimal amount steps necessary to solve the task were seven and fourteen 
steps, respectively. A step was counted when participants placed a disc on anoth-
er peg (so not on the same peg) once the disc was let go (i.e., if they changed 
their mind before releasing the disc, this was not counted as a step). Performance 
of participants who did not solve the task in 300 s was not scored. 
Chess task 
For each of the three chess trials we obtained solving speeds and number 
of attempts (i.e., lower solving speed and number of solving attempts means 
higher performance). Solving-steps were automatically counted when participants 
clicked-and-dragged a piece and let it go, and for each attempt participants had to 
perform 3, 4, 5 solving steps for chess task 1, 2, 3, respectively. When partici-
pants did not solve the task in 300s performance was not scored. 
Gesture 
Each participant‘s video data were coded for gesture prevalence for each 
TOH and chess trial. Three types of gesture prevalence were possible in each 
trial, namely non-gesturing vs. spontaneous gesturing vs. instructed gesturing; 
which we will collectively refer to as gesture prevalence type. Note, that the par-
ticipants in the gesture allowed group, are thus re-divided into two categories of 
gesture prevalence type (non-gesturing vs. spontaneous gesturing), and since the 
participants in the instructed gesturing group all gestured, they were all assigned 
to the instructed gesturing prevalence type.  
Additionally, we looked at form (pointing vs. iconic), and frequency of 
gesture. Almost all instructed and spontaneous gesturing consisted of pointing 
gestures (see Figure 2 for examples) with three exceptions. Two participants 
briefly used counting gestures and one participant briefly used iconic gestures 
with two hands picking and moving all the discs. Therefore, as a measure of ges-
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ture frequency we only counted the number of pointing gestures; in such a way 
that each rest point after a pointing gesture (either whole hand -or finger-
pointing) was considered as one instance. For the TOH task, a research assistant 
counted all the gestures, and the first author recounted 10.4 % to check for reli-
ability (interrater reliability was high, r = .96, p < .001). For the chess task, the 
second author counted all the gestures, and the first author recounted 10% to 
check for reliability (interrater reliability was high, r = .90, p < .001).  
Note, for the chess task, although we could ascertain whether partici-
pants gestured we were unable to count the exact gesture frequencies for a 
number of participants for task 1 (n = 8), 2 (n = 8), and 3 (n = 6). This was be-
cause of an erroneous positioning of the video camera which was problematic 
since participants sometimes gestured more closely to the screen (the computer-
monitor obstructed the view on the participants‘ hands). Since time differed 
across task complexity for the chess task we will also report a gesture ratio 
measure that provided number of gestures per 10 seconds; gesture frequency 
divided by mental preparation time x 10 (task 1, 2, 3 = 3 x 10s, 6 x 10, 9 x 10 s). 
Chu et al. (2014) used a similar procedure to control for time in gesture fre-
quencies. 
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Figure 2. Examples of spontaneous gestures arising during mental problem solving 
for the TOH and chess task (1 frame per second). 
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Results Tower of Hanoi 
Before discussing the analyses that address our hypotheses, we first ad-
dress overall performance results on the 3-disc and 4-disc TOH (solving speed 
and solving steps), and visual working memory capacity (VPT), spatial working 
memory capacity (CBT), and gesture production data.  
Overall Performance TOH 
 Three-disc TOH. Overall mean solving speed and solving steps 3-disc 
TOH and the correlation between solving speed and solving can be obtained 
from Table 1. In terms of solving steps most participants had a ceiling perfor-
mance (82.2 % performed the task in 7 steps). Since both solving speed (skew-
ness = 4.87, SE = 0.28, kurtosis = 27.23, SE = 0.56) and solving steps (skewness = 
3.12, SE = 0.28, kurtosis = 9.63, SE = 0.56) were heavily skewed, we logarithmi-
cally transformed these variables. This did not completely resolve issues of skew-
ness or kurtosis for solving speed (skewness = 1.99, SE = 0.28, kurtosis = 6.40, 
SE = 0.56), nor solving steps (skewness = 2.73, SE = 0.28, kurtosis = 7.09, SE = 
.56). 
Four-disc TOH. Overall mean solving speed and solving steps for the 4-
disc TOH, and the correlation between solving speed and solving can be obtained 
from Table 1. Note that 37.7 % had a ceiling performance of 15 solving steps. 
Three participants were unable to solve the task within 300 s. One participant 
forgot to follow the rules and made several mistakes during the 4-disc TOH (and 
was therefore excluded from analysis of the 4-disc TOH). Solving speed (skew-
ness = 0.90, SE = 0.29, kurtosis = -0.361, SE = 0.57) showed no issues with nor-
mal distribution. However, solving steps was not normally distributed (skewness 
= 1.54, SE = 0.29, kurtosis = 2.05, SE = 0.57) and we therefore used a log trans-
formation (skewness = 0.54, SE = 0.28, kurtosis = -0.04, SE = 0.57). 
Visual and Spatial Working Memory Capacity 
Next we checked for (unexpected and unwanted) differences in working 
memory measures between conditions. Table 1 displays the averages, standard 
deviations and correlations for VPT and CBT, and solving speed of both 3- (log-
transformed) and the 4-disc TOH. There were no differences between the ges-
ture allowed and instructed condition in the proportion correct trials on the 
VPT, t(71) = -0.494, p = .623 or CBT, t(70) = 0.328, p = .744. The VPT (but not 
CBT) showed a significant negative correlation with solving speed on the 3-disc, 
and both the VPT and CBT negatively correlated negatively with solving speed on 
the 4-disc TOH, such that higher VPT and CBT scores were associated with fast-
er solving speeds and a lower amount of solving steps. 
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 Mean SD 1 2 3 
1. VPT score 0.50 0.15    
2. CBT score 
3. Solving speed 3-disc TOH 
0.41 
20.52 
0.15 
16.00 
.36** 
-.19* 
 
-.16 
 
4. Solving speed 4-disc TOH 84.61 57.83 -.57** -.41** 0.21 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Averages, standard deviations and correlations for the 
VPT, and the solving speed for both TOH tasks 
 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of VPT, CBT, and solving 
speed on the Tower of Hanoi 3-disc and 4-disc. 
 
Gesture production 
 As indicated by Figures 3 and 4, on the 3-disc TOH, 28.90% (N = 11/38) 
of the participants in the gesture allowed condition spontaneously gestured dur-
ing the mental solving phase (which had a fixed time of 150 s) with a mean abso-
lute gesture frequency of 23.45 (SD = 13.87; frequency minimum = 8, maximum = 
59). In the gesture instructed condition the mean absolute gesture frequency was 
46.03 (SD = 24.20; frequency minimum = 7, maximum = 105).  
On the 4-disc TOH, 44.44% (N = 16/38) of the participants in the gesture 
allowed condition spontaneously gestured during the mental solving phase, with a 
mean absolute gesture frequency of 36.25 (SD = 25.40; frequency minimum = 5, 
maximum = 79). In the gesture instructed condition the mean absolute gesture 
frequency was 65.73 (SD = 18.52; minimum = 19, maximum = 104). 
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Gesture Likelihood Hypothesis 
The gesture likelihood hypothesis predicted that the percentage of spon-
taneous gesture prevalence (non-gesturing vs. spontaneous gesturing) and fre-
quency (number of gestures) would be higher in the complex task and for those 
with a lower visual and/or spatial working memory capacity. The subsequent 
analyses test that hypothesis and also provide a manipulation check on whether 
participants who were instructed to gesture did indeed do so more often in 
terms of gesture frequency than those who spontaneously gestured (also see Fig-
ure 4). 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence likelihood 
To assess whether there was a significant difference in the percentage of 
prevalence of spontaneous gesturing (as opposed to non-gesturing) across com-
plexity we performed a dependent Chi square test (McNemar Change Test), 
which revealed that spontaneous gesture prevalence was indeed more likely in 
the 4-disc TOH than in the 3-disc TOH, χ²(1) = 4.000, p = .039.  
However, participants who gestured spontaneously during the mental 
solving-phase of the solution procedure for 3-disc TOH, did not differ from non-
gesturing participants with regard to VPT score, t(36) = -0.351, p = .728. Similar-
ly, participants who gestured spontaneously during mental solving phase of 4-disc 
TOH, did not differ from non-gesturing participants with regard to VPT score, 
t(36) = -0.950, p = .348.  
Similarly, spontaneously gesturing participants during the 3-disc TOH, did 
not differ from non-gesturing participants with regard to CBT score, t(35) = -
.094, p = .962. This was also the case for the 4-disc TOH, spontaneously gestur-
ing participants did not differ from non-gesturing participants with regard to CBT 
score, t(35) = .083, p = .926. 
Thus in contrast to our predictions, visual (VPT) and spatial (CBT) work-
ing memory capacity did not affect whether participants gestured or not (i.e., ges-
ture prevalence). 
Spontaneous and instructed gesture frequency likelihood 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess whether task 
complexity (within-subjects: 3-disc TOH vs. 4-disc TOH) and gesture prevalence 
type (between-subjects: spontaneous vs. instructed gesture) predicted gesture 
frequency. This allows us to test whether gesture frequencies were indeed higher 
in the instructed gesture condition (manipulation check) and whether task com-
plexity affected gesture frequency (gesture likelihood hypothesis). We found a 
significant main effect of task complexity, F(1, 52) = 26.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .339, 
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with gesture frequency being lower during the mental solving phase for the 3-disc 
TOH (M = 35.68, SD = 27.945) than for the 4-disc TOH (M = 53.83, SD = 27.26). 
Additionally there was a main effect of gesture prevalence type, F(1, 52) = 26.62, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .453, showing that participants who were instructed to gesture did 
so more often (M = 56.94, SD = 22.18) than participants who spontaneously ges-
tured (M = 22.32, SD = 21.02). There was no interaction between complexity and 
gesture group, F(1,52) = .02, p = .882. 
We additionally assessed whether visual working memory (VPT) co-
varied with gesture frequency by running a repeated measures ANCOVA, how-
ever this did not account for variance in frequency of gestures, F(1, 51) = 0.34, p 
= .562, and the effect of complexity on gesture frequency dissipated, F(1, 51) = 
0.22, p = .641. Also no interactions were obtained for VPT with complexity, F(1, 
51) = 3.27, p = .077, or gesture group F(1, 51) = 0.20, p = .887. When entering 
CBT as a covariate this similarly yielded non-significant results, F(1, 50) = 0.32, p 
= .574. Also no interactions were obtained for VPT across complexity or gesture 
type, F(1, 50) < .009, p > .924. These findings suggest that visual and spatial work-
ing memory capacities did not predict the frequency at which participants ges-
tured (either when instructed to do so, or when spontaneously produced). 
 
Gesture Effect Hypothesis 
The gesture effect hypothesis predicted that co-thought gesturing (spon-
taneous and instructed) would positively affect mental problem-solving perfor-
mance (as evidenced by solving speed of subsequent actual performance) under 
high cognitive load conditions in comparison to participants who did not gesture 
but were allowed to (i.e., ‗spontaneous‘ non-gesturing). Because number of steps, 
which could serve as a measure of performance, was non-normally distributed 
(even after log-transformation), we will only analyze solving speed. We first ana-
lyzed whether VPT, gesture prevalence type (non-gesturing vs. spontaneous ges-
turing vs. instructed gesturing) and their interaction affected solving speed on the 
3-disc and 4-disc TOH in two multiple stepwise hierarchical regression analyses 
(i.e., separate analysis for each task complexity level). Note that the gesture ef-
fect hypothesis predicts interaction effects - especially on the more complex task 
(i.e., solving speed 4-disc TOH) - of VPT and gesture prevalence type, such that 
those with lower VPT scores improve in performance when using gestures (i.e., 
instructed or spontaneous) as compared to those who did not gesture and that 
have similar VPT scores. 
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We entered VPT (mean centered) in the first step, and dummy variables 
spontaneous gesturing (0 = non-gesturing, 1 = spontaneous gesturing) and in-
structed gesture (0 = non-gesturing, 1 = instructed gesturing) in the second step. 
In the third step we entered two interaction terms of the centered VPT with in-
structed and spontaneous gesture prevalence. In Table 2 the results of the multi-
ple stepwise hierarchical regression on solving speed of the 3-disc and 4-disc 
TOH are reported.  
As can be seen in Table 2, no significant predictors were obtained for 
solving speed on the 3-disc TOH. However, on the 4-disc TOH, there was a 
main effect of VPT on solving speed, which remained so in the final model, t(68) = 
-5.44, p < .001, Partial r = -.570. We found no main effects of gesture prevalence 
type for spontaneous gesture, t(68) = -.92, p = 0.361, or instructed gesture, t(68) 
= -.31, p = .758. However in the final model (explaining 37% of the variance), the 
interaction terms of VPT and spontaneous gesture prevalence, t(68) = 2.88, p = 
.005, Partial r = .341, as well as instructed gesture prevalence, t(68) = 2.42, p = 
.018, Partial r = .292, were significant in the predicted direction. Namely, sponta-
neous and instructed gestures were positively affecting performance (i.e., lower 
solving speeds) on the task as compared to non-gesturing, especially when partic-
ipants had a lower VPT score (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Regression slopes for gesture type prevalence (spontaneous vs. in-
structed vs. no gesture) on solving speed on the TOH 4-disc, with centered 
VPT score on the horizontal axis. 
  
Note. The ―†‖ denotes the region where the effect of spontaneous gesture 
prevalence (vs. no gesture) was significant. The ―ﬃ‖ denotes the region of sig-
nificance for instructed gesture prevalence.   
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3-disc TOH B (SE) β Model R
2
adj 
Intercept 
VPT 
2.888(0.050) 
-.451 (0.236)* 
 
-.221 
1 .036 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
2.910 (0.083) 
-0.444 (0.239)* 
-0.014 (0.153) 
-0.03 (0.110) 
 
-.218 
 .012 
-.058 
2 .012 
 
 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
VPT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
VPT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
2.896 (0.083) 
-0.905 (0.083)* 
 0.025 (0.152) 
-0.035 (0.109) 
-0.037 (0.782) 
 0.837 (0.520)  
 
-.444 
 .021 
-.041 
-.013 
 .313 
3 .034 
4-disc TOH B (SE) β Model R
2
adj 
Intercept 
VPT 
86.191 (5.769) 
-168.68 (29.695) 
 
-.570 
1** .315 
Intercept  
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
94.254 (10.925) 
-162.614 (30.709)** 
-13.850 (16.560) 
-10.265 (13.893) 
 
-.550 
-.102 
-.089 
2** .303 
 
 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
VPT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
VPT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
87.321 (10.607) 
-291.533 (53.623)** 
-14.962 (16.192) 
-4.080 (13.286) 
267.111 (92.805)* 
160.130 (66.178)* 
  
-.985 
-.110 
-.035 
 .356 
 .397 
3** .377 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
Table 2. Summary of stepwise hierarchical regression analysis for variables pre-
dicting log transformed solving speed on easy 3-disc TOH and solving speed on 
4-disc TOH. 
 
To further assess these interactions we performed Johnson-Neyman Re-
gions of Significance Tests using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) to assess the nature of 
the two interaction effects of instructed and spontaneous gestures with the VPT 
(see also Figure 5). We performed the first analysis by contrasting ‗spontaneous‘ 
non-gesturing vs. instructed gesturing (IV; 0 = non-gesturing, 1 = instructed ges-
ture prevalence), centered VPT (Moderator), and solving speed on the 4-disc 
TOH (DV). These analyses revealed that the region of significance (p < .05) was 
indeed obtained for a conditional positive effect of instructed gesturing on per-
formance on 4-disc TOH (range b = -.66.815 to -29.183, range Se = 25.404 to 
14.522, range t(52) = -2.63 to -2.01, range p = .011 to .050) for those with a low-
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er working memory capacity, range of significance for centered score VPT = -
.392 to -.130, 26.41 % of the lowest VPT scorers. However, we further found 
that those with a higher working memory capacity (range of significance for cen-
tered score VPT = .361 to .448, 1.89% of the highest VPT scorers) seemed to be 
slowed down by instructed gesturing (range b = 51.269 to 65.238, range Se = 
25.549 to 65.238, range t(49) = 2.01 to -2.16, range p = .05 to .035).  
Similarly, in the second analysis, this time only contrasting spontaneous 
gesture prevalence with ‗spontaneous‘ non-gesturing (coded 0 = non-gesturing, 1 
= spontaneous gesturing), we found a conditional positive effect of spontaneous 
gesturing, range b = -108.927 to -37.302, range Se = 37.198 to .18.313, range t 
(32) = -2.93 to -2.04, range p = .05 to .006) for those with a lower working 
memory capacity, region of significance for centered score VPT = -.351 to -.083, 
33.33% lowest VPT scorers. Additionally, we obtained a (small) region of signifi-
cance for participants with a higher working memory capacity (centered score 
VPT = .260 to .288, 2.78 % of the highest VPT scorers) that seemed to be slowed 
down by spontaneous gesturing (range b = 54.416 to 62.025, range Se = 26.714 
to 28.8416, range t(49) = 2.01 to -2.16, range p = .05 to .039).  
 
 
3-disc TOH B (SE) β Model R
2
adjusted 
Intercept 
CBT 
2.891 (0.050) 
-0.621 (0.334) 
 
-.217 
1 .033 
Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
2.921 (0.085) 
-0.631 (0.338) 
0.012 (0.155) 
 -0.064 (0.112) 
 
-.220 
 .010 
-.074 
2 .012 
 
 
Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
CBT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
CBT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
2.920 (0.086) 
-0.514(0.519) 
0.013 (0.158) 
-0.64 (0.113) 
-0.159 (1.125) 
 -0.220 (0.731)  
 
-.197 
 .011 
-.074 
-.019 
-.051 
3 -.017 
4-disc TOH B (SE) β Model R
2
adjusted 
Intercept 
CBT 
86.346 (6.470) 
-155.747 (42.805)* 
 
-.409 
1** .154 
Intercept  
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
107.694 (12.009) 
-155.252 (42.127)** 
-32.983(17.769) 
-28.005 (15.076) 
 
-.407 
-.243 
-.243 
2** .185 
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Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
CBT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
CBT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
107.708 (12.198) 
-157.104 (69.062)** 
-33.768 (18.221) 
-28.043 (15.308) 
 33.547 (128.081) 
 -7.447 (93.543) 
  
-.412 
-.249 
-.244 
 .035 
 -.13 
3* .160 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01 In sum, when instructed to gesture or spontaneously 
gesturing, participants who had a lower visual (but not spatial) working memory 
capacity performed better on the most difficult TOH trial (in terms of solving speed).  
 
Table 3. Summary of stepwise hierarchical regression analysis for variables pre-
dicting log transformed solving speed on easy 3-disc TOH and solving speed on 
4-disc TOH. 
 
We also reran the previous analyses with the CBT (reported in Table 3), 
but no significant interactions of CBT and instructed or spontaneous gesture 
prevalence were obtained in explaining variance in solving speed on the 3-disc 
and 4-disc TOH.  
  
152 
 
6 
Mental effort, Difficulty, and Interest 
We assessed whether task complexity indeed affected self-report 
measures of invested mental effort, experienced difficulty, and interest, serving as 
a subjective manipulation check of experienced cognitive load. See Table 4 for 
means and SDs for self-report ratings. Task complexity indeed affected self-
report ratings, F(3, 70) = 123.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .968. Pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni corrected p-values showed higher scores on invested mental effort, 
Mdiff = -1.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .554, difficulty, Mdiff = -1.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .793, and 
self-reported interest, Mdiff = -0.690, p < .001, ηp2 = .968, on the 4-disc TOH as 
compared to the 3-disc TOH.  
 
 
 Mental 
Effort M 
(SD) 
Difficulty  
M (SD) 
Interest  
M (SD) 
TOH 3 2.05 (0.91) 1.84 (0.71) 2.99 (3.09) 
TOH 4 3.53 (0.92) 3.43 (0.90) 3.70 (0.76) 
Chess 1 2.78 (1.21) 2.31 (1.29) 2.93 (0.84) 
Chess 2 3.27 (1.11) 3.15 (1.15) 3.29 (0.85) 
Chess 3 3.29 (1.07) 3.02 (1.08) 3.32 (0.83) 
Table 4. Means and standard deviations for self-report ratings of experienced 
mental effort, difficulty and interest across task complexity on TOH and chess 
tasks 
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Results Chess 
 All the analyses performed on the TOH data are repeated here for the 
chess task. 
Overall Performance Chess Tasks 
The results and performance distributions of the overall performance on 
chess task 1, 2, and 3, for solving speed and number of attempts are reported 
here (see also Table 5). 
- insert Table 5 here - 
Chess task 1. Overall mean solving speed for the 3-step chess task was 
33.16 seconds (SD = 42.44), with overall mean of 1.83 attempts (SD = 1.61), and 
an intercorrelation of r = .817 (p < .001). Three participants were unable to solve 
the task, and were ceased in their attempt after 300 s and were therefore not 
included in the analysis. Solving speed was non-normally distributed with skew-
ness of 2.30 (SE = 0.33) and kurtosis of 5.26 (SE = 0.64). A log transformation 
was performed on solving speed, which reduced skewness of this measure to 
0.81 (SE = 0.33) and kurtosis to -.22 (SE = 0.64). For subsequent analysis we use 
log transformed solving speed as performance measure (see Table 5).  
Chess task 2. Overall mean solving speed for the 4-step chess task 68.71 
s (SD = 78.95), with overall mean of 2.96 attempts (SD = 2.98), and an intercor-
relation of r = .91 (p < .001). Three participants were unable to solve the task. 
Solving speed was non-normally distributed with skewness of 1.53 (SE = 0.33) 
and kurtosis of 1.29 (SE = 0.64). For subsequent analysis we used log transformed 
solving speed as performance measure (skewness .31, SE = 0.33 and kurtosis -
1.16, SE = 0.64).  
Chess task 3. Overall mean solving speed for the 5-step chess task was 
26.92 s (SD = 38.43), with overall mean of 1.63 attempts (SD = 1.7), and an inter-
correlation of r = .95 (p < .001). Eight participants were unable to solve the task. 
Solving speed for this task was also non-normally distributed with skewness of 
4.18 (SE = 0.34) and kurtosis of 18.19 (SE = 0.67). Again, a log transformation 
was performed on solving speed which reduced skewness to 1.83 (SE = 0.34) and 
kurtosis to 4.05 (SE = 0.676). 
Visual and Spatial Working Memory Capacity  
Table 5 displays the averages, standard deviations and correlations be-
tween VPT, CBT and the log transformed scores on each of the three chess 
tasks. There were no differences between the instructed gesture and gesture 
allowed condition on the proportion correct on the VPT, t(53) = 0.33, p = 0.743, 
nor the CBT, t(52) = 0.842, p = .404. For each task, there was a negative rela-
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tionship between VPT score and solving speed (i.e., higher VPT associated with 
faster solving speeds). CBT also showed negative correlations with solving speed 
on chess task 1 and 3, but not task 2. Furthermore, prior knowledge of chess was 
associated with faster solving speed on each of the three tasks.  
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
1.VPT Score 
2. CBT Score 
2. Prior knowledge  
3. Solving speed chess Task1 (log) 
4. Solving speed chess Task2 (log) 
5. Solving speed chess Task3 (log) 
0.52 
0.43 
2.47 
2.95 
3.61 
2.93 
0.23 
0.16 
1.32 
0.97 
1.14 
0.69 
 
 .45** 
.46** 
-.45** 
-.31* 
-.41* 
 
 
.38** 
-.32* 
-.20 
-.32* 
 
 
 
 
.43** 
.47** 
 
 
 
 
 
.44** 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01  
Table 5. Averages, standard deviations and correlations for the VPT, and log 
transformed solving speed for chess task 1, 2 and 3.  
Gesture Production 
 Here we provide an overview of the percentages and frequency of ges-
tures across task complexity and condition (also see Figure 3 and 4). 
On chess task 1, 20% (N = 5/25) of the participants in the gesture al-
lowed condition spontaneously gestured during the mental solving phase, with a 
mean gesture frequency of 8.00 (SD = 4.76, minimum frequency = 3, maximum = 
13), and a gesture ratio of 2.6 (SD = 1.6). In the gesture instructed condition the 
mean gesture frequency was 14.86 (SD = 7.5, minimum frequency = 3, maximum 
= 30), with a gesture ratio of 4.9 (SD = 2.5). 
On chess task 2, 32.0% (N = 8/25) of the participants in the gesture al-
lowed condition spontaneously gestured during the mental solving phase, with a 
mean gesture frequency of 9.50 (SD = 5.12, minimum frequency = 4, maximum = 
18) and a gesture ratio of 3.0 (SD = 1.6). In the gesture instructed condition the 
mean gesture frequency was 22.84 (SD = 7.68, min = 5, max = 37.00) with a ges-
ture ratio of 3.8 (SD = 1.3).  
On chess task 3, 44% (N = 11/25) of the participants in the gesture al-
lowed condition spontaneously gestured during the mental solving phase, with a 
mean gesture frequency of 12.20 (SD = 8.57, minimum frequency = 4, maximum 
= 28) and a gesture ratio of 1.4 (SD = 1.0). In the gesture instructed condition 
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the mean gesture frequency was 33.36 (SD = 17.38, min = 6, max = 77) with a 
gesture ratio of 3.7 (SD = 1.9). 
Gesture Likelihood Hypothesis 
The gesture likelihood hypothesis predicts that higher percentage of ges-
ture prevalence and frequencies (controlling for time, i.e., gesture ratio) will be 
observed when participants have a lower visual or spatial working memory ca-
pacity (VPT) and in more complex tasks (spontaneous gesture frequency task 3 > 
2 > 1). 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence likelihood. We assessed whether 
there was a significant difference in the percentage of prevalence of spontaneous 
gesturing (as opposed to non-gesturing) across complexity. We performed a de-
pendent Chi square test (Cochran‘s Q test), which revealed that there were dif-
ferences across spontaneous gesture prevalence across the three chess trials, 
χ²(2) = 7.714, p = .021. Pairwise comparisons only showed a significant difference 
in the likelihood of spontaneous gesture prevalence between chess task 1 and 3, 
χ²(1) = 2.777, p = .016, and not between task 1 and 2 or 2 and 3, χ²(1) > 1.389, p 
> .495. 
We further assessed whether those with a lower visual or spatial 
working memory capacity were more likely to spontaneous gesture. This 
was not the case. Participants in the gesture allowed condition who spon-
taneously gestured during task 1 did not differ from non-gesturing partici-
pants with regard to VPT score, t(23) = -0.02, p = 0.984. Thus VPT did not 
relate to gesture prevalence in chess task 1. Participants in the gesture al-
lowed condition who spontaneously gestured during task 2 did not differ 
from non-gesturing participants with regard to VPT score, t(23) = 0.52, p 
= .608. Similarly, participants in the gesture allowed condition who spon-
taneously gestured during task 3 did not differ from non-gesturing partici-
pants with regard to VPT score, t(23) = 0.48, p = 0.636. Thus VPT did not 
relate to spontaneous gesture prevalence in any of the three chess tasks. 
In similar vein, spontaneously gesturing participants during chess task 1, 
did not differ from non-gesturing participants with regard to CBT score, 
t(22) = .226, p = 0.823. Spontaneously gesturing participants during chess 
task 2, did not differ from non-gesturing participants with regard to CBT 
score, t(22) = 1.18, p = 0.251. Spontaneosly gesturing participants during 
chess task 3, did not differ from non-gesturing participants with regard to 
CBT score, t(22) = 2.04, p = .054. 
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Spontaneous and instructed gesture frequency likelihood. A repeat-
ed measures ANOVA was conducted to assess whether task complexity (within-
subjects: task 1 vs. task 2 vs. task 3) and gesture type (between-subjects: sponta-
neous vs. instructed gesture) predicted gesture frequency after controlling for 
time on task (gesture ratio), which allows us to test whether gesture frequencies 
were indeed higher in the instructed gesture condition (manipulation check) and 
whether task complexity affected gesture frequency (gesture likelihood hypothe-
sis). Note that participants are included in this analysis when they have gestured 
on task 1 or 2 or 3. Thus participants in the gesture allowed condition who did 
not gesture in any of the tasks are not included. In contrast to the hypothesis, we 
did not find an effect of task complexity on gesture ratio, F(2, 58)= 0.33, p = 
0.679. However, there was a main between subjects effect of gesture type, F(1, 
29) = 29.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .508, showing that gesture ratio was higher for par-
ticipants who were instructed to gesture (Mestimated = 0.43, SE = 0.05) than for 
participants who spontaneously gestured (Mestimated = 0.12, SD = 0.04). No inter-
action effect was obtained between complexity and gesture type, F(2, 58) = 
0.99, p = .378. 
We additionally added VPT as a covariate into the repeated measures 
ANCOVA, however this did not account for variance in frequency of gestures 
across complexity or gesture prevalence group, F(2, 56) > .269, p > .765. This 
was also the case when taking CBT into account as a covariate, F(2, 54) < .291, p 
> .749. This suggests that visual working memory capacity was not related to 
spontaneous (nor instructed-) gesture frequency. 
Gesture effect hypothesis 
We assessed whether visual working memory capacity (VPT) and gesture 
prevalence type (‗spontaneous‘ non-gesturing vs. spontaneous gesturing vs. in-
structed gesturing) affected performance (log solving speed) on each of the chess 
tasks through three separate multiple stepwise regression analyses. For each re-
gression analysis we entered VPT (mean centered for sample on chess task) in 
the first step, and dummy variables spontaneous gesture prevalence (0 = non-
gesturing, 1 = spontaneous gesturing) and instructed gesture prevalence (0 = 
non-gesturing, 1 = instructed gesturing) in the second step. In the third step we 
entered two interaction terms of the centered VPT with instructed and sponta-
neous gesturing. Again we predicted that gestures would benefit performance in 
more complex tasks (complexity task 1 < 2 < 3) qualified by interaction effects of 
VPT with instructed and spontaneous gesture prevalence, such that especially 
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those with a lower VPT scores improve in performance when using gestures (as 
compared to those who do not gesture). 
As can be seen in Table 6, no significant predictors were obtained for 
solving speed on task 1 in the final model.  
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a. Chess task 1 B (SE) β Model R
2
adjusted 
Intercept 
VPT 
2.972 (0.120) 
-1.890 (0.525)** 
 
-.451 
1** .188 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
2.993 (0.204) 
-1.866 (0.533)** 
-0.367 (0.489) 
 0.011 (0.260) 
 
-.444 
-.101 
 .006 
2** .166 
 
 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
VPT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
VPT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
2.993 (0.207) 
-1.934 (1.053) 
 -0.427 (0.503) 
0.011 (0.264) 
1.140 (1.984) 
 -0.107 (1.258)  
 
-.461 
 .117 
 .006 
 .095 
 -.020 
3* .140 
b. Chess task 2 B (SE) β Model R
2
adjusted 
Intercept 
VPT 
3.626 (0.150) 
-1.560 (0.662)* 
 
-.313* 
1* .081 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
4.058 (0.257) 
-1.509 (0.649)* 
-0.313 (0.480) 
 -0.715 (0.324) * 
 
-.303 
 -.094 
-.316 
2* .131 
 
 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
VPT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
VPT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
4.100 (0.248) 
1.127 (1.261)* 
 -0.322 (0.477) 
-0.747 (0.312)* 
-3.062 (2.093) 
 -3.592 (1.492)*  
 
 .226 
 -.097 
-.331 
-.240 
-.561 
3** .195 
c. Chess task 3 B (SE) β Model R
2
adjusted 
Intercept 
VPT 
2.967 (0.093) 
-1.285 (0.415)** 
 
-.415 
1** .265 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
3.174 (0.178) 
-1.17 (0.404)* 
.029 (0.153) 
 -0.417 (0.215) 
 
-.380 
 -.018 
-.303 
2** .220 
 
 
Intercept 
VPT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
VPT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
VPT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
3.248 (0.171) 
-3.084 (0.934)* 
 -0.064 (0.246) 
-0.530 (0.208)* 
1.392 (1.180) 
2.742 (1.066)* 
 
-.996 
-.039 
-.386 
.237 
.657 
3** .304 
Table 6. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting solving 
speed on task one to three. p < .05, ** p < .01 
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For task 2 (see also Figure 6a), in the final model (explaining 19.5% of the 
variance), instructed gesturing resulted in faster solving speed overall, t(47) = -
2.39, p = .021, Partial r = -.331. This was not the case for spontaneous gesturing, 
t(47) = -0.67, p = .506, Partial r = -.098. However, we also obtained an interaction 
of instructed gesturing and VPT t(47) = -2.41, p = .020, Partial r = -.331. We per-
formed a Johnson-Neyman Regions of Significance Tests to assess the nature of 
this interaction. This analysis showed, surprisingly, that especially those with a 
higher score on the VPT (centered score VPT = -.0104 to .4451, 60.34 % highest 
VPT scorers), benefited from gesturing when instructed to do so (range b = -
0.574 to -1.611, range Se = 0.285 to 0.624, range t(49) = -2.01 to -2.58, range p = 
.05 to .013).  
For task 3 (see also Figure 6b), in the final model (explaining 30.04% of 
the variance), we again found a main effect of instructed gesturing on log solving 
speed, t(47) = -2.55, p = .014, Partial r = -.366, next to a main overall effect of 
VPT, t(47) = -3.30, p = .002, Partial r = -.454). No effects on solving speed of 
spontaneous gesturing, t(47) = -0.26, p = 0.796, Partial r = -.040, nor an interac-
tion of spontaneous gesturing with VPT was found, t(47) = 1.18, p = 0.244, Partial 
r = .179. Additionally, the interaction term of VPT and instructed gesturing was a 
significant predictor for solving speed, t(47) = 2.57, p = .014, Partial r = .369. Fur-
ther regions of significance analysis showed a conditional effect of instructed ges-
ture resulting in faster solving speed (range b = -1.350 to -.344, range Se = 0.412 
to 0.171, range t(52) = -3.28 to -2.02, range p = .002 to .05) for those with a 
lower visual working memory capacity, range of significance for centered score 
VPT = -.475 to -.031 (47.91 % lowest VPT scorers). 
It should be noted that it is possible that the effects found in task three 
are the result of two statistical outliers and should be interpreted more carefully. 
These participants performed relatively slowly on task 3 (as can be seen in Figure 
6b). Yet we find no reason to exclude them based on information other than 
their performance. Note further that the task ceased when participants took 
longer than 300 seconds, ensuring the exclusion of extreme outliers (these two 
participants solving speed was 179 s and 219 s). However, we reran the analysis 
with these two data points excluded, which resulted in a non-significant fit of the 
overall regression model, but including a conditional significant effect of instruct-
ed gesture (range b = -0.368 to -0.282 range Se = 0.183 to 0.140, range t(52) = -
2.018 to -2.018, range p = .05 to .05, lowest p = .040) but for a smaller region, 
range centered score VPT = -0.133 to 0.033 (21.73% of VPT scorers). 
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6 
Chess task 1 B (SE) β Model R
2
adjusted 
Intercept 
CBT 
2.990 (0.130) 
-1.987 (0.837)* 
 
-.371 
1* .082 
Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
3.093 (0.225) 
-2.202 (0.853)* 
-0.528 (0.522) 
 0.109 (0.284) 
 
-.321 
-.146 
-.056 
2 .064 
 
 
Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
CBT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
CBT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
3.124 (0.230) 
-2.861 (1.335) 
-0.580 (0.535) 
-0.143 (0.289) 
1.877 (3.381) 
1.417 (1.807)  
 
-.459 
 -.160 
 -.068 
 .084 
 -.160 
3 .039 
Chess task 2 B (SE) β Model R
2
adjusted 
Intercept 
CBT 
3.601 (0.157) 
-1.409 (0.991) 
 
-.197 
1 .081 
Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
4.147 (0.276) 
-1.778 (0.971) 
-0.586 (0.500) 
 -0.835 (0.343)  
 
-.249 
-.177 
-.366 
2 .131 
 
 
Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
CBT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
CBT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
4.063 (0.278) 
0.063 (1.571)* 
 -0.638 (0.499) 
-0.753 (0.342)* 
-5.627 (2.991) 
 -2.087 (2.080)  
 
 .005 
-.193 
-.330 
-.297 
-.201 
3 .195 
(Continued on next page) 
Table 7. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting 
solving speed on chess task 1, 2, 3. 
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Chess task 3 B (SE) β Model R
2
adjusted 
Intercept 
CBT 
2.953 (0.098) 
-1.418 (0.621)* 
 
-.322 
1* .084 
Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
3.327 (0.197) 
-1.602 (0.621)* 
-0.191 (0.285)* 
 -0.618 (0.233) 
 
-.364 
 -.117 
-.446 
2** .201 
 
 
Intercept 
CBT 
Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
Instructed gesture prevalence 
CBT × Spontaneous gesture prevalence 
CBT × Instructed gesture prevalence 
3.277 (0.218) 
-1.071 (1.173) 
 -0.271 (0.303) 
-0.570 (0.251)* 
2.402 (1.810) 
-0.93 (1.066) 
 
-.243 
-.166 
-.411 
-.251 
-0.14 
3* .207 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Table 7 (continued). Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
predicting solving speed on chess task 1, 2, 3.  
We repeated the hierarchical regression analyses reported above with 
CBT. As can be seen in Table 4 across all tasks, none of the predicted interac-
tions of CBT with spontaneous or instructed gesture were obtained. 
In sum, participants who were instructed to gesture or spontaneously 
gestured performed better on the chess task 2 and 3 overall (in terms of solving 
speed) than participants who did not gesture. The moderating effects of visual 
working memory capacity were mixed, such that stronger effects of instructed 
(but not spontaneous) gesture were obtained (as compared to no gesture) for 
those with a higher visual working memory capacity in task 2 (contrary to our 
predictions), but in task 3 stronger effects were obtained for those with a lower 
visual working capacity (in line with out predictions). 
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Mental effort, difficulty, and interest 
As a subjective manipulation check of experienced cognitive load we as-
sessed whether task complexity indeed affected self-report measures of experi-
enced mental effort, difficulty and interest. 
See Table 3 for means and SDs for self-report ratings across chess task 
complexity and gesture prevalence. Overall, mental effort significantly varied 
across the three chess tasks, F(2, 102) = 7.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .131. Pair-wise 
comparisons with Bonferonni corrected p-values yielded a significant difference 
across complexity for the mental effort ratings, where mental effort was rated 
lower for task 1 compared to task 2, Mdiff = -0.48, p = .003, and task 1 compared 
to task 3, Mdiff = -0.48, p = .015. No differences in mental effort were observed 
between task 2 and 3, Mdiff = -0.00, p > .999. Difficulty also varied significantly 
across complexity, F(2, 104) = 14.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .221, wherein significant dif-
ferences were found between task 2 and task 1, Mdiff = -0.79 p < .001, and be-
tween task 1 and task 3, Mdiff = -0.70, p < .001. There was no difference in per-
ceived difficulty between task 2 and task 3, Mdiff = 0.09 p > .999. The same pattern 
was observed for the interest ratings, F(2, 104) = 7.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .132. Pair-
wise comparisons showed a significant difference between the reported interest 
for task 2 and task 1, Mdiff = -0.38, p < .001, and between task 1 and task 3, Mdiff = 
-0.34, p = .008. Again, there was no difference in interest between task 2 and task 
3, Mdiff = .04, p > .999.  
 
Discussion 
 
We hypothesized that gestures were more likely to arise in (gesture like-
lihood hypothesis) and positively affect (gesture effect hypothesis) problem solv-
ing under conditions of higher cognitive load (i.e., higher task complexity, lower 
visual or spatial working memory capacity). 
 
Gesture effect hypothesis 
 
In line with the gesture effect hypothesis, our results indicate that partic-
ipants who gestured on the TOH, either spontaneously or instructed, subse-
quently performed the task faster than participants who did not gesture of their 
own accord, but only for those with a lower visual working memory capacity. 
Interestingly, this interaction effect was not found for spatial working memory 
capacity. On the more complex chess tasks 2 and 3, instructed gesturing indeed 
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resulted in faster solving speeds overall as opposed to not gesturing. However, in 
contrast to the TOH task, spontaneous gesturing did not significantly speed up 
subsequent performance compared to not gesturing, possibly because of the 
smaller sample of spontaneous gesturers. Moreover, especially subjects with a 
lower visual (but again not spatial) working memory capacity who gestured when 
instructed to do so showed improved performance on chess task 3 (which re-
quired the most amount of moves to solve the problem) as compared to partici-
pants with similar working memory capacity who did not gesture. Interestingly, 
however, for task 2 those with a higher visual (but not spatial) working memory 
capacity, being instructed to gesture seemed to be less beneficial for subsequent 
performance as compared to those who did not gesture with similar visual work-
ing memory capacities. Again, no such interactions of gesture were found in rela-
tion to spatial working memory capacity. 
These findings on co-thought gesture‘s effect on problem solving lend 
additional support to the general idea that gesturing may be especially effective 
when internal cognitive resources are limited (Pouw et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
gestures seem to provide resources to support, or counteract, limited visual ra-
ther than spatial working memory processes in the current task. Before address-
ing this interesting unexpected difference between visual and spatial working 
memory capacity we should address how gestures might have benefited problem 
solving in the current task. We speculate that when confronted with mentally 
exploring the solution space of the Tower of Hanoi and Chess task the partici-
pants simulate the transformations of the discs/pieces from one place to another 
through mental imagery. Such mental imagery processes are likely to work in 
concert with the visual information that is provided by the static presentation of 
the task set-up, allowing simulated moves to be projected on the pegs or chess 
board (Kirsh, 2009). Simulating the moves also entails continuously memorizing 
the positions of the discs/pieces that are moved during the mental simulation. 
Keeping track of simulated moves therefore requires visual working memory 
processes, and those who have lower capacities are more likely to lose track of 
the changing positions of the discs/pieces during their more unstable visual imagi-
nations. We speculate that producing gestures offer stable visual and propriocep-
tive information regarding the hands in space, that allow a way to spatially index 
or ―temporarily‖ locking simulated moves represented by the hand in space, 
thereby alleviating the relatively unstable visual imagery processes that would 
otherwise fulfill this tracking function. Indeed, in a recent companion study we 
have found preliminary evidence that when participants with a lower visual work-
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ing memory capacity are instructed to gesture (vs. not to gesture) during mental 
preparation of the TOH they produce less eye movements, which suggests that 
moving the hands allow for a way to stabilize simulations in a less visually de-
manding way (Pouw, Mavilidi, Van Gog, & Paas, 2016).  
The finding that spatial working memory capacity did not interact with an 
effect of gesture on performance was surprising, and can only be met with sub-
stantial speculation. A superficial explanation would be that the pointing gestures 
in the current case are more potent for keeping active (i.e., locking) the visuo-
spatial static positions of the multiple pieces throughout the mental simulation 
rather than to keep track of the spatial sequential trajectories of the simulated 
discs/pieces. Yet, this explanation begs the question why pointing gestures would 
be potent in only this way. After all, these pointing gestures do contain infor-
mation about spatial sequential trajectories. Additionally, it might be the case that 
mental imagery involved in the TOH and Chess is especially taxing for visual 
working memory capacity, as indicated by higher correlations of the VPT with 
performance as opposed to the CBT, and as such gestures become supportive of 
this component rather than another. Changing the task to a more spatially taxing 
task might thus reverse the current result for the differential effect of gesture 
with regards to visual vs. spatial working memory. Speculations aside, the current 
findings cannot provide insight into why we find this interesting difference. How-
ever, an interesting alignment with the current results is that visual working 
memory capacity has been found to be more predictive for co-speech gesture 
frequency than spatial working memory capacity (Chu et al., 2014), corroborating 
the idea that gestures may be especially potent to alleviate limitations in visual 
working memory capacity. 
This study had some limitations that could lead us to over-interpret the 
evidence in favor of the gesture effect hypothesis, especially in the case of the 
chess tasks. Firstly, when designing the chess tasks we attempted to manipulate 
task complexity by varying the number of moves necessary to transform the 
begin state of the chessboard into the end state. We assumed that increasing the 
number of steps would linearly increase task complexity. This was not the case 
for the last two chess tasks, as participants performed better on chess task 2 
than on 3 and no differences in perceived difficulty or invested mental effort 
(both indices of experienced cognitive load) were obtained. Possibly, there were 
some task characteristics that we did not control for which also might have influ-
enced task complexity. For instance, in chess task 2, participants could transform 
the begin state into the end state in two ways, both using legitimate moves of the 
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chess pieces. However, one of these solutions was incorrect because it required 
the invalid chess action of moving a chess piece of the same color twice in a row. 
This was something that participants sometimes seemed to forget, resulting in 
overall slower solving speeds. Perhaps this resulted in different task demands in 
chess task two as compared to task three. This difference in chess task demands 
may have also resulted in the gesture and visual working memory capacity inter-
action we found that is difficult to interpret from our perspective; namely, that 
especially those with a higher visual working memory capacity benefited from 
instructed gesturing on chess task 2.  
Another objection to our present interpretation is that the current ges-
ture effects can be attributed to the idea that gestures reflect efficient mental 
simulations rather than contributing to them. We think the present findings are 
not very supportive for this possibility. Firstly, a salient aspect of the present de-
sign is that we measure performance after a gesture manipulation, as such ensur-
ing that gesture effects are in some way causally related to performance as op-
posed to being an epiphenomenon to some ongoing problem solving process. 
Additionally, had we only obtained a relation between spontaneous (and not in-
structed) gestures and performance it could still be that gestures are a conse-
quence of effective mental planning rather than supportive of it. However, we 
found that manipulating gesture use through instruction showed similar positive 
gesture effects as spontaneous gestures in the TOH and chess task (although in 
this case we only obtained effects for instructed gesturing), thus providing evi-
dence for a causal relation of gesture production and performance, rather than 
mental pre-cursors of gesture and performance (for a discussion see Pouw et al., 
2014). 
 
Gesture Likelihood Hypothesis 
 
Our results provide only partial support for the gesture likelihood hy-
pothesis dictating that gesticulation (in terms of prevalence or frequency) is more 
likely when cognitive load is high. With increasing task complexity, the percent-
age of participants who spontaneously gestured, increased, as expected, and ges-
turing was more frequent during the more complex TOH trial. In the chess task, 
however, no significant differences of gesture frequency were found when con-
trolling for time on task (which was longer on the more complex tasks). Moreo-
ver, in contrast to research that suggests that limited working memory capacities 
relate to higher co-speech gesture frequency, neither visual nor spatial working 
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memory capacity contributed to gesture frequency or prevalence in either the 
TOH or chess task.  
This partial support should also be interpreted with some caution, be-
cause the higher the task complexity, the larger the number of steps needed to 
solve the task. Even though participants indeed experienced higher cognitive load 
(i.e., higher mental effort and difficulty ratings) in the more complex TOH task, 
the finding that gesture frequency was higher on the more complex TOH task 
might be due to the fact that this task required more steps to solve as opposed 
to the cognitive load the task imposed. Of course, in the current tasks, it is diffi-
cult to manipulate complexity without (a) increasing the number of steps to solve 
the task or (b) keeping the task the same but adding a secondary task to manipu-
late cognitive load. Future research could resolve this issue by adopting option b 
in the design (see e.g., Marstaller & Burianová, 2013). 
Yet, shortcomings aside, it should be emphasized that the current study 
shows for the first time that the present physical and digital setup of the TOH 
and Chess tasks, respectively, solicit spontaneous co-thought gestures. That 
spontaneous co-thought gesticulation was similar in nature (pointing gestures) 
across tasks is interesting as Chu & Kita (2016) have shown that when digital 
mental rotation stimuli are perceived as more manipulable co-thought gestures 
increase in rate when problem solving with such stimuli. Clearly, more research 
is needed to ascertain the factors which determine the likelihood and the form of 
co-thought gesticulation, by differentiating between factors that are inherent to 
the logical structure of solving the task, and the physical affordances related to 
solving the task (cf. Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009). Yet, that co-thought gestures 
spontaneously emerged during the current tasks is an important finding in and of 
itself, as it provides a paradigm for further investigation into natural occurrences 
of co-thought gesticulation, next to the few paradigms that are currently used 
(e.g., mental rotation, route learning). Moreover, in the case of the TOH task the 
current findings may inspire future research contrasting the cognitive function of 
co-thought and co-speech gestures. For example, the spontaneous gestures ob-
served in the current TOH task were virtually all deictic (i.e., pointing) gestures, 
whereas previous research has established that co-speech gestures in explaining 
solving the TOH are often iconic in nature (e.g., grasping movements; e.g., Cook 
& Tanenhaus, 2009; Trofatter et al., 2015). This begs the question whether the 
form (pointing vs. iconic), is connected with different functions relating to prob-
lem solving versus speech processes (see e.g., Capuccio, Chu, & Kita, 2013; Chu 
& Kita, 2016). 
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Conclusion 
 
The current findings add to the sparse literature on co-thought gestures. 
Firstly, we offer novel evidence that co-thought pointing- (rather than iconic-) 
gestures can be spontaneously solicited when participants are confronted with 
having to mentally solve the current TOH or chess task. Furthermore, gestures 
seem to be especially productive for problem solving performance when tasks 
are more complex (as corroborated by previous findings, Chu & Kita, 2008), and 
interact visual (but not spatial) working memory capacity. Moreover, given the 
current results that while some individuals already naturally use the body for 
cognitive benefit, encouraging others to do so may aid problem-solving perfor-
mance. The present study therefore provides additional support that gestures‘ 
cognitive function may go beyond speech processing (a fundamental topic in ges-
ture theory), and may (if developed further) improve educational environments 
by soliciting embodied problem solving. For instance, from the results we can 
imagine that current chess learning regimes can be more accommodating for be-
ginning learners (as they experience a higher complexity of the task) when these 
learners are prompted to think out their moves with their hands.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Co-thought gestures in children‘s mental problem solving: 
Prevalence and effects on subsequent performance* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This chapter has been submitted for publication as Pouw, W., Van 
Gog, T., Agostinho, S., Zwaan, R. A., & Paas, F. (2016). Co-thought ges-
tures in children’s mental problem solving: Prevalence and effects on subse-
quent performance. Manuscript submitted for publication 
Open Data: This study has been pre-registered on the Open Science 
Framework. Pre-registration form, materials, anonymized data-set, and 
syntax of statistical analyses can be retrieved from https://osf.io/dreks/. 
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Co-thought gestures in children‘s mental problem solving: 
Prevalence and effects on subsequent performance 
 
Co-thought gestures are understudied compared to co-speech gestures, yet may 
provide insight into possible cognitive functions of gestures that are independ-
ent of speech processes. A recent study with adults showed that co-thought 
gesticulation occurred spontaneously during mental preparation of problem 
solving. Moreover, co-thought gesturing (either spontaneous or instructed) 
during mental preparation was effective for subsequent solving of the Tower 
of Hanoi under conditions of high cognitive load (i.e. when visual working 
memory capacity was limited and when the task was more difficult). We inves-
tigated whether co-thought gestures would also spontaneously occur and 
would aid problem-solving processes in children (N = 74; 8-12 years old) un-
der high load conditions. Although children also spontaneously used co-
thought gestures during mental problem solving, this did not aid their subse-
quent performance when physically solving the problem. If these null-results 
are on track, effects of co-thought gestures may be different in adults and 
children.  
172 
 
7 
Introduction 
 The majority of our hand-gestures emerge in synchrony with speech, 
usually in service of some communicative goal. Yet, we also gesture when we 
think in silence, without any intention of communication. These so-called co-
thought gestures, which may take the form of pointing to locations/objects, or 
simulating task-relevant actions (e.g., grasping and replacing), are observed in a 
variety of non-communicative tasks, such as mental rotation, or remembering 
a route (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2008; Logan, Lowrie, & Diezmann, 2014). Evidence 
suggests that such co-thought gestures are not merely epiphenomenal to 
thinking, because problem solvers‘ performance has been shown to improve 
from gesturing (as opposed to not gesturing or being prohibited from gestur-
ing; e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011; Pouw, Eielts, Van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, under re-
view; So, Shum, & Wong, 2015). Yet, the cognitive function of co-thought ges-
tures is understudied relative to co-speech gestures. As a consequence, it is 
still unclear when and why co-thought gestures are produced, and whether 
and how they support cognitive processes.  
According to recent evidence, co-thought gestures and co-speech ges-
tures may have a common cognitive origin (Chu & Kita, 2015). That is, the 
rate with which co-thought gestures are spontaneously produced in a silent 
mental rotation task corresponds (within participants) with the rate with 
which co-speech gestures are elicited in the same task. Moreover, when ob-
jects are seen as more difficult to physically rotate, both co-speech and co-
thought gestures are less likely to spontaneously emerge (as opposed to ob-
jects with a more manipulable surface). Such findings hint at a possible com-
mon cognitive origin of co-thought and co-speech gestures that are not direct-
ly tied to speech processes or communicative intent (cf. McNeill, 2008). Ra-
ther, an action-generation system may underlie such gestures observed in 
mental rotation tasks, which is sensitive to affordances solicited by the objects 
that is thought or spoken about (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008).  
 In addition to the issue of which cognitive processes (e.g., action read-
iness) play a causal role in co-thought gesture production, there is the issue of 
whether, and if so how, co-thought gestures play a causal role in cognitive 
processes (Chu & Kita, 2011; Pouw, de Nooijer, Van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, 
2014). That co-thought gestures affect cognitive processes is supported by a 
handful of studies (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011; Hegarty, Mayer, Kriz, Keehner, 
2005; Logan, Lowrie, & Diezmann, 2014; Pouw, Eielts, Van Gog, Zwaan, & 
Paas, under review; Schwartz & Black, 1999; So, Shum, & Wong, 2015). For 
xample, mental rotation co-thought gestures are found to improve mental 
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rotation performance (Chu & Kita, 2011). For example, judging whether a cup 
of a particular size will spill water can be improved when physically enacting a 
pouring movement through silent gesture (as opposed to mental inference 
alone; Schwartz & Black, 1999). Arguably, enacting a grasping movement al-
lows bringing forth procedural knowledge from previous experience, which 
improved performance in this task. Route learning can be improved when par-
ticipants rehearse the route on a road map with silent tracing gestures (as op-
posed to rehearsing it verbally; So et al., 2015). In sum, co-thought gestures 
are not merely epiphenomenal to cognitive processing; they seem to directly 
support those very processes. 
 With regard to when and why co-thought gestures are produced, evi-
dence seems to suggest that - like co-speech gestures - they are used to sup-
port problem solving especially when internal cognitive resources are taxed 
(Pouw et al. de Nooijer, van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, 2014). That is, compared to 
not gesturing, co-speech and co-thought gestures are more likely to arise 
when the problem at hand is more difficult (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2008; Hostetter, 
Alibali, & Kita, 2007). Such gestures seem to provide additional cognitive re-
sources when engaging in cognitively demanding dual-tasks or when internal 
cognitive resources such as working memory capacity is low (e.g., Goldin-
Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Marstaller & Burianová, 2013).  
 In a recent study with adults, the idea was tested that co-thought ges-
tures occur when internal cognitive resources are taxed, either induced by the 
difficulty of the task, or by limited cognitive capacities (Pouw et al., under re-
view). Participants (aged 18-31) had to mentally prepare for physically solving 
the Tower of Hanoi at different levels of complexity (3-disc and 4-disc), and 
were allowed to gesture (i.e. they were not instructed to, but also not prohib-
ited from gesturing) or instructed to gesture. Participants‘ subsequent prob-
lem solving performance (i.e., solving speed) improved when they gestured 
during mental preparation (either spontaneously or instructed), but only when 
the TOH task was more difficult, and when they had lower visual working 
memory capacity (determined via a Visual Patterns Test, explained below). In a 
subsequent study (Pouw, Mavilidi, van Gog, & Paas, 2016), it was found that 
adult participants (age 24-50 yrs) who were instructed to gesture during men-
tal problem solving of the TOH, and especially those with a lower visual work-
ing memory capacity, were likely to reduce their eye movements during men-
tal problem solving (as indicated by a drop in fixations directed at the Tower 
of Hanoi display when gesturing vs. not gesturing). This suggests that gesturing 
provides an alternate (i.e., non-visually guided) motoric strategy to support 
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mentally simulation of the problem solving procedure, which may be especially 
fruitful for those problem solvers who lack internal cognitive resources for 
solving the task in a more disembodied way, using purely internal mental in-
ference and imagery processes. 
 The aim of the current study is to investigate whether our findings 
with adults, showing that co-thought gestures are effective for fostering sub-
sequent problem solving when cognitive load is high, would be replicated in 
children (we pre-registered this study). It is important to attempt to replicate 
these findings in a younger age sample (8-12 years), because children‘s visual 
working memory capacity is likely still in development (Gathercole, Pickering, 
Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004), and as such co-thought gestures could prove to 
be especially effective for this age sample (see also Paas & Sweller, 2012). 
Moreover, research on children‘s spontaneous adoption of co-thought ges-
tures, and the effects on problem solving performance, is particularly scarce 
(for an exception, see Delgado et al., 2011).  
 In the current study, we assessed children‘s visual working memory 
capacity and then had them solve two consecutive trials of the Tower of Ha-
noi problem that differed in complexity, and hence, working memory load (3-
disc and 4-disc). Before each problem-solving phase children were required to 
mentally prepare the task, by thinking through the solution in silence - just 
prior to physically solving the particular TOH trial. One third of the children 
were instructed to gesture during mental problem solving, whilst the rest 
were allowed (but not instructed) to gesture, and we assessed whether they 
spontaneously gestured (spontaneous gesture group), or not (no gesture 
group). We hypothesized that gesture prevalence during mental problem solv-
ing in children (either when children were instructed to gesture, or when 
spontaneously gesturing) would positively affect actual problem-solving per-
formance (solving speed and solving steps) in all trials (TOH 3-disc and TOH 
4-disc) as compared to natural non-gesturing. Furthermore, this effect would 
be more pronounced on the more complex task (TOH4) and for children 
with lower visual working memory capacity. We will further refer to this hy-
pothesis as the gesture effect hypothesis. 
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Method 
Participants & Design 
This study was approved by the Human Research Committee of the 
University of Wollongong. Children between 8 and 12 years old were recruit-
ed for participation during their visit to a local Science Centre & Planetarium. 
This is a facility where children can learn about science, engineering and tech-
nology through interactive exhibits. The Tower of Hanoi is one of these inter-
active exhibits and thus was considered an ideal context for this study. The 
initial plan was to recruit 100 participants, but within the available time at the 
science centre we recruited 74 participants. We had to exclude 3 participants 
due to video camera failure, and an additional 3 participants, because they did 
not fit the age-requirement (younger than 8 or older than 12) years13. Addi-
tionally, 2 participants were excluded because they failed to comply with the 
task procedures (e.g., did not engage in the mental solving task), as observed 
by both the first and second coder of the video data (e.g., being continuously 
distracted, talking continuously during the mental solving phase). The final 
sample consisted of 66 participants (38 boys (57.6%), 28 girls (42.2%), Mage 
=9.83, SD = 1.20).  
As stated in the pre-registration report, we assigned one third of par-
ticipants to the gesture instruction condition (after exclusion: N = 23, 13 boys 
(56.5%), 10 girls (43.5%), Mage = 9.96, SD = 1.21), and two thirds to the no 
gesture instruction condition (after exclusion: N = 43, 15 boys (34.9%), 28 
girls (64.1%), Mage = 9.75, SD = 1.21), This was done because participants in 
the no gesture instruction condition would later be subdivided in the analyses, 
depending on whether they gestured spontaneously during the mental prob-
lem-solving phase (spontaneous gesture group) or not (no gesture group). For 
the 3-disc Tower of Hanoi (TOH 3) the spontaneous gesture group included 
13 participants, vs. 30 in the no gesture group and 23 in the instructed gesture 
group; in the 4-disc Tower of Hanoi (TOH 4) the spontaneous gesture group 
included 19 participants, vs. 24 in the no gesture group and 23 in the instruct-
ed gesture group.  
 
  
                                                          
13 Although parents were briefed about the age-requirement, due to some miscom-
munication, some parents enrolled younger/older children for the study. 
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Materials & Measures 
Visual working memory capacity: Visual Patterns Test 
The Visual Patterns Test (VPT; Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, & Wilson, 
1997) was used as a measure of visual working memory capacity. We used an 
adaptation of the VPT developed by Chu and colleagues (2013). Participants 
were shown a matrix, in various patterns, in which half of the squares were 
colored black. Each pattern was displayed for 3 seconds, after which all the 
squares turned white. Subsequently, participants indicated by mouse-clicking 
on an empty grid the previous pattern of black squares. This was the adapta-
tion made to simplify the task for children as when administered with adults 
they are required to verbally recall the pattern by naming letters that are as-
signed to the squares. Participants could select and deselect squares and con-
tinue to the next trial when they clicked on ‗next‘ button. The VPT consists of 
25 trials, with blocks of five trials per difficulty level (which increased from 
seven to 11 black squares). Before the start of the task participants were pro-
vided with two practice trials (of three and four black squares, respectively). If 
participants failed to recall one or more of the black squares, the trial was au-
tomatically scored as an incorrect response. After five consecutive incorrect 
responses within one block of trials the task automatically stopped. Perfor-
mance scores were calculated as the proportion of correct responses out of 
all trials (i.e., number of correct trials/total number of trials [i.e., 25]).  
Tower of Hanoi  
The TOH consisted of a structure with a rectangular base with three 
evenly spaced pegs mounted on top. The task unfolded with a number of dif-
ferently sized discs (practice trial: two discs, first trial: 3-discs, second trial: 4-
discs) placed on the left-most peg; discs were placed decreasing in size from 
bottom to top. The discs were to be replaced during the problem-solving 
process onto the right-most peg in the same order (decreasing in size from 
bottom to top) while following the rules (see procedure). Identical to the 
procedure used in Pouw et al. (under review), Participants engaged in mental 
preparation for 2.5 minutes and then physically solved the problem when they 
took longer than five minutes for physical solving, the trial was aborted.  
Gesture. Each participant‘s mental preparation phases for the 3-disc 
and 4-disc trials were coded for prevalence (no gesture vs. gesture) and type 
(pointing vs. iconic) of gesture. However, since there were virtually no iconic 
gestures observed (there were two exceptions where children momentarily 
gestured as-if grasping the discs next to performing pointing gestures) we only 
examined pointing gestures (see Figure 1 for examples of observed gestures). 
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We counted the number of pointing movements per participant as a measure 
of gesture frequency in such a way that each rest point after a pointing gesture 
(either whole hand -or finger-pointing) is considered as one instance and as a 
trial wherein gesture is prevalent (gesture prevalence). It should be noted that 
participants were able to, and sometimes did touch the rectangular base of the 
TOH (or just a place on the table) thereby ―marking‖ a place through pointing 
gesture instead of pointing only in the air (these pointing-touch gestures were 
counted as pointing gestures). Additionally, there were four participants who 
did not point during mental preparation but when they asked a question to 
the experimenter during this session they did use pointing gestures. These 
gestures were not considered as gestures during mental preparation. An inde-
pendent coder counted all the gesture instances in the sample and the first 
author recounted gestures of 15.15% of the participants who gestured to 
check for interrater reliability (interrater reliability was high, r = .992, p < 
.001).  
 
 
Figure 1. Two examples of spontaneous gestures arising during mental problem 
solving for the TOH (1 frame per second). Faces blurred for anonymization.   
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Self-report Measures: Mental effort, difficulty, interest 
We obtained an indication of experienced mental effort, perceived dif-
ficulty, and experienced interest after the 3-disc as well as the 4-disc TOH 
problem-solving trial. These self-reports (for a discussion on self-report and 
cognitive load see Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Gerven, 2003) were verbally 
reported and administered by the experimenter on a 5-point rating scale: 
―How hard did you need to think to solve the task? (mental effort; 1 = ‗not 
hard‘, to 5 = ‗very hard‘), ―How difficult did you find this task‖ (difficulty; 1 = 
‗not difficult‘, to 5 = ‗very difficult‘), and ―How interesting did you find this 
task‖ (interest; 1 = ‗not interesting‘, to 5 = ‗very interesting‘). 
Prior experience. Before the start of the TOH task participants were 
asked whether they had played the Tower of Hanoi before (‗no‘ responses: 
83.8 %, ‗yes‘ responses: 16.2%; yes responses were equally distributed among 
the no gesture instruction condition 16.6 % ‗yes‘ and the gesture instruction 
condition 15.9% ‗yes‘). 
Procedure 
 The current study was conducted at the local science centre. Visiting 
parents/caregivers (from hereon: caregivers) and their children were invited 
to participate in a 30 minute study about problem solving. Caregivers were 
asked whether (one of) their children was between 8-12 years old, and were 
further informed about the nature of the study and given an information sheet 
and consent form. Additionally, caregivers were recruited and informed about 
the study via email through the member‘s list of the centre, upon which an 
appointment could be made to conduct the study at the science centre. As a 
reward for their participation, children were given a discount at the science 
centre‘s shop of 6 Australian Dollars. 
When caregivers and children agreed on participation they were di-
rected to a more quiet space with minimal background noise, and no other 
visitors present. However, some background noise of other visitors and exhi-
bitions was unavoidable. The caregivers, were allowed to be (and often were) 
present during the experiment, and were seated behind the child and were 
asked to not help the child or otherwise intervene during the study in any 
way. Children were seated at a desk, with a computer, a video camera and the 
TOH present and were informed about the tasks. Additionally, children were 
told that there were no right or wrong answers, that results would not be 
shared with their caregivers, and that they were able at all times to abort the 
study.  
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In the first phase of the study children performed the VPT. Children 
would first read the instruction, upon which the experimenter verbally re-
peated it, and they proceeded with the VPT-practice trials. If children made a 
mistake during the practice trials, the experimenter would explain what went 
wrong and in such cases children re-did the practice trials until successfully 
completed. Children were then told that a longer series of trials would com-
mence and that they would do that on their own for about 5 minutes, after 
which they would proceed to the next task. 
Subsequently, children engaged in the TOH problem-solving trials. 
The experimenter explained the nature of the task with a practice example of 
2-discs. The children were told that each trial would involve the experimenter 
putting a tower of discs on the left-most peg from large to small (i.e., smaller 
discs on top). They would need to solve the task by replacing the discs to the 
outer most right peg while taking two rules into consideration. Firstly, only 
one disc can be moved at a time. Secondly, only smaller discs can be put upon 
larger discs, not the other way around, and discs of any size could always be 
put on empty pegs. Additionally, the experimenter demonstrated that you 
could always move discs back to the original peg if needed, as long as the rules 
were not violated. Children then performed the practice TOH 2-disc trial. 
When children were unable to solve the task (which did not happen often), 
the experimenter repeated the instruction and children redid the practice trial 
until successfully completed. Subsequently, children were presented with a 
TOH 3-disc problem, and the rules of the task were repeated. They were told 
they would have to solve the puzzle as fast and accurately as possible, but be-
fore doing so they could prepare their solution for 2.5 minutes (150 seconds) 
without physically interacting with the TOH. This was called the mental prep-
aration phase, and children were informed that thinking out the moves before 
the actual task could help them understand the problem. Participants in the 
gesture instructed condition were explicitly instructed to think with their 
hands using pointing gestures (as demonstrated by the experimenter who per-
formed several pointing movements in the air directed at the TOH apparatus) 
during this mental preparation phase. Participants in the no gesture instruction 
condition were not given this additional instruction. During the mental prepa-
ration phase(s), the participant‘s hand gestures that (spontaneously) emerged 
during thinking out the solution for 2.5 minutes were video-recorded. Note, 
that sometimes children asked a question during the mental preparation 
phase. If the question concerned the task rules, the experimenter would give 
the answer, and instruct the child to (mentally) work again on the problem. 
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Directly after each preparation phase participants solved the task by physically 
manipulating the TOH (which was also video-recorded). This procedure, that 
is, a 2.5 minute mental preparation phase followed by actual problem solving, 
was performed first with the TOH 3-disc, and then with the more difficult 
TOH 4-disc. 
During the actual solving of the TOH tasks, participants had to solve 
the task within 5 minutes (they were not informed about this time constraint 
to avoid them experiencing pressure). If they were not able to solve the task 
in time (which was sometimes the case on the TOH 4-disc), the trial was 
aborted, but the experimenter would give pointers to the child on how to 
finish the task. Although the rules of the TOH were mastered quite easily by 
the children, they did sometimes make a mistake with regard to one of the 
rules, and the experimenter would instruct the child to look again whether 
they did not violate any rules. This always led to self-correction upon which 
the child could proceed further. 
After the TOH 3-disc and 4-disc procedure children were given a final 
task for exploratory purposes; it involved another 4-disc task with the rules 
inversed preceded by a self-explanation phase. Data on this task will not be 
reported here (as registered in the pre-registration report). Finally, children 
were informed about the nature of the study, thanked and awarded with a 
voucher for their participation, and contact details of caregivers were gath-
ered for future communication of the results of the study (reported at group 
level, never on individual children).  
 
Outliers 
As mentioned in the pre-registered report, it is likely that the current 
sample will have considerable variability in visual working memory capacity 
and problem-solving competence. We used a similar procedure to control for 
extreme outliers as used by Chu, Meyer, Foulkes, and Kita (2013; see also 
Miyake et al., 2000). For each variable included in the regression analysis (VPT, 
solving speed, number of solving steps) any value laying 3 standard deviations 
under (or above) the mean will be set to exactly 3SD under (or above) the 
mean. This trimming procedure allows us to prevent loss of data with ex-
treme values, without dramatically biasing the results.  
Results 
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The results are divided in three parts. First, relevant descriptive statis-
tics and correlations are reported. Subsequently we report the confirmatory 
analysis according to plan (see pre-registration report). 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
TOH Problem-Solving Performance 
All participants were able to solve the TOH 3-disc within 5 minutes. 
Mean solving time was 46.33 seconds (s) (SD = 0.72 s, observed range 9-272 s; 
one outlier > 3SD above the mean was observed and replaced as reported 
above; new range: 9-173). The mean number of solving steps for TOH 3-disc 
was 10.02 (SD = 5.16, observed range: 7-26; one outlier > 3SD above the 
mean was observed and replaced; new range: 7-25). Furthermore, 62.1% 
(41/66) of the children solved the TOH 3-disc in the fastest way possible (i.e., 
7 steps).  
Seven participants (10.6%) were not able to solve the TOH 4-disc 
within 5 minutes, so for these participants no score was obtained. Mean solv-
ing time was 111.02 s (SD = 65.84, observed range: 26-278 s; no outliers). The 
mean number of solving steps for the TOH 4-disc was 31.83 (SD = 13.22, ob-
served range: 15-74; one outlier > 3SD above the mean was observed and 
replaced; new range: 15-63). Only 4.5% (3/58) of the participants were able to 
solve the task in the minimal number of moves (i.e., 15 steps). 
VPT. The mean score on the VPT was .42 (SD = .20, observed range: 
.04-.92; no outliers were observed). 
Gesture Production. In the no gesture instruction condition during 
the TOH 3-disc, 30.95% (13/42)14 of the participants spontaneously gestured 
during the mental preparation phase with a mean gesture frequency of 48.85 
(SD = 13.57; observed range: 2-166). In the gesture instruction condition, eve-
ry participant gestured, and the mean gesture frequency was 77.13 (SD = 
29.37, observed range: 27-134). 
On the TOH 4-disc, 44.19% (19/43) of the participants spontaneously 
gestured during the mental preparation phase in the no gesture instruction 
condition, with a mean gesture frequency of 43.211(SD = 34.82, observed 
range 7-123). In the instructed gesture condition, all participants gestured, and 
the mean gesture frequency was 72.09 (SD = 34.79, observed range 35-158). 
                                                          
14 Note that analysis including gesture and performance on the TOH3, one additional 
participant was excluded because of a camera failure during this trial (but not the sub-
sequent TOH4 trial). 
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Gesture Production Relative to Adults. Figure 2 provides the graph-
ical presentation of the gesture production data presented above, with an ad-
ditional comparison of the gesture production rate (and percentage of spon-
taneous gesturers) of our previous study with the adult sample (Pouw et al., 
under review). Note that exactly the same procedure was used, thus a direct 
comparison is informative. Informal inspection of the figure shows that the 
likelihood that spontaneous gestures are adopted in the no instruction group 
seems to be comparable across age sample (i.e. there is only a 1.64% [TOH3] 
and 2.09% [TOH4] difference in the likelihood that participants spontaneously 
gesture). Additionally, it seems that children had a similar gesture frequency as 
adults on the 4-disc Tower of Hanoi, but a higher gesture rate on the 3-disc 
Tower of Hanoi. We will return to this interesting finding from the compari-
son in the discussion. 
 
 
Figure 2. Gesture frequency, and spontaneous gesture likelihood on the TOH 
3-disc and 4-disc Gesture production data for the current sample with chil-
dren versus the adult sample as reported in (Pouw et al., under review). Next 
to the gesture rate during each mental preparation trial (150 seconds of men-
tal preparation) per age group, the number of spontaneous gesturers (i.e., the 
number of participants from the total no instruction group that spontaneously 
adopted gesture) is presented.  
Correlations between Problem-Solving Performance, VPT, and 
Gesture. Table 1 shows the overall correlations and correlations-per-gesture-
group (no gesture-, spontaneous gesture-, and instructed gesture group) be-
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tween problem-solving performance on the TOH 3-disc and 4-disc, VPT, and 
gesture frequency. As can be seen, overall, VPT is not a strong predictor for 
problem solving performance, showing only a significant correlation with solv-
ing steps on the TOH 4-disc (p = .033), such that participants with higher VPT 
scores solved the problem in a lower number of steps. Not surprisingly, solv-
ing speed and number of solving steps needed to solve the TOH tasks were 
highly correlated. A more interesting finding of the correlation analyses is that 
for participants in the instructed gesture group, the number of gestures per-
formed (i.e., gesture frequency) was highly correlated with problem solving 
performance on TOH 3-disc, such that higher gesture frequencies resulted in 
faster solving times (p = .001) and a lower number of steps needed to solve 
the task (p = .019). However, surprisingly, this was not the case for those par-
ticipants who spontaneously gestured. Furthermore, this effect of instructed 
gesture frequency on problem-solving performance was not replicated for the 
more difficult TOH 4-disc task. 
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Overall Mean(SD) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. VPT .41(.20)  -.074 -.014 -.328 -.467* 
2. Solving Time 47.75(47.42)   .734** .376 .244 
3. Solving Steps 9.95(4.92)    .238 .127 
4. Solving Time 103.78(63.59)     .127 
5. Solving Steps 30.46(13.09)      
No Gesture Group TOH 3-
disc (N = 29) 
Mean(SD) 1. 2. 3.   
1.VPT .41(.20)  -.174 -.004   
2. Solving Time 48.63(46.91)   .715**   
3. Solving Steps 9.97(5.28)      
Spontaneous Gesture 
Group TOH 3-disc (N = 13) 
Mean(SD) 1. 2. 3. 4.  
1. VPT .41(.20)  -.361 -.360 .106  
2. Solving Time 48.15(51.52)   .880* -.042  
3. Solving Steps 10.15(4.36)    -.154  
4. Gesture Frequency 48.85(48.92)      
Instructed Gesture Group 
TOH 3-disc (N = 23) 
Mean(SD) 1. 2. 3. 4.  
1. VPT .45(.21)  -0.74 -.014 .152  
2. Solving Time 33.87(28.77)   .734** -.634**  
3. Solving Steps 9.44(4.51)    -.483*  
4. Gesture Frequency 77.13(29.37)      
No Gesture Group TOH 4-
disc (N = 21) 
Mean(SD) 1. 2. 3.   
1.VPT .42(.21)  -.469* -.404   
2. Solving Time 111.24(63.78)   .95**   
3. Solving Steps 31.57(13.59)      
Spontaneous Gesture 
Group TOH 4-disc (N = 16) 
Mean(SD) 1. 2. 3. 4.  
1. VPT .45(.15)  -.070 .347 .105  
2. Solving Time 94.00(64.05)   .878** -.333  
3. Solving Steps 29.00(12.70)    -.258  
4. Gesture Frequency 44.19(37.42)      
Instructed Gesture Group 
TOH 4-disc (N = 21) 
Mean(SD) 1. 2. 3. 4.  
1. VPT .45(.21)  -.328 -.467* .231  
2. Solving Time 123.76(69.34)   .738 -.243  
3. Solving Steps 32.23(9.84)    -.148  
4. Gesture Frequency 73.381(31.73)      
Table 1. Means (and SD) and Correlations of Problem-Solving Performance, VPT, and Ges-
ture. Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05. When TOH 4-disc is concerned we only report 
means and correlations for participants who were able to solve the task.  
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Self-Report Data. Overall means for the TOH 3-disc and 4-disc are 
reported in Table 2. As can be expected the TOH 4-disc was generally re-
ported to be more difficult, t (65) = -9.236, p < .001 (paired t-test), and to 
require more mental effort, t (65) = -8.443, p < .001 than the TOH 3-disc. 
The children found the TOH 4-disc more interesting than the TOH-3 disc, t 
(65) = -2.345, p = .022.  
 
Table 2. Means (and SD) of Self-reported Difficulty, Mental Effort, and Interest 
  
 
Overall 
TOH 3-disc 
Mean(SD) 
TOH 4 Hanoi 4-disc 
Mean(SD) 
1. Difficulty 2.56(0.93) 3.86(0.90) 
2. Mental Effort 3.02(1.09) 4.08(0.89) 
3. Interest 4.21(0.81) 4.42(0.70) 
No Gesture Group Mean(SD) Mean(SD) 
1. Difficulty 2.41(0.63) 3.75(0.99) 
2. Mental Effort 2.76(1.09) 3.92(1.02) 
3. Interest 4.241(0.83) 4.38(0.71) 
Spontaneous Gesture 
Group 
Mean(SD) Mean(SD) 
1. Difficulty 2.77(1.09) 3.89(0.88) 
2. Mental Effort 3.46(0.78) 4.11(0.81) 
3. Interest 4.08(0.95) 4.37(0.68) 
Instructed Gesture 
Group 
Mean(SD) Mean(SD) 
1. Difficulty 2.57(1.12) 3.95(0.84) 
2. Mental Effort 3.13(1.18) 4.23(0.81) 
3. Interest 4.21(0.74) 4.50(0.74) 
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Confirmatory Hypothesis Testing 
 The following analyses were registered in the pre-registration report. 
Hypothesis 1 
Our first hypothesis was that after controlling for age, visual working 
memory capacity would be positively related to problem-solving performance 
(i.e., that higher VWM would result in faster TOH solving speed and less steps 
needed to solve the task). We assessed whether this was the case with step-
wise multiple regressions analyses, entering age and VWM as predictors for 
performance. As can be seen in Table 3, no significant effects of age or VPT 
score on performance (i.e., solving speed and solving steps) were obtained on 
either the TOH 3-disc or TOH 4-disc. This was unexpected and suggests that 
visual working memory capacity and age were not strong predictors for per-
formance on the problem-solving task. 
Hypothesis 2 
Our second hypothesis was that after controlling for age, gesture 
prevalence (instructed and spontaneous) during mental problem solving would 
positively affect actual problem-solving performance (i.e., faster solving speed 
and less solving steps) in both trials (TOH 3-disc and TOH 4-disc) as com-
pared to natural non-gesturing, but that this effect would be more pro-
nounced on the most complex task (TOH4) and for participants with a rela-
tively lower visual working memory capacity. We analysed whether this was 
the case with two multiple stepwise regression analyses per DV. For each DV 
(3-disc and 4-disc solving speed and number of steps) we first looked at the 
combined gesture effect (as opposed to parsing out the effects of instructed 
vs. spontaneously gesturing) as this is the most powerful analysis to assess the 
gesture effect hypothesis. In the first step of the stepwise regression analysis 
we entered age, and VPT (centered) as a predictor, adding gesture prevalence 
(coding: 0 ‗no gesture‘, 1 ‗gesture‘) in the second step and the third step the 
interaction term of the centered VPT and gesture prevalence, as predictors 
for solving speed. The results of these regression analyses are reported in Ta-
ble 3. Age, VPT score, gesture prevalence, and the interaction of VPT and ges-
ture prevalence, were unreliable predictors for performance (i.e., solving 
speed and solving steps) on both the TOH 3-disc and 4-disc. 
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Solving Speed TOH 3-disc Step B (SE) β t p R2adj 
1. Constant 1 109.376 51.580   2.121 .038 .034 
2. Age  -6.696 5.215 -.188 -1.284 .204  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -20.511 31.019 -.097 -.661 .511  
1. Constant 2 107.996 51.867   2.082 .042 .025 
2. Age  -6.170 5.302 -.173 -1.164 .249  
3. VPT (Centralised  -21.294 31.188 -.100 -.683 .497  
4. Gesture (0 = no gesture, 1 = gesture)  -6.854 10.576 -.081 -.648 .519  
1. Constant 3 108.005 52.299   2.065 .043 .009 
2. Age  -6.171 5.346 -.173 -1.154 .253  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -20.690 43.135 -.098 -.480 .633  
4. Gesture (0 = no gesture, 1 = gesture)  -6.852 10.664 -.081 -.642 .523  
5. Interaction VPT & Gesture  -1.089 53.172 -.004 -.020 .984  
Solving Steps TOH 3-disc Step B (SE) β t p R2adj 
1. Constant 1 6.312 5.979   1.056 .295 -.021 
2. Age  .357 .604 .089 .590 .557  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -2.892 3.596 -.121 -.804 .424  
1. Constant 2 6.241 6.029   1.035 .305 -.036 
2. Age  .384 .616 .095 .623 .536  
3. VPT (Centralised  -2.932 3.625 -.123 -.809 .422  
4. Gesture (0 = no gesture, 1 = gesture)  -.352 1.229 -.037 -.286 .776  
1. Constant 3 6.265 6.068   1.032 .306 -.050 
2. Age  .382 .620 .095 .617 .540  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -1.324 5.005 -.055 -.264 .792  
4. Gesture (0 = no gesture, 1 = gesture)  -.346 1.237 -.036 -.280 .781  
5. Interaction VPT & Gesture  -2.897 6.169 -.090 -.470 .640  
Solving Speed TOH 4-disc Step B (SE) β t p R2adj 
1. Constant 1 187.002 80.267   2.330 .024 .083 
2. Age  -7.475 8.106 -.140 -.922 .360  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -81.942 51.162 -.243 -1.602 .115  
1. Constant 2 185.963 83.492   2.227 .030 .066 
2. Age  -7.428 8.232 -.139 -.902 .371  
3. VPT (Centralised  -82.262 52.006 -.243 -1.582 .120  
4. Gesture (0 = no gesture, 1 = gesture)  .901 17.536 .007 .051 .959  
1. Constant 3 182.121 84.271   2.161 .035 .055 
2. Age  -7.031 8.311 -.131 -.846 .401  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -114.036 75.769 -.338 -1.505 .138  
4. Gesture (0 = no gesture, 1 = gesture)  .194 17.687 .001 .011 .991  
5. Interaction VPT & Gesture  51.580 88.955 .118 .580 .564  
Table 3. Analyses of Hypotheses 1 & 2 (continues on next page) 
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Solving Steps TOH 4-disc Step B (SE) β t  
 
p R2adjust
ed 
1. Constant 1 39.973 14.973   2.670 .010 .033 
2. Age  -.867 1.512 -.089 -.573 .569  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -12.164 9.544 -.198 -1.275 .208  
1. Constant 2 40.585 15.571   2.606 .012 .015 
2. Age  -.895 1.535 -.092 -.583 .562  
3. VPT (Centralised  -11.976 9.699 -.195 -1.235 .222  
4. Gesture (0 = no gesture, 1 = gesture)  -.531 3.270 -.022 -.162 .872  
1. Constant 3 39.247 15.592   2.517 .015 .019 
2. Age  -.757 1.538 -.078 -.492 .625  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -23.036 14.019 -.375 -1.643 .106  
4. Gesture (0 = no gesture, 1 = gesture)  -.777 3.272 -.031 -.237 .813  
5. Interaction VPT & Gesture  17.955 16.459 .225 1.091 .280  
 
Table 3. Analyses of Hypotheses 1 & 2 (Continued) 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Our third hypothesis was that after controlling for age, instructed and 
spontaneous gesture prevalence during mental problem-solving would posi-
tively affect actual problem-solving performance (solving speed) for all trials 
(TOH disc 3 and TOH disc 4) as compared to spontaneous non-gesturing, but 
that this effect would be more pronounced on the most complex task 
(TOH4) and for participants with a relatively lower visual working memory 
capacity. We analysed effects of spontaneous vs. no gesture and instructed vs. 
no gesture prevalence on performance (solving speed and solving steps) on 
the TOH 3-disc and 4-disc multiple stepwise regression analyses. For each DV 
(3-disc and 4-disc solving speed and number of steps) we entered age, and 
VPT (centered) in the first step, and dummy variables spontaneous gesture 
prevalence (0 = no gesture, 1 = spontaneous gesture) and instructed gesture 
prevalence (0 = no instructed gesture, 1 = instructed gesture) in the second 
step. In the third step we entered two interaction terms of the centered VPT 
with instructed and spontaneous gesture prevalence.  
 The regression analyses results for hypothesis 3 are shown in Table 4, 
and each analysis is visualized (without controlling for age) in Figure 3. Again, 
we did not find any significant results for the overall model fit for this set of 
predictors on any of the performance measures. Indeed, age, VPT score, 
spontaneous and instructed gesture prevalence, and the interaction of VPT 
with spontaneous or instructed gesture prevalence were unreliable predictors 
for performance (solving speed and solving) on the TOH 3-disc and 4-disc. 
189 
 
We did however find one significant interaction effect as predicted; of children 
scoring lower on the VPT, those who spontaneously gestured needed less 
steps to solve the TOH 4-disc as compared to children scoring lower on the 
VPT who did not gesture. However, this finding should be interpreted with 
caution given the low reliability of the overall model fit. In sum, our confirma-
tory analyses did not replicate previous findings with this younger age sample. 
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Solving Speed TOH 3-disc 
(See Figure 3a) 
Step B (SE) β t  
 
p R2adjusted 
1. Constant 1 109.376 51.580   2.121 .038 .064 
2. Age  -6.696 5.215 -.188 -1.284 .204  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -20.511 31.019 -.097 -.661 .511  
1. Constant 2 113.119 52.113   2.171 .034 .086 
2. Age  -6.699 5.327 -.188 -1.257 .213  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -17.888 31.370 -.084 -.570 .571  
4. Spontaneous Gesture (0 = no 
gesture, 1 = spontaneous gesture) 
 
2.649 14.190 .025 .187 .853 
 
5. Instructed Gesture (0 = no ges-
ture, 1 = instructed gesture) 
 
-12.030 11.764 -.137 -1.023 .311 
 
1. Constant 3 117.751 52.494   2.243 .029 .108 
2. Age  -7.178 5.367 -.201 -1.338 .186  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -17.506 43.023 -.083 -.407 .686  
4. Spontaneous Gesture  2.317 14.266 .022 .162 .872  
5. Instructed Gesture  -12.757 11.840 -.145 -1.077 .286  
6. Interaction VPT & Spontaneous 
Gesture 
 
-57.844 72.731 -.118 -.795 .430 
 
7. Interaction VPT & Instructed Ges-
ture 
 
32.810 58.869 .094 .557 .579 
 
Solving Steps TOH 3-disc 
(see Figure 3 b) 
Step B (SE) β t  
 
p R2adjusted 
1. Constant 1 6.312 5.979   1.056 .295 -.021 
2. Age  .357 .604 .089 .590 .557  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -2.892 3.596 -.121 -.804 .424  
1. Constant 2 6.437 6.103   1.055 .296 -.052 
2. Age  .363 .624 .090 .583 .562  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -2.802 3.674 -.117 -.763 .449  
4. Spontaneous Gesture  .012 1.662 .001 .007 .994  
5. Instructed Gesture   -.549 1.378 -.055 -.399 .691  
1. Constant 3 6.813 6.178   1.103 .275 -.072 
2. Age  .326 .632 .081 .516 .608  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -1.145 5.063 -.048 -.226 .822  
4. Spontaneous Gesture   -.040 1.679 -.003 -.024 .981  
5. Instructed Gesture   -.585 1.393 -.059 -.420 .676  
6. Interaction VPT & Spontane-
ous Gesture 
 
-7.558 8.560 -.136 -.883 .381 
 
7. Interaction VPT & Instructed 
Gesture 
 
-.335 6.928 -.008 -.048 .962 
 
  
Table 4. Analyses of Hypothesis 3 (continues on next page) (see Figure 3 a) 
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Solving Speed TOH 4-disc 
(See Figure 3b) 
Step B (SE) β t  
 
p R2adjusted 
1. Constant 1 187.002 80.267   2.330 .024 .083 
2. Age  -7.475 8.106 -.140 -.922 .360  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -81.942 51.162 -.243 -1.602 .115  
1. Constant 2 204.768 83.195   2.461 .017 .092 
2. Age  -9.308 8.205 -.174 -1.134 .262  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -75.900 51.448 -.225 -1.475 .146  
4. Spontaneous Gesture (0 = no 
gesture, 1 = spontaneous gesture) 
 
-18.481 21.179 -.127 -.873 .387 
 
5. Instructed Gesture (0 = no ges-
ture, 1 = instructed gesture) 
 
14.885 19.414 .110 .767 .447 
 
1. Constant 3 197.225 84.905   2.323 .024 .067 
2. Age  -8.542 8.377 -.160 -1.020 .313  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -107.979 75.492 -.320 -1.430 .159  
4. Spontaneous Gesture   -20.377 21.640 -.140 -.942 .351  
5. Instructed Gesture  14.755 19.760 .109 .747 .459  
6. Interaction VPT & Spontaneous 
Gesture 
 
97.373 127.453 .118 .764 .448 
 
7. Interaction VPT & Instructed 
Gesture 
 
31.584 94.911 .061 .333 .741 
 
Solving Steps TOH 4-disc  
(see Figure 3d) 
Step B (SE) β t  
 
p R2adjusted 
1. Constant 1 39.973 14.973   2.670 .010 .033 
2. Age  -.867 1.512 -.089 -.573 .569  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -12.164 9.544 -.198 -1.275 .208  
1. Constant 2 42.647 15.755   2.707 .009 .012 
2. Age  -1.101 1.554 -.113 -.709 .482  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -11.278 9.743 -.184 -1.158 .252  
4. Spontaneous Gesture  -2.656 4.011 -.100 -.662 .511  
5. Instructed Gesture  1.003 3.676 .041 .273 .786  
1. Constant 3 38.478 15.306   2.514 .015 .08 
2. Age  -.680 1.510 -.070 -.450 .654  
3. VPT (Centralised)  -23.345 13.609 -.380 -1.715 .092  
4. Spontaneous Gesture  -3.850 3.901 -.145 -.987 .328  
5. Instructed Gesture   1.201 3.562 .049 .337 .737  
6. Interaction VPT & Spontaneous 
Gesture 
 
53.566 22.976 .358 2.331 .024 
 
7. Interaction VPT & Instructed 
Gesture 
 
4.247 17.110 .045 .248 .805 
 
  
Table 4 (continued). Analyses of Hypothesis 3 (see Figure 3 a) 
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Figure 3a-d. Confirmatory analyses graphs. Note that the slopes are modelled 
on the observed data and differ from the estimated regression coefficients 
of the complete regression model (which includes age as a covariate).  
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Discussion 
 In the current study we aimed to replicate previous findings with 
adults (Pouw et al., under review) in young children. In adults, participants 
with lower visual working memory capacity who gestured either spontaneous-
ly or when instructed to do so during mental problem solving, performed bet-
ter when subsequently solving the more difficult Tower of Hanoi problem 
than participants who did not gesture. In the current age sample with 8-12 
year old children, we did not replicate these findings. That is, there were no 
effects of gesture (either spontaneous or instructed) on problem solving per-
formance, either overall or as a function of visual working memory capacity or 
task difficulty.  
There are several possible reasons why our hypothesized gesture ef-
fect was not replicated in the current sample. Firstly, in contrast to the study 
with adults, children‘s problem-solving performance was not correlated with 
performance on the visual working memory task. One possible explanation is 
that we used a more simplified version of the task, wherein children recreated 
the visual pattern by selecting locations through mouse-clicking, whereas the 
study with adults required verbally recalling the pattern by naming the letters 
that were assigned to the previous locations during the response phase. This 
difference in the task potentially recruits different cognitive processes. Given 
that we assume that gestures become effective when task-relevant resources 
are taxed, if we failed to gauge such task-relevant resources with the current 
task, then the current study was not able to test the cognitive load hypothesis. 
However, we doubt whether the difference of the simplified task with the task 
used with adults recruits different resources in such a dramatic way. Yet, 
problematically, this does beg the question why children‘s visual working 
memory resources were not correlated with task performance. One possible 
explanation is that children might not use a similar strategy as adults, and use 
more various strategies that do not recruit such visual imagery processes. In-
deed it has been argued that children of the current age group are still devel-
oping the planning skills that are required to solve the Tower of Hanoi (Schiff 
& Vakil, 2015), 
Relatedly, a general worry of the present results is that a younger age 
sample inevitably produces more noisy data, which might lower the detection 
of a possible gesture effect. One way that this manifested itself, is that some 
participants seemed more engaged with the task as than others (i.e., some 
children were not very enthused about performing the mental preparation 
task for [the full] 150 seconds). Even though we did not obtain any differences 
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in self-reported motivation scores across conditions, given that we are unable 
to assess with certainty how engaged children are during the mental prepara-
tion phase, it might be that this natural variability prevents detection of a po-
tential gesture effect. Yet, in any case the current sample does provide infor-
mation about the ecological robustness of a potential co-thought gesture ef-
fect in children; which would not be very robust in a sample comparable to 
the present one (8-12 yrs old). 
Although the results did not confirm our hypotheses, the current 
study provides novel evidence that children (in comparable ways as adults) 
spontaneously adopt co-thought gestures when being confronted with mental-
ly simulating the problem space of the Tower of Hanoi. This is interesting, as 
it provides evidence that co-thought gesturing is already part of the cognitive 
toolkit in earlier development, and such gesturing persists throughout adult-
hood (Pouw et al., under review). Thus, at a minimum this study provides a 
productive paradigm that naturally solicits co-thought gestures from children, 
which will be useful for the further investigation of the cognitive role of co-
thought gesticulation in younger age samples.  
 There is another aspect that needs to be emphasised to put the cur-
rent results in an appropriate context. Firstly, in the current study we did not 
compare the effect of gesture with the inhibition of gesture, but rather with 
spontaneous non-gesturing. We reasoned, if we did obtain an effect of gesture 
it would allow us to conclude that the production rather than the inhibition of 
gestures affects cognitive processing (for a discussion of the theoretical im-
portance of this difference, see Pouw et al., 2014; Cook, Yip, & Goldin-
Meadow, 2010; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Wagner, Nusbaum, & Goldin-
Meadow, 2004). However, future studies could compare the role of inhibiting 
gestures as well, to see whether gesture effects on performance does arise. 
That is, given the fact that children did spontaneously gesture in the current 
study, it could be the case that actively inhibiting children to move their hands 
would result in a gesture effect on performance (albeit in a negative way). 
The current study does provide more insight on the role of co-
thought gestures in thinking and the potential boundary conditions concerning 
the beneficial effect on problem solving. Namely, children (8-12 yrs) sponta-
neously use gestures in similar ways (pointing gestures), and in similar 
amounts (Figure 2) as compared to adults, although do not necessarily posi-
tively affect problem solving as compared to non-gesturers. As such, it keeps 
the question that motivated this study in the first place very alive: what is the 
cognitive function of co-thought gesture? Why does the current task invoke 
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spontaneous pointing gestures, while others evoke more iconic pantomimic 
gestures (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2008)? Moreover, the current study can inspire a 
more systematic study into the development of co-thought gestures in chil-
dren, as it provides a paradigm in which these gestures are naturally adopted. 
This is needed, as current studies on the developmental emer-
gence/ontogenetics of gestures largely ignore the phenomenon of co-thought 
gestures (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, 1998; Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 2008). 
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Chapter 8  
 
Gesturing during mental problem solving reduces eye  
movements, especially for individuals with lower visual work-
ing memory capacity * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter has been published as Pouw, W. T. J. L., Mavilidi, M., Van Gog, 
T., & Paas, F. (2016). Gesturing during mental problem solving reduces eye 
movements, especially for individuals with lower visual working memory ca-
pacity. Cognitive Processing, 17, 269-277. doi: 10.1007/s10339-016-0757-6 
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Gesturing during mental problem solving reduces eye move-
ments, especially for individuals with lower visual working 
memory capacity 
 
Non-communicative hand gestures have been found to benefit problem-solving 
performance. These gestures seem to compensate for limited internal cognitive 
capacities, such as visual working memory capacity. Yet, it is not clear how ges-
tures might perform this cognitive function. One hypothesis is that gesturing is a 
means to spatially index mental simulations, thereby reducing the need for visual-
ly projecting the mental simulation onto the visual presentation of the task. If that 
hypothesis is correct, less eye movements should be made when participants ges-
ture during problem solving than when they do not gesture. We therefore used 
mobile eye tracking to investigate the effect of co-thought gesturing and visual 
working memory capacity on eye movements during mental solving of the Tower 
of Hanoi problem. Results revealed that gesturing indeed reduced the number of 
eye movements (lower saccade counts), especially for participants with a relative-
ly lower visual working memory capacity. Subsequent problem solving perfor-
mance was not affected by having (not) gestured during the mental solving phase. 
The current findings suggest that our understanding of gestures in problem solv-
ing could be improved by taking into account eye movements during gesturing. 
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Introduction 
 
Gesturing can benefit problem solving, especially under conditions of high 
cognitive load (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011; Marstaller & Burianová, 2013; for a review 
see Pouw, De Nooijer, Van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, 2014). Yet, the exact mecha-
nisms through which the cognitive system exploits manual activity are still not 
clear. Based on the literature discussed below, we hypothesized that gestures 
(pointing) allow for spatially indexing mental simulations in space, which come to 
stand in for eye movements that visually project mental simulations onto the 
presentation of the task in the external environment (Cappucio, Chu, & Kita, 
2013; Cooperrider, Wakefield, & Goldin-Meadow, 2015; Pouw et al., 2014). To 
test that hypothesis, we investigated whether gesturing (pointing) vs. not gestur-
ing during mental problem solving (Tower of Hanoi; hereon TOH) affected eye 
movements. 
Gesturing during problem solving (or mentally problem solving) has been 
shown to benefit (subsequent) problem-solving performance, especially when 
cognitive load is high (for a review Pouw et al., 2014). That is, when the task is 
more complex (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011; Delgado, Gómez, & Sarriá, 2011; Logan, 
Lowrie, & Diezmann, 2014) and/or when cognitive resources (such as working 
memory) are limited (e.g., Marstaller & Burianová, 2013). For example, partici-
pants who spontaneously used pointing gestures, or had been instructed to ges-
ture while mentally solving the TOH for 150 s (in silence), subsequently per-
formed better on solving the problem as compared to participants who did not 
gesture (Pouw, Eielts, Van Gog, Paas, & Zwaan, under review). However, gestur-
ing was only beneficial for performance compared to not gesturing under condi-
tions of higher cognitive load: for participants with lower visual working memory 
capacities, and only on more complex trials. In line with these results, there is 
evidence that gestures are indeed spontaneously employed to compensate for 
visual processing load: spontaneous gestures have been found to increase in rate 
when subjects are wearing glasses that project visually complex information com-
pared to when simple information is projected (Smithson & Nicoladis, 2014). 
The effect of cognitive load on gestures‘ effectiveness can be interpreted 
from an embodied and embedded cognition perspective (Cappucio et al., 2013; 
Clark, 2013; Pouw et al., 2014). According to this interpretation, gestures offer 
the cognitive system stable extra-neural tools for visuo-spatial thinking from 
which new or improved cognitive resources can emerge. That is, gestures em-
199 
 
bed, support and extend ongoing internal cognitive processing (e.g., working 
memory).  
Yet, a major challenge for current research on the role of gesture in 
problem solving is to specify how gestures support cognitive processes (Cappuc-
cio, Chu, & Kita, 2013; Cooperrider, et al., 2015; Pouw et al., 2014). One poten-
tial mechanism was proposed by Cappuccio and colleagues (2013). Focusing on 
the role of pointing gestures, they suggest that gesturing during problem solving 
provides a compensatory mechanism for visual processing: ―pointing hence rep-
resents a stand-in for the corresponding series of acts of ocular redirection; the 
benefits received from monitoring these acts affect capabilities such keeping track 
of what has been counted, individuating objects, focusing on a particular object, 
anchoring number words to objects… … double-check, re-organize, concen-
trate, and parse in time/space the task...‖ (p. 141).  
Indeed, there is evidence that eye movements (―ocular redirection‖) re-
flect and even support mental simulations during on-line problem solving. For 
example, Kirsh (2009) confronted participants with a tic-tac-toe game, in which 
they had to keep track of their own and the opponent‘s moves in working 
memory. It was found that participants (especially those with a low spatial ability) 
performed better on the most difficult task when they could play the game while 
looking at a tic-tac-toe matrix as opposed to an empty sheet of paper. The tic-
tac-toe matrix allowed a way to ―project‖ mentally simulated information on a 
presentation of the task in the environment. In similar vein, findings from eye 
tracking research on solving the TOH suggest that problem solvers actively ex-
plore possible moves visually when presented with a 2D presentation of the task, 
anticipating (or simulating) the placement of the disc from one peg to another 
with an eye-movement (e.g., Patsenko & Altmann, 2010). As argued by Spivey and 
Dale (2011), eye-tracking research in problem solving (e.g., Thomas & Lleras, 
2007) suggests that eye movements not only reflect but also support ongoing 
problem solving by anchoring cognitive processes in the environment. This visual 
projection strategy, though, produces substantial cognitive load, because of the 
need to not only visually plan, but also visually monitor the ―correctness‖ of each 
step of the mental simulation, mapped onto an external visual presentation that 
has not (yet) changed. Thus, this strategy might be especially difficult for those 
with lower visual working memory capacity. 
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Although not explicitly stated by Cappuccio and colleagues (2013), it can 
be argued that gestures are likely to be ―monitored‖ through proprioception (i.e., 
the sense of the relative positions of body and limbs in space; see Pouw et al., 
2014 for a discussion). Gesturing, we would suggest, provides an additional non-
visual based spatial presentation that can anchor mental simulations. That ges-
ture‘s function is (at least in part) proprioceptive, is in line with recent research 
that shows that gestures affect problem solving of the TOH even when gesturers 
cannot see their own hands (Cooperrider, et al., 2015). When gestures are pro-
prioceptively monitored, it can be hypothesized that gestures can come to 
―stand-in‖ for eye movements as an anchor for mental simulations in the external 
environment, thereby reducing the number of eye movements being made. Fur-
thermore, this effect should be stronger under conditions of higher visual work-
ing memory load, that is, when tasks are more complex or (when task complexi-
ty is equal) for those individuals who have lower visual working memory capacity.  
We investigated this hypothesis in the present study. Participants per-
formed two trials of the TOH of similar complexity: Each trial consisted of a 4-
disc problem but with normal or inversed rules, wherein each solution path is 
exactly the same (see method for details). In one of the two trials participants 
were instructed to gesture (pointing in silence) during a 60 s mental solving phase 
that preceded actual problem solving, in the other trial participants did not ges-
ture. If pointing gestures indeed allow for spatially indexing a mentally simulated 
move of a disc in space surrounding the body (peri-personal space), then the 
need to project information visually onto the 2d presentation of the task be-
comes functionally redundant, and a lower saccade count would be expected on 
the gesture trial than on the non-gesture trial. Moreover, we would predict that 
the function of gesturing is especially relevant (and therefore exploited) for those 
with lower WM capacity, as those with higher WM capacity may be able to easily 
project mental simulations using a visual strategy. If this prediction is correct it 
could provide a functional explanation to why gestures seem especially effective 
for those with a lower visual working memory capacity (e.g., Marstaller & Buri-
anová, 2013; Pouw et al., under review). 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
This study was approved by the Human Research Committee of the Uni-
versity of Wollongong. A total of 20 adults participated in the present study (em-
ployees of the Early Start Institute Wollongong), who were unaware of the hy-
potheses of the study (Mage = 34.40, SD = 8.63, age range 24-50 years; 5 males).  
A within-subjects experimental design was used, meaning that all partici-
pants performed two versions of the 4-disc TOH task. Depending on counterbal-
ancing condition participants were instructed not to gesture or to use pointing 
gestures during the first or second mental solving phase. Whether they first 
solved the normal TOH and then the inverted TOH or vice versa, was also coun-
terbalanced between subjects. Each physical solving phase was preceded by a 
mental solving phase of the task for 60 s.  
Before the start of the experiment participants reported previous expe-
rience with the TOH (yes or no) and one participant reported that he had expe-
rience with solving the TOH in the past. We did not exclude this participant, be-
cause our within-subjects design should control for possible confounds of skill in 
relation to the manipulation. Note, however that excluding this participant re-
sulted in the same pattern of findings reported in the result section. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Eye-tracking equipment 
Eye movements were recorded with SMI eye-tracking glasses 2.0 con-
nected via USB to a smart-phone from which the data could be uploaded after-
wards. Data were analyzed with SMI BeGaze software (version 3.3). The sampling 
rate was set at 60 Hz and was bi-ocular. For each participant, before the start of 
the experiment, a 3-point triangular calibration was performed (distance between 
participants‘ eyes and points on the screen: point 1: 175 cm, point 2: 175 cm, 
point 3: 154 cm; distance between point 1 and point 2: 98 cm, distance between 
points 1 and 2 with point 3: 56 cm). To verify the accuracy of the calibration, sub-
jects were asked to look at the same points again.  
Video screen 
All tasks were performed on the computer that projected onto a large 
LED TV screen, size 167 × 95 cm. The distance between the eyes and the screen 
was 165 cm. 
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Visual Patterns Test 
The Visual Patterns Test (VPT; Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, & Wilson, 
1997) was a mouse-based task and served as a proxy for visual working memory 
capacity. We used an adapted version of the VPT (as adapted from and kindly 
provided by Chu, Meyer, Foulkes, & Kita, 2013). Participants were shown a ma-
trix, in various patterns, wherein half of the cells (i.e., squares of 14 cm × 14 cm) 
were colored black. Each pattern was displayed for 3 s, after which all the 
squares turned white. Participants needed to recreate the pattern of black 
squares by selecting the squares in a non-specific order, which upon selecting 
would turn black. The VPT consisted of 25 trials, with blocks of 5 trials per diffi-
culty level (from seven to 11 black squares). Before the start of the task partici-
pants were provided with 2 practice trials (3 and 4 black squares, respectively). If 
participants failed to recall all the black squares during a given trial, it was scored 
as an incorrect response. After five consecutive incorrect responses within one 
difficulty block of trials the experimenter stopped the task. Performance scores 
were the proportion of correct responses out of all trials.  
Tower of Hanoi 
The TOH was programmed in Adobe Flash and consisted of three evenly 
spaced pegs (distance between pegs: 41 cm, bases: 29.5 × 2.5 cm, peg: 2 × 3.4 
cm) with four discs (disc 1: 29 × 4 cm, disc 2: 24 × 4, disc 3: 17 × 4 cm, disc 4: 12 
× 4 cm). In the starting position, all discs were stacked on the outer left peg. In 
the normal rule TOH, the discs decreased in size (i.e., disc 1 to 4), and the in-
verted rule TOH increased in size (i.e., disc 4 to 1). Discs could be placed on the 
other pegs during the problem-solving process with the click-and-drag mouse 
function. The goal of the TOH is to transfer the discs from the left peg to the 
right peg in the same stacking order, subject to the following rules: 1) only one 
disc at a time can be moved to another peg, 2) a disc can only be moved if it is on 
the top of the stack, and 3) only smaller discs can be placed on top of bigger discs 
(normal TOH setup) or only bigger discs can be placed on top of smaller discs 
(inverted TOH setup).  
 
Procedure 
Prior to the experiment participants provided their written consent. Par-
ticipants were tested individually with the two experimenters present in the 
room (but they could not see the experimenters during the tasks). They were 
first presented with the VPT. Participants were instructed on the nature of the 
task and performed two practice trials before the start of the VPT proper. The 
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VPT task took approximately 5 min to complete and there were no time re-
strictions for this task.  
Subsequently, participants put on the eye-tracking glasses and the eye 
tracker was calibrated. After successful calibration, a practice TOH task with two 
discs was presented to participants and consistent with the counterbalance or-
der, this was a normal TOH or inverted TOH practice task. The experimenter 
explained the rules of the task (with the third rule depending on assigned condi-
tion) and participants then solved the two-disc TOH trial as practice (for both 
normal and inverted TOH). After each instruction the experimenter verified 
whether subjects understood the instructions based on whether they solved the 
practice trial and participants were also asked to verbally repeat the rules.  
After the practice trial, participants were informed that before actually 
solving a similar 4-disc TOH trial, they would be presented with the begin state 
of the 4-disc TOH trial (i.e., discs placed on the outer-most left peg) and that 
they should mentally plan the moves in silence for 60 s so they could solve the 
task as fast as possible directly afterwards. Participants were told that they should 
rehearse the solving moves repeatedly during this phase. Depending on the coun-
terbalancing condition participants were instructed to think with their hands us-
ing pointing-gestures during this mental planning phase in a way that suited them 
(gesture condition). During this instruction the experimenter made several point-
ing gestures directed at the TOH as a cue how gestures could be performed. 
Participants were additionally instructed that they should not gesture directly in 
front of their face (this was done to ensure that field of vision was not, or only 
peripherally occluded by gesturing). In the no gesture condition participants were 
asked not to move their hands during the 60 s of mental solving. Directly after 
the mental solving phases, participants solved the respective 4-disc TOH.  
This cycle (practice task, mental solving, actual solving) was repeated 
twice. Participants either received the normal task first and the inverted second 
or vice versa (i.e. counterbalanced between participants), and were instructed 
either to gesture on the first task and not on the second or vice versa (i.e., coun-
terbalanced between participants). Once participants correctly solved the first 
problem, they automatically proceeded to the next cycle. When participants 
were unable to solve the task, they automatically proceeded to the next cycle 
after 5 minutes. Participants were recorded during the TOH (mental) solving 
phases with a video camera for the purpose of counting their gestures after the 
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experiment. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participa-
tion.  
 
Scoring and data analysis  
Gesture 
Participants‘ video data per task were coded for gesture frequency (for 
an example see Figure 1). Due to camera malfunction we could not count ges-
tures of two participants. Gestures were defined as any hand movement of one 
or both hands from one still point to the next, indicating the travel of a disc from 
one peg to another (see Garber & Goldin-Meadow, 2002). All participants used 
index-pointing gestures. The first two authors independently counted the ges-
tures, and interrater reliability was high, Pearson‘s r = .89, p < .001. 
Eye movement data 
The number of saccades within the 60 s mental solving phase per task 
were generated using default settings of the eye-tracking software SMI BeGaze 
software (version 3.3) for the exact period of 60 seconds. 
Performance 
For the two problem-solving trials we obtained solving speed and num-
ber of solving steps (number of mistakes were not counted by the program). 
Lower number of solving steps and faster solving speeds reflect a higher perfor-
mance. For each TOH problem-solving trial the minimal amount steps necessary 
to solve the task were fifteen steps. As the given period of solving a trial was set 
at 300 s, participants who did not solve the task in 300 s were not scored on 
performance. 
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Figure 1. Example of gesturing during the mental solving phase (1 s per frame).To 
show where participants look at during gesturing, the last frame is an example of 
the static Tower of Hanoi presented for 60s during mental problem solving 
(inverted rules condition). 
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Results 
Three participants had to be excluded due to technical issues with the 
eye tracking glasses. This resulted in a total sample of 17 participants, (Mage = 
35.24, SD = 9.10, age range 24-50 years; 4 males), wherein counterbalancing re-
sulted in N = 4 for gesture-normal setup, N = 5 for no gesture-normal setup, N = 
4 for gesture-inverted setup, and N = 4 for no gesture-inverted setup during the 
first TOH trial (counterbalanced for the second TOH trial). Where TOH per-
formance effects are concerned, an additional 2 participants were not included in 
the sample as they were not able to solve one of the two TOH trials within 300 
s. 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations of VPT 
score, solving steps and solving speed during the solving phase, as well as saccade 
counts during the mental solving phase. Note, that higher VPT scores were asso-
ciated with fewer fixations and saccades overall (ps < .034). Interestingly, howev-
er, when partialling out the correlations per condition (gesture vs. no gesture) 
we found that this overall significant correlation was primarily carried by the no 
gesture condition (VPT and saccade count: r = -.541, p = .025). In the gesture 
condition there was no significant correlation of VPT with saccade count (r = -
.022, p = .933). Note however, that these correlations did not significantly differ, 
p = 0.123 (see Lee, & Preacher, 2013). These results suggest that visual working 
memory capacity was more predictive for saccade count in the no gesture condi-
tion.  
 
 M (SD) 1. 2. 3. 
 1. VPT score    .76 (.13)    
2. Solving speed  89.86 (38.97) -.054   
3. Solving steps  29.37 (12.02) .195 .828**  
4. Saccade count 138.08 (25.41) -.517* .131  .024 
 
Table 1. Overall means and standard deviations, and correlations between VPT 
score, solving time TOH, solving steps TOH, and saccade count. Note. * p < .05, 
** p < .01 
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The mean pointing gesture frequency (which could only be obtained for 15 par-
ticipants because two had to be excluded due to camera malfunction) during the 
mental solving phase was 31.87 (SD = 13.11; minimum gesture frequency = 14, 
maximum = 57). We found no significant correlations between gesture frequency 
and VPT score, r = .13, p = .638. Also, the gesture frequency on the task was not 
significantly correlated with solving speed on the respective trial (which was pre-
ceded by gesturing during the mental solving phase), r = -.33, p = .224, nor was 
this the case for solving steps, r = -.28, p = .320. We also checked whether ges-
ture frequency was associated with saccade and fixation count but no significant 
associations were found, saccade count r = -.02, p = .953, fixation count r = -.07, 
p = .802. 
Eye Movements 
 To test our main hypothesis whether gesturing leads to lower saccade 
counts during the mental solving phase as compared to not gesturing, and wheth-
er this effect was moderated by visual working memory capacity, we performed 
two separate mixed effects Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) on the number 
of saccades. For each DV, we examined the within-subjects effect of gesturing 
versus not gesturing, with VPT score as a covariate. We first checked for be-
tween-subjects effects of counterbalancing order of gesture first vs. no gesture 
first, as well as the order of TOH type (normal vs. inverted) by adding these as 
between-subjects factors, which there were not: gesture counterbalance order, 
F(1, 12) = .22, p = .644, TOH type counterbalance order, F(1, 12) = .03, p = .865, 
and interaction, F(1, 12) = 1.63, p = .226.  
The results did reveal a significant relationship on the number of saccades 
when participants gestured compared to when they did not gesture, F(1, 12) = 
8.34, p = .014, ηp2 = .41. Overall, fewer saccades were observed when partici-
pants gestured (estimated means saccade count = 124.06, SD = 26.52, 95%CI = 
108.36 - 140.00) than when they did not gesture (estimated means saccade count 
= 132.88, SD = 39.24, 95%CI = 115.34 - 151.79) when controlling for the covari-
ate VPT. Moreover, there was a significant interaction of gesture condition and 
the VPT regarding the number of saccades, F(1, 12) = 7.32, p = .019, ηp2 = .38. In 
Figure 2 we have plotted the effect of VPT score on the observed differences of 
saccade count across gesture condition. As Figure 2 shows, the reduction in sac-
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cades when gesturing compared to not gesturing was stronger for participants 
who scored lower on the VPT.15, 16 
 
 
Figure 2a and 2b. On the left the estimated marginal means and standard errors 
of the ANCOVA for number of saccades during the 60 s are presented. On the 
right the difference scores are presented in relation to visual working memory 
                                                          
15 Note that since saccade and fixation frequency closely covary, very similar results 
are obtained when taking into account fixation frequency. A similar repeated-
measures Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was performed with fixation count as 
the dependent variable. There were no significant between subject-effects of gesture 
counterbalance order, F(1, 12) = .05, p = .831, or TOH counterbalance order, F(1, 12) 
= .21, p = .653, nor did the interaction of counterbalancing conditions have an effect, 
F(1, 12) = 2.48, p = .141. Results revealed significantly lower fixation counts when 
participants gestured (estimated means = 143.70, SE = 5.38, 95%CI = 131.97 – 155.44) 
compared to when they did not gesture (estimated means = 153.298, SE = 6.30, 
95%CI = 139.56 – 167.02), F(1, 12) = 8.29, p = .014, Eta2p = .41. Also, there was a 
significant interaction between the number of fixations and gesture and the VPT, F(1, 
12) = 7.22, p = .020, Eta2p = .38. 
16 As was to be expected given the fixed time available for mental problem solving and 
the lower fixation count, average fixation duration when gesturing was somewhat 
higher than when not gesturing, but a similar repeated-measure Analysis of Covari-
ance (ANCOVA) on average fixation duration showed that this difference was not 
significant. No between-subject effects of gesture counterbalance order were found, 
F(1, 12) = 0.831, p = .380, TOH type, F(1, 12) = .09, p = .776, and its interaction, F(1, 
12) = 0.66, p = .433. Furthermore, average fixation duration was not significantly af-
fected by gesture (estimated means in ms = 300.25, SE = 15.16, 95%CI = 267.20– 
333.25) versus no gesture (estimated means in ms = 284.80, SE = 14.96, 95%CI = 
252.23 – 317.42), F(1, 12) = 0.25, p = .625, nor was there an interaction effect of ges-
ture and VPT, F(1, 12) = 0.14, p = .716. 
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capacity. Note. On the right plot, a negative difference means that lower saccade 
counts were observed when participants gestured versus did not gesture during 
the mental solving phase. The trend shows, that participants with a lower visual 
working memory capacity were more extremely affected by gesturing, such that a 
lower saccade count was observed when participants gestured as compared to 
when they did not gesture. 
TOH Performance 
For exploratory purposes we assessed whether gesture condition and 
VPT affected performance of the TOH, using two repeated-measures ANCOVAs 
with solving time or solving steps as the dependent variable, gesture versus no 
gesture during the mental solving phase as within-subject factor, counterbalancing 
variables gesture order and TOH type as between-subject variables, and the 
scores on the VPT task as the covariate.  
Solving time 
No effects of between-subject (i.e., counterbalance) factors gesture or-
der, F(1, 10) = 1.86, p = .202, TOH order, F(1, 10) = 0.16, p = .699, or their in-
teraction, F(1, 10) = 1.97, p = .191, were found on solving time. Furthermore, 
solving time was not affected by whether participants gestured (M = 94.24, SD = 
55.80, 95%CI = 65.48 - 124.48) or did not gesture (M = 85.48, SD = 42.03, 95%CI 
= 64.55 - 109.96) during the mental solving-phase, F(1, 10) = 1.25, p = .289. Also, 
VPT was not significantly co-varying with observed differences, F(1, 10) = 1.37, p 
= .346.  
Solving steps 
No effects of between-subject (i.e., counterbalance) factors gesture or-
der, F(1, 10) = 0.44, p = .523, TOH order, TOH, F(1, 10) = 0.99, p = .341, or 
their interaction, F(1, 10) = 0.21, p = .655, were found on the number steps tak-
en to solve the problem. Additionally, solving steps was not affected by whether 
participants gestured (M = 30.63, SD = 14.68, 95%CI = 22.27 - 39.01) or did not 
gesture (M = 28.13, SD = 16.73, 95%CI = 17.97 - 38.28) during the mental solv-
ing-phase, F(1, 10) = 0.54, p = .479. Also, VPT was not significantly co-varying 
with observed differences, F(1, 11) = 0.65, p = .437.  
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Discussion 
 
Prior research has shown that gesturing may compensate for high work-
ing memory load (e.g., Marstaller & Burianová, 2013; Pouw et al., under review). 
However, it is not yet clear how gestures perform this cognitive function. The 
present study investigated the hypothesis that pointing gestures, by exploiting 
space, reduce the need for exploiting the visual presentation of the task in the 
external environment as a way to anchor mental simulations. Consequently, we 
expected less eye movements to be made when participants gestured during 
mental problem solving of the Tower of Hanoi (TOH) than when they did not 
gesture, because gestures can come to ―stand-in‖ for eye movements as an an-
chor for mental simulations in the external environment. That is, through point-
ing, gesturers can spatially index mental simulations of moving the discs from one 
peg to another in peri-personal space, rather than moving the eyes to project 
imagined disc-movements onto the visual presentation of the task. Given that 
gestures can compensate for high cognitive load, we expected this effect to be 
stronger for those individuals who have lower visual working memory capacity 
(as problem solving places higher demands on their resources).  
In line with this hypothesis, our results showed that gesturing lowered 
saccade counts during mental problem solving, and more strongly so for those 
with a lower visual working memory capacity. As such, this study makes a novel 
contribution towards explaining (one of) the mechanism(s) through which ges-
tures may support (mental) problem solving. Whereas eye movements allow for 
projecting mental simulations in the external environment, gestures do this in 
exploiting peri-personal space through proprioceptive monitoring and peripheral 
visual control, thereby offloading visual working memory processes.  
An important question is whether we can exclude that the effect of ges-
ture on eye-movements is an epiphenomenon, i.e., functionally irrelevant for 
mental problem solving? We think that gestures‘ effect on eye-movements are 
not likely to be epiphenomenal as there are a host of findings which show that 
eye-movement patterns are crucial for thinking through the solution space of a 
problem (Spivey & Dale, 2011) and to visual imagery in general (e.g., Brandt & 
Stark, 1997; Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006; Laeng, & Toedorescu, 
2002). However, we do not (and cannot) claim (based on the present data) that 
reduction of saccade count is necessarily beneficial for problem solving as op-
posed to a more visually dominant strategy. However, given that eye-movements 
are highly likely to be functionally relevant for mental simulations, and given the 
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present findings that especially those gesturers with a lower visual working 
memory capacity considerably alter their gaze patterns without significant loss in 
performance, it is likely that there is some trade-off mechanism present. 
 But what is the exact nature of this trade-off mechanism? Although this 
question cannot be definitively answered based on our data, the present study 
does suggest that the change from a visually dominant strategy to a strategy that 
exploits sensory consequences of gesture (especially proprioception) may offer a 
preliminary explanation. Recall that a visually dominant strategy involves moving 
the eyes in a way that corresponds with mentally moving the discs from one peg 
to another. This allows a way to anchor mental transformation on a visual 
presentation of the task (see Figure 1, last frame). This strategy thus involves 
mental projection onto the external environment, where the external environ-
ment offers an anchor or reference that is meaningful to the task (e.g., Kirsh, 
2009). Pointing gestures can, we think, fulfil the same function as eye-movements. 
However, pointing fulfils this function with different and less visually dominant 
resources. Namely, through pointing peripersonal space is sequentially filled by 
positions of the hand that are, by physical human nature, monitored through 
proprioception and/or (peripheral) visual control (e.g., Bremner & Cowie, 2013). 
The locations that the hand takes in in space during pointing can come to corre-
spond with the mental transformation being made by the gesturer. That is, men-
tally simulating the move of a disc, corresponds to pointing from one location to 
another. The reason why we think pointing is not a visually dominant strategy, is 
that if participants pointing gestures were actively visually tracking their pointing 
movements then we would not have observed a difference in saccades between 
gesture vs. no condition, as mental transformation in both cases are visually 
tracked (albeit in the gesture condition via an external loop). This was not the 
case. Furthermore, informal inspection of the videos reveals that participants 
were indeed not looking directly at their hands during gesturing. This leads us to 
our interpretation that gestures must provide some additional resource for spa-
tially indexing mental transformations. We thus think that next to peripheral vi-
sion, proprioception can offer a natural way to monitor the hand in space as to 
spatially index mental transformations. Finally, although we cannot definitively 
establish that gestures are indeed propriocepively dominant in this case, it does 
serve as an additional explanation of why those with a lower visual working 
memory capacity (a proxy for visual mental imagery ability) are especially likely to 
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reduce their eye-movements. Namely, those problem solvers that are prone to 
have difficulty projecting/simulating visual transformations on the environment, 
can reap the benefits of spatially indexing mental transformation in a non-visually 
dominant way through pointing (using the proprioceptive sense of the hand in 
space). Findings that gesturing is especially potent for those with a lower working 
memory capacity (Marstaller & Burianová, 2013; Pouw et al., under review), and 
is beneficial even when participants cannot see their own hands (Cooperrider et 
al., 2015), concur with this idea that switching to a non-visually dominant strategy 
is possible and perhaps potent for some but not all problem solvers. 
Another question that could be raised is whether present results exclude 
a strict motor-based interpretation of gesture, wherein gestures effect should be 
attributed to re-use (internal simulations) of motor experience (Hostetter & 
Alibali, 2008). Namely, a strict motor-based interpretation may hold that the mo-
tor-intention to produce a pointing gesture, rather than the actual bodily gesture and its 
sensory consequences, activates/supports internal motor-simulations which in some 
way affects gaze-behavior as observed in the present study. This is in contrast to 
the embedded/extended approach which assumes that any explanation of a cogni-
tive function of gesture must always lay (at least in part) in the sensory conse-
quences of gesturing that are used in some cognitively potent way (Pouw et al., 
2014). However, the present study was not designed to differentiate between 
these interpretations. Future research could focus on distinguishing a strict mo-
tor-based interpretation from an interpretation that emphasizes sensory conse-
quences of gesture. This can be done by manipulating gesture intention (as to 
trigger motor-simulations) versus actual gesture production. If the production of 
gestures plays no functional role in the present effect, then the intention to ges-
ture should produce the same effect on eye-movements (without loss in problem 
solving performance). Finally note that the embedded/extended and motor-based 
approach can also be complementary. Under such a hybrid view, gestures arise 
out of motor-simulations and have sensory consequences which further affect 
ongoing simulation-based cognitive processes. 
Our study has limitations. First, it should be stressed that the current 
study is small in scale, and as such definitive conclusions on the precise role of 
pointing on problem-solving processes should not be drawn from the present 
data. Especially, the present lack of an effect of gesture on problem-solving per-
formance should be treated with caution as similar studies that did find a benefi-
cial effect investigated this with a larger sample (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011; Garber & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2002; Pouw et al., under review). That is, in contrast to our ex-
213 
 
pectation, we did not find beneficial effects of gesturing during the mental prob-
lem-solving phase on TOH performance (TOH solving speed and solving steps). 
This is in contrast to prior findings (Pouw et al., under review), but important 
differences between the current and prior study lie in the design. First, partici-
pants in the prior study had more mental solving time before they physically per-
formed the task: 150 s vs. 60 s in the present study. Second, whereas gesturing 
was a between-subjects factor in the prior study, it was a within-subjects factor in 
the present study. As such, even though it is unlikely given that the rule was in-
versed between tasks and the analysis of order effects revealed no significant dif-
ferences, we cannot rule out entirely that there were carry-over effects that may 
have eliminated potential beneficial effects of gesturing on performance (especial-
ly since the number of participants per group in the order analyses were based 
was very small). For example, Chu and Kita (2011) have found that the beneficial 
effects of gesture can carry over to a subsequent task (similar in nature) when 
gesturing is prohibited. Additionally, it could be the case that pointing gestures 
are less beneficial for problem solving performance as compared to co-speech 
iconic gestures that have been found to co-occur with verbal explanations of solv-
ing the TOH (e.g., Cook & Tatenhaus, 2009; Cooperrider et al., 2015), wherein 
participants gesture as-if grasping actual discs. Future research should further in-
vestigate whether iconic gestures during actual problem solving may have differ-
ent effects than pointing-gestures. For example, this can be done by letting partic-
ipants verbally explain the solution of the TOH (e.g., Cooperrider et al., 2015). 
Yet there are several reasons why in the present case iconic gestures might not 
be particularly effective. Firstly, in a previous study (Pouw et al., under review) 
we have found that pointing gestures, but not iconic gestures, are spontaneously 
produced during mentally solving a physical Tower of Hanoi task without speech. 
This suggests that iconic-gestures may be co-dependent on speech production, 
and not naturally employed during mental problem solving without the additional 
constraint to verbalize one‘s thoughts. Furthermore, in this previous study point-
ing gestures were found to benefit performance on subsequent solving of the 
TOH when cognitive load is high. Finally, the reason why iconic gestures are held 
to affect mental problem solving of the TOH is that they offer a correspondence 
with the actions to be performed on the actual task (Cook & Tatenhaus, 2009; 
Cooperrider et al., 2015). Yet, in the present case, manipulation of the task was 
mouse-based, which does not correspond with a grasping action. In sum, alt-
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hough iconic gestures may offer unique or better cognitive support for problem-
solving, in the present non-verbal mouse-based task we doubt whether iconic 
gestures are more potent than pointing gestures. 
A second limitation of the present study is that it relied on eye-
movement frequency counts, and therefore does not yet illuminate the precise 
dynamics of pointing and gaze behaviour (i.e., when and how participants use ges-
tures during [mental] problem solving and how this affects their eye movements). 
The benefit of our mobile eye-tracking device was that it allowed for maintaining 
natural degrees of freedom in hand movement, which is more difficult to obtain 
(at present) with remote eye tracking devices. Nevertheless, the higher temporal 
and spatial resolution that can be obtained with remote eye-tracking devices 
would allow us to address in more detail how eye movements are affected by 
gestures in future research.  
Despite these limitations, this study made a first step towards explaining 
(one of) the mechanism(s) through which gestures may support (mental) problem 
solving. Our findings suggest that gesturing may provide a unique embodied re-
source, exploiting peri-personal space, which may come to stand in for visually 
dominant strategies when these prove to be insufficient for meeting the cognitive 
demands imposed by the task. Taking gaze behavior into account in future re-
search, may enhance our understanding of the role that non-communicative 
pointing gestures play in problem solving processes, for individuals differing in 
cognitive dispositions. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Gesture as Predictive Action * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter has been accepted for publication as Pouw, W. T. J. L., & 
Hostetter, A. (in press). Gesture as predictive action. Retti, Sapperi, Linguaggi: 
Italian Journal of Cogntive Sciences. 
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Gesture as Predictive Action 
Two broad approaches have dominated the literature on the production of 
speech-accompanying gestures. On the one hand, there are approaches that aim 
to explain the origin of gestures by specifying the mental processes that give rise 
to them. On the other, there are approaches that aim to explain the cognitive 
function that gestures have for the gesturer or the listener. In the present paper 
we aim to reconcile both approaches in one single perspective that is informed 
by a recent sea change in cognitive science, namely, Predictive Processing Per-
spectives (PPP; Clark, 2013b, 2015). We start with the idea put forth by the Ges-
ture as Simulated Action (GSA) framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). Under 
this view, the mental processes that give rise to gesture are re-enactments of 
sensori-motor experiences (i.e., simulated actions). We show that such anticipa-
tory sensori-motor states and the constraints put forth by the GSA framework 
can be understood as top-down kinesthetic predictions that function in a broader 
predictive machinery as proposed by PPP. By establishing this alignment, we aim 
to show how gestures come to fulfill a genuine cognitive function above and be-
yond the mental processes that give rise to gesture.  
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Introduction 
When speakers talk, they often move their hands and arms in a way that 
mirrors or complements the semantic content of what they are saying. These 
movements, hereafter referred to simply as gestures, are, in some sense, the 
epitome of ―embodiment‖ because they are movements of the body that are pro-
duced in the interest of communication. Yet, to say that gestures are embodied 
just because they make use of the body is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of 
Cognitive Science, which uses the term Embodied Cognition to mean that cognitive 
processes make use of perceptual and motor systems, even in situations where 
such systems would seem to be irrelevant (e.g., Wilson, 2002). To say that ges-
tures are truly embodied then, requires the specification of how, and in virtue of 
which unique properties (e.g., visual, proprioceptive stimulation), gestures affect 
cognition (Pouw, de Nooijer, van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, 2014). That is, we must 
move beyond descriptive accounts of what gestures are and towards understand-
ing why they are produced and how they come to have facilitative effects on cog-
nition. 
So, why are gestures produced? This question has received increasing at-
tention over the past two decades. While space does not allow a detailed de-
scription of the many possibilities, a review of the literature reveals two broad 
types of answers to this question. First, there are answers that are about origin. 
That is, are the processes or representations that underlie gesture unique to ges-
ture or are they similar to those that are involved in speaking or action genera-
tion more generally? Second, there are answers that are about cognitive function. 
Once a gesture is produced, what effect does it have for the speaker and for the 
listener, and how is this effect brought about? 
In this paper, we consider both the origin and function of gesture in a 
single account. We first describe one theory about the origin of speech-
accompanying gestures, namely the Gesture as Simulated Action (GSA) frame-
work (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). Under this view, gestures arise from simulated 
perceptual and action states that are created as a speaker talks about a present 
or imagined situation. Inspired by contemporaneous ideas about the embodied 
nature of language comprehension (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), 
the goal of the GSA framework was to explain how gestures might originate in an 
embodied cognitive system that is engaged during speech production. However, 
in the years since the GSA framework was published, a number of theories have 
taken hold in Cognitive Science that we believe are compatible with, and nicely 
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complement, ideas presented in the GSA framework, namely, Predictive Pro-
cessing Perspectives. 
Predictive Processing Perspectives (hereon PPP; e.g., Clark, 2013b, 
2015a, b, 2015; Den Ouden, Kok, & De Lange, 2012; Friston, 2010; Glenberg & 
Gallese, 2012; Hohwy, 2013; Lupyan & Clark, 2015), broadly characterized, pos-
tulate that the central work of cognitive systems is to engage in predictions. That 
is, predictions about sensori-motor consequences that emerge during interaction 
with the environment, and are updated and acted upon in a way that minimizes 
surprisal or prediction error (i.e., the residual discrepancy between what is pre-
dicted and what is encountered). We think PPP are promising for furthering our 
understanding of how gestures emerge from embodied simulations, while also 
securing a central role for bodily action in these processes. In this paper, we aim 
to explore how gestures may be thought about as one instantiation of predictive 
processing; that is, gestures have functions for speakers and thinkers that can be 
broadly construed as minimizing prediction error, and these functions can be cap-
tured by one broad underlying mechanism giving rise to gestures, namely the ac-
tivation of simulations (i.e., predictions) in the motor and perceptual system. 
Thus, by considering gestures as a case of predictive processing, we aim to move 
beyond considering the origin of gesture and its function as separate explanatory 
quests, and provide a way to understand how origin and function of gesture are 
intricately related. 
 
Outline  
Next, (section 2) we provide an overview of the GSA framework‘s key 
tenets and the evidence to date. In section 3, we address the cognitive function 
of gesture. Finally, we introduce PPP, as a means of understanding how gestures 
not only arise from sensori-motor predictions (i.e., simulations) in the cognitive 
system (section 4), but also support these predictive processes during on-going 
cognitive activity (section 5).  
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The Gesture as Simulated Action Framework 
 The Gesture as Simulated Action (GSA) framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 
2008) considers gesture production to be the outgrowth of a cognitive system 
that is actively engaged in simulating motor and perceptual states. Simulations are 
neural enactments or re-enactments of interactions with the world; when a 
speaker engages in simulation, the same motor and perceptual areas of the brain 
are recruited that would be involved in actually performing the action or viewing 
the scene. This neural activity in the motor and action systems of the brain has 
the potential to be expressed alongside speech as gesture. The GSA framework 
proposes three determinants of whether a simulation is actually expressed along-
side speech in any particular instance. 
 First, the production of a gesture depends on how strongly the simula-
tion evokes thoughts of action. Simulations that are closely tied to action are 
more likely to engage the motor system strongly enough to result in a movement 
being produced (e.g., gesture) than simulations with weaker ties to action. For 
example, a speaker who has experience actually making a pattern he is describing 
is more likely to gesture about the pattern than he is about a pattern he has only 
viewed (Hostetter & Alibali, 2010). Action can also be evoked in a simulation of a 
perceptual scene that was not directly acted on. For example, if speakers can eas-
ily imagine interacting with what they are describing, they are particularly likely to 
gesture about it. Chu and Kita (2015) found that speakers gestured less about a 
mug that had spikes along its handle than they did about a mug with no spikes 
that more readily afforded grasping. Masson-Carro, Goudbeek, and Krahmer 
(2015) further show that the affordances of objects directly predict whether the 
objects are gestured about. Simulating perceptual scenes may also evoke action if 
the speaker imagines the scene or its objects in motion. For example, speakers 
frequently gesture when engaged in mental rotation exercises (e.g., Chu & Kita, 
2008, 2011) and gesture more when talking about the process of rotating than 
when describing the end state of the rotation (e.g., Hostetter, Alibali, & Barthol-
omew, 2011). Finally, even thinking about a static perceptual experience may en-
gage the motor system because of the tight coupling between perception and 
action. When we perceive an object, we automatically activate processes about 
how we would use, grasp, or interact with the object (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998). 
Under the GSA framework, such activation can be expressed as gestures that 
depict how to interact with the object, or outline the object‘s shape. 
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 Second, the production of a gesture depends not only on the absolute 
strength of action activation involved in the simulation, but also whether this acti-
vation is strong enough to pass the speaker‘s current gesture threshold. The ges-
ture threshold is conceptualized as the speaker‘s current resistance to producing 
a gesture, but can change from moment to moment during speaking. For exam-
ple, in situations where speakers think a gesture might benefit their listener, they 
may lower their threshold and gesture more (e.g., Alibali, Heath, & Myers, 2001). 
Similarly, if speakers consider the information they are conveying to be particu-
larly important to their listener, they gesture more (e.g., Kelly, Byrne, & Holler, 
2011), perhaps as the result of maintaining a lower threshold that even weaker 
action simulations can surpass. Moreover, speakers may adjust their threshold 
(either consciously or unconsciously) based on the cognitive demands of the 
speaking situation. Because gestures are known to have a number of beneficial 
effects (e.g., Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 2015), a speaker may find it advantageous 
to lower her threshold to allow even a weak action activation to be expressed as 
gesture in certain situations. Conversely, even in situations where there is no 
clear reason to lower one‘s threshold, simulations that evoke strong activation of 
action may result in gesturing regardless because the simulation is strong enough 
to pass even a heightened threshold (see Hostetter, 2014 for some evidence on 
this point). 
 Finally, the GSA framework contends that the occurrence of gesture is 
particularly likely in situations where the articulatory motor system is already 
activated in the interest of speaking. Because the speaker must engage his or her 
motor system for speaking, it is difficult to simultaneously inhibit the manual mo-
tor system from also expressing the action activation that occurs during simula-
tion. This is corroborated by findings that show that hand and mouth actions are 
linked from infancy (Iverson & Thelen, 2000) and heavily constrain one-another 
throughout further adulthood (Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Gangitano, & Grimaldi, 2011 
). However, while the GSA framework contends that gestures are more likely to 
occur with speech than in its absence, the framework by no means precludes the 
occurrence of gestures without speech. Indeed, since the publication of the GSA 
framework, a number of reports have been published about gestures that occur 
in the absence of speech (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2011; Delgado, Gómez, & Sarría, 
2011). Such co-thought gestures seem to share many characteristics with co-
speech gestures (Chu & Kita, 2015). This evidence supports for the idea that ges-
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tures are not dependent on language; while they frequently occur with language, 
the processes that give rise to gesture are more generally rooted in the sensori-
motor, rather than linguistic, system.  
The cognitive function of gesture 
The GSA framework was developed to account for how gestures arise 
from an embodied cognitive system (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, p. 495). While not 
reducing gestures to an epiphenomenon, the issue of how gestures function in 
such a system was left open to further speculation. Consequently, the GSA 
framework is flexible regarding the possible functions of gesture. Indeed, once a 
gesture is produced, the GSA framework allows that the movement may have 
any number of cognitive effects. However, in order to offer a truly embodied 
account of gesture that considers both their origin and their function, a more 
detailed specification of how gestures perform their cognitive functions is need-
ed. 
What does an embodied account of gesture function entail? Pouw and 
colleagues (2014; see also Pouw, Van Gog, Zwaan, & Paas, in press) argue that to 
truly explain the cognitive function of gesture, a theory must be able to explicate 
how this bodily act affects the cognitive system above and beyond neural pro-
cesses that precede gesturing. That is, it must become clear how the act of ges-
turing directly affects cognition, which is not accomplished when positing some 
neural process that generates the gesture as well as its cognitive effect. For ex-
ample, consider a learner who is attempting to memorize the steps needed to 
complete a route. The learner may mentally visualize the steps required, and this 
visualization may lead the learner to gesture about each step and may also lead to 
improved memory for the steps. However, in order to consider gesture as a 
causal agent that led to improved memory, it must become clear what additional 
benefit gesturing brings above and beyond the mental visualization that gives rise 
to the gesture in the first place. 
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The idea that the act of gesture might add something to the cognitive 
toolkit is not new. As the philosopher Andy Clark (2013b) has recently de-
scribed: 
 
In gesture, as when we write or talk, we materialize our own 
thoughts. We bring something concrete into being, and that 
thing (in this case, the arm motion) can systematically affect our 
own ongoing thinking and reasoning… … [as such] gesture and 
overt and covert speech emerge as interacting parts of a distrib-
uted cognitive engine, participating in cognitively potent self-
stimulating loops whose activity is as much an aspect of our 
thinking as its result. (Clark, 2013b, p. 263). 
In this way of thinking, cognition is not completely brain-bound; rather 
the physical activity of gesture - in virtue of its co-constitutive role in ongoing 
cognition - is itself a genuine form of cognition (cf. Clark & Chalmers, 1998). 
Similarly, McNeill (2005) has argued that gesture and speech exist together in a 
dialectic, with each influencing and affecting the other. In sum, gestures are not 
just the result of cognition, they are a critical determinant of cognition (e.g., 
Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010). 
 Indeed, there is much research suggesting that gestures affect cognition in 
a variety of ways (see Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 2015 for a recent review). For 
example, speakers who gesture have better memory for what they gesture about 
than speakers who do not gesture (Cook, Yip, & Goldin-Meadow, 2010). In addi-
tion to strengthening the representation being described, gestures also appear to 
reduce general working memory demands, such that there are more cognitive 
resources available to devote to a secondary task when speakers gesture than 
when they do not (Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001). Gestures 
appear to affect how speakers solve spatial problems, by influencing the strategy 
choice (e.g., Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011) or by focusing attention on 
perceptual elements of the problem (e.g., Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010). Giv-
en these effects on cognitive processing, it is perhaps not surprising that gestures 
also help speakers communicate, particularly about concepts that are highly spa-
tial or motoric (e.g., Hostetter, 2011). There is some evidence that gestures may 
actually prime relevant words or ideas in the lexicon (e.g., Krauss, 1998), and that 
they may help speakers conceptualize what they want to say and package the ide-
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as into the linear stream of speech (e.g., Kita, 2002). In sum, the cognitive func-
tions of gesture are varied, and have been shown in a variety of domains ranging 
from problem solving to memory to language. 
We believe that these varied functions can be explained under a general 
mechanism suggested by Predictive Processing Perspectives (PPP). Not only are 
PPP highly compatible with the GSA framework and the suggestion that gestures 
arise out of embodied neural simulations, but they also provide further explana-
tion for how gestures‘ function is not reducible to these neural simulations. Ra-
ther, action (and thus gesture) is central to the job description of the cognitive  
Predictive Processing Perspectives 
 PPP are a recent sea change in cognitive science (for broad overviews see 
Clark, 2013a, 2015b; Hohwy, 2013). As PPP are rapidly adapting, they are becom-
ing more divergent from each other (see e.g., Pickering & Clark, 2014). Yet, what 
unites these models is that they assign a single job description to the cognitive 
system under which most, if not all, cognitive feats (e.g., perception, action, social 
cognition, language production and comprehension) can be subsumed. Namely, 
the cognitive system is engaged in optimizing predictions about the continuous 
flow of sensory data that perturb the system during the ongoing flux of (poten-
tially hazardous) interactions with the environment. Minimizing prediction error 
is not some abstract project, but key to the perseverance of life: simply put, 
―avoid surprises and you will last longer‖ (original emphasis, Friston, Thornton, & 
Clark, 2012, p. 2). 
 We will argue that gesture is one special way to optimize predictions. 
We do this by showing that action-oriented models in PPP (Clark, 2015a, b; Fris-
ton, 2009) are compatible with the GSA framework, and are able to clarify the 
mechanism by which gestures benefit cognition. Two important aspects of PPP 
will be considered. First, PPP put sensori-motor neural simulations in a broader 
context of a hierarchical predictive architecture. Second, PPP assign a pivotal role 
of action within this broader predictive machinery. Thus, by considering gesture 
as a special case of action, we can use PPP to understand both the cognitive 
origin and function of gesture. 
 Before introducing basic tenets of PPP, some preliminary remarks are in 
place. First, we only provide a broad conceptual overview of some key mecha-
nisms of PPP (e.g., Clark, 2015b) that we think are relevant to thinking about ges-
ture, neglecting statistical formalisms (e.g., Bayes Theorem) that ground PPP (see 
Friston, 2009, 2010; but see Hohwy, 2013 for an approachable introduction). Se-
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cond, although it is largely undisputed that there is a predictive component in 
many central cognitive processes, such as attention (e.g., Hohwy, 2013), vision 
(O‘Regan & Noë, 2001), action (e.g., Franklin & Wolpert, 2011), and language 
comprehension and production (e.g., Lupyan & Clark, 2013; Pickering & Garrod, 
2013), models within PPP are still highly debated, and at present there is no evi-
dence to decisively choose among competing models. Thus, our account is an 
attempt to show the preliminary utility of PPP for understanding gesture‘s pro-
duction and function, rather than an endorsement of any one view. 
 
Introduction to PPP 
 Predictive Processing Perspectives (PPP), as presented by Clark (2013a, 
b; 2015a, b; based on Friston, 2009, 2010), entail that the cognitive system has, 
and continuously adapts, a body of knowledge (called a ‗hierarchical generative 
model‘) that allows the agent to self-generate data (called ‗predictions‘ or ‗prior 
expectations‘) about the world that capture the statistical regularities of incoming 
sensory data. These predictions mostly run on automatic pilot, and need not be 
subject of awareness to do their work (although they may be constrained by con-
scious processing). Importantly, a generative model is never perfect, and its pre-
dictions never completely match the incoming sensory input. In fact, these dis-
crepancies between incoming sensory input and the predictions are informative 
and continuously monitored. These discrepancies, called ‗prediction-error‘, are 
used to update the generative model in order to issue more precise predictions 
in the future. Thus, prediction errors are used to calibrate future predictions, and 
over time enable the generative model to make better predictions about the 
world. 
 The generative model is ―hierarchical‖ because predictions are issued on 
multiple higher and lower order levels. Lower order levels issue fast-changing 
sensory predictions, likely to operate on timescales ranging from hundreds of mil-
liseconds to seconds. For example, when reaching for a mug, lower order haptic 
predictions are produced about the instant consequences of picking up the mug. 
Higher order levels are more likely to be abstract and multi-modal, and operate 
on longer time-scales. That is, these levels are not concerned with one particular 
sensory consequence, but with complex multi-modal regularities that emerge 
over longer periods of time. Slower predictions might concern keeping track of a 
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trajectory of a moving object, or for slower predictions still, how particular types 
of situations generally unfold (e.g., restaurant visits, idle conversations etc.). In 
each level, the model predicts the output from the level below and compares this 
predicted output to the actual input received from the level below. This results in 
a complex multi-layered predictive machinery that works in concert to track rel-
evant small- and large-scale changes that have proved to be relevant to the agent 
in the past. 
In many ways, PPP are a reversal of classical models of perception - 
wherein the cognitive system passively receives input in a bottom-up fashion. Ra-
ther, in PPP, the mind has a more active, anticipatory and self-adaptive role17. In 
PPP, action is an essential part of perception, as active sampling can make percep-
tual patterns that are predicted come true and allow the agent to make better 
predictions. For example, I may not know for sure that my coffee cup is empty, 
but when I grasp the handle without enough muscle tone to account for its filled 
weight, I sample unexpected proprioceptive feedback (i.e., prediction-error is 
produced) that informs me to adjust my prediction about the cup‘s fullness, as 
well as what action is appropriate. To continue with this example, in some ver-
sions of PPP (Clark, 2015b; Friston, 2009; 2010) the proprioceptive consequenc-
es of a full coffee-mug result in prediction error that activates the motor system 
to adjust to a grasp that optimally deals with a full cup instead of the present 
grasp (empty cup). In fact, in such versions of PPP, all actions are produced by the 
motor system to resolve prediction errors by making predictions about the con-
sequences of actions true by actually performing those actions. Simply put, when 
an action is predicted in a particular context, the consequences of those predict-
ed actions are compared to the present state of the system. This results in pre-
diction-errors that are resolved by acting on those predictions. 
Minimizing prediction error with action is called active inference. Active 
inference reduces prediction error using what Pickering and Clark (2014, p. 451) 
refer to as ―twin strategies.‖ Predictions are altered to fit the environment and 
the environment and body are altered through action to fit the predictions. Fur-
ther, action can simplify what we might call the ―predictive load‖ of the genera-
tive model (see Clark, 2015a, b). Namely, actions are informative for updating 
predictions, as active sampling provides information otherwise not (as reliably) 
                                                          
17 Interestingly, computer vision research has yielded productive results by implement-
ing just such an active model of vision (e.g., Rao & Ballard, 1999), and this model has 
unique explanatory power with regards to persistent optical illusions experienced by 
humans (for an overview see Hohwy, 2013).  
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available in a passive mode. As Clark (2015a, p. 15) says, ―the course of embod-
ied action to novel patterns of sensory stimulation, may thus acquire forms of 
knowledge that were genuinely out-of-reach prior to such physical-manipulation-
based re-tuning of the generative model.‖ As an illustrative instance, Clark 
(2015a) points to abacus-training, wherein children are able to learn to perform 
complex arithmetic by using an abacus, and learn to perform these calculations 
without an abacus after sufficient training (Stigler, 1984). Learning by acting on an 
abacus allows the generative model to shape predictions with more reliable in-
puts (e.g., the results of the actions themselves), and effectively reduces the de-
grees of complexity of the generative model itself (see Kirsh & Maglio, 1994 for a 
similar example).  
How is an agent able to flexibly employ the different strategies for pre-
diction error-minimization? For example, in some cases active sampling is not an 
option, and inference on the basis of present input is more appropriate. PPP em-
ploy precision-estimation as a mechanism that allows for the flexibility of predic-
tive strategies. Namely, every prediction and sensory input is given a certain se-
cond-order ‗weighting‘ (called a ‗precision estimate‘) on the bases of its predicted 
accuracy. That is, given the context (e.g., say a misty day, or a dark room), the 
cognitive system may treat incoming sensory signals as less reliable (i.e., lower 
precision estimate), which results in relatively higher precision estimates of top-
down predictions. This allows the agent to behave according to prior knowledge 
(e.g., anticipating stop signs on the misty road you are driving on; navigating the 
dark room based on memory) as a more reliable way to reduce prediction error 
than relying only on sensory bottom-up information. In contrast, in a completely 
novel situation, it may be difficult to form top-down predictions with any amount 
of accuracy. In such situations, action becomes increasingly important as a means 
of learning the environment. Thus, precision estimates allow the system more 
flexibility, as in some situations the environment can be used as its own best 
model, whereas in others, a top-down model for the environment may be more 
effective (Clark, 2015a, b). Precision estimates allow the system to determine 
which is best. 
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 We believe that there is synergy between the key concepts of PPP and 
those of the GSA framework. In the sections that follow, we will explore how 
each of the three determinants of whether a gesture is produced as proposed in 
the GSA framework can be explained by PPP. Further, by considering gestures as 
action in a PPP, some predictions about gesture function naturally emerge.  
Action simulations are strongly activated when prediction error 
is high 
 The GSA framework holds that gestures arise from action-simulations, 
wherein the strength of motor activations predicts (in part) the likelihood of 
overt gestures. The strength of activation is determined in large part by the man-
ual motor-affordances that are solicited by the environment or content of speech 
(e.g., Chu & Kita, 2015; Masson-Carro et al., 2015). 
In PPP, action is produced as a means of resolving the prediction error 
that exists when an action is predicted but one‘s body state is different (e.g., stat-
ic). In order to think about an event that involves action, speakers‘ cognitive sys-
tem must predict what actions are involved and what the proprioceptive and vis-
ual consequences of those actions would be. Creating such predictions in the 
absence of overt movement results in high prediction error, as the cognitive sys-
tem predicts that movement should be occurring but does not receive the kine-
matic feedback of such movement. To resolve this prediction error, the speaker‘s 
motor system may be activated to produce congruent movement. Such move-
ment is recognized as gesture when it occurs alongside speech.  
Thus the claim that gestures occur when action simulations are strongly 
activated in the mind of a speaker is compatible with the basic claim of PPP. For 
example, PPP can accommodate the idea that when the relevant content of 
speech is actional (e.g., throwing a ball) gestures are more likely, than when the 
content of speech is about visual-spatial (e.g., seeing a house) or abstract con-
cepts (e.g., democracy), as action is part of the prediction formed by the cogni-
tive system in the former case. To think (and talk) about throwing a ball without 
actually producing the corresponding action requires the cognitive system to tol-
erate a higher amount of prediction error in the motor-system. Under PPP, such 
a state is not desirable; thus, an action is likely to be produced as a means of re-
solving the prediction error. 
Consider the case of mental rotation, in which participants are asked to 
imagine the visual consequence of rotating some object a specified amount 
around its axis. In such a task, the visual information associated with rotation of 
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the object must be predicted top-down by a generative model that captures sen-
sory consequences that co-uccur with such rotations based on previous experi-
ence. This requires spatiotemporally fine-grained visual predictions of a moving 
object. In the terminology of PPP, prediction error in such a situation is high, as 
the top-down predictions of the object‘s visual appearance as well as motor-
associations following rotation do not match the sensory input of the objects‘ 
given starting position. To resolve the error, an action may be initiated, even one 
which does not actually manipulate the object. Indeed, during mental rotation, 
either co-occuring with or without speech, participants naturally adopt gestures 
as-if manipulating the object to be rotated (Chu & Kita, 2008; 2011). In terms of 
the GSA framework, such gestures occur because the movement involved in ro-
tation is being simulated strongly in the speaker‘s mind, in order to determine its 
endstate (see Hostetter, Alibali, & Bartholomew, 2011). 
Of course, not all gestures are direct pantomimes of action. Many ges-
tures take a form of outlining or tracing a described object. For example, a 
speaker might say ―it was round‖ while tracing a circle shape in the air. In such an 
instance, it is difficult to see how the gesture could be reducing prediction error 
between a predicted action and the kinematic absence of such action. However, 
in PPP, predictions are multimodal, meaning that they are not limited to action 
predictions but can also involve visual predictions. Thinking (and talking) about a 
ball does not only involve predicting what corresponding actions go along with a 
ball, but also what the ball looks like. Creating an image of the ball with one‘s 
hands could be a way to minimize the prediction error that is inherent to talking 
about how an object looks without getting sensory input about the object‘s actu-
al appearance. Indeed, speakers gesture less about objects that are visually pre-
sent than about objects that are not present (e.g., Morsella & Krauss, 2004). This 
could be because there is less prediction error involved in talking about an object 
that is visually present in the environment, so action is not as likely to be initiat-
ed. In contrast, when there is no visual object present, gestures make the infer-
ences about the object made in speech become true. Under this view, proprio-
ceptive predictions, that are first inherent to action processing, become multi-
modally associated with depictive visual-spatial processing (e.g., shape of a house) 
over development. We speculate that the proprioceptive feedback of an action 
or gesture comes to activate relevant visual-spatial details as well (see Cooper-
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rider, Wakefield, & Goldin-Meadow, 2015; Pouw, Mavilidi, Van Gog, Zwaan, & 
Paas, under review, for some evidence on this point). 
In sum, the GSA framework proposes that gestures are automatically ac-
tivated as the result of activation in the sensori-motor system during speaking 
and thinking. This is congenial to the idea that top-down predictions about senso-
ri-motor events are continuously employed by the cognitive system. Further-
more, that gestures are most likely to be produced when there is a disconnect 
between the physical and mental environment (e.g., when action is being talked 
about or when a visual scene is being described that is not visually present) sug-
gests that gestures may emerge precisely when prediction error related to the 
motor-system is high. In the terms of the GSA framework, action simulations 
become strongly activated in such situations, and this high activation leads to ges-
ture.  
Gesture threshold is adjusted based on precision estimates 
Recall that the GSA framework argues that simulations underlying ges-
tures are automatically activated, but that their overt production as a gesture is 
dependent on a number of contextual factors captured by the ‗gesture-
threshold‘. Speakers can adjust their gesture rate (either consciously or uncon-
sciously) as the result of such things as believing that a gesture will be helpful to 
either themselves or their listener. 
This is similar to the way that predictions and sensory inputs are given 
precision estimates in PPP, so that the cognitive system can rely more on one or 
the other in a particular situation. When sensory input is degraded, the cognitive 
system may favor top-down predictions. When top-down predictions seem insuf-
ficient, the cognitive system will seek out sensory input to provide new infor-
mation through active inference. For example, Tetris players often rotate blocks 
to decide where to best place them (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). Producing the rota-
tion movement provides more reliable bottom-up information than top-down 
predictions (i.e., mental rotations) of where the pieces will fit best.  
As mentioned above, a similar process has been observed with the use of 
gesture during mental rotation tasks (Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011). Most important 
for our discussion of prediction estimates and the gesture threshold, however, is 
the finding that participants do not always gesture during such tasks. In cases 
where the rotational angle is smaller, those participants who generally gesture in 
more difficult trials may not adopt gestures. At smaller rotation angles, the task is 
easier, and as such, the precision estimate of top-down visual and motor predic-
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tions of the rotation is set to be more reliable (given previous successes in the 
past) and thus active inference (gesture) is less likely to occur.  
This could also explain the findings that those with a lower (as opposed 
to higher) working memory capacity are more likely to gesture during speech 
production (e.g., Chu, Meyer, Foulkes, & Kita, 2013; Gillespie, James, Federmeier, 
& Watson, 2014). For participants with limited working memory systems, top-
down predictions are generally more unreliable, leading them to adopt gestures 
as a means of providing more accurate sensori-motor predictions. In the terms of 
the GSA framework, such speakers intuit the potential benefit of gesture and 
thereby set a low gesture threshold so that many of their simulations come to be 
expressed in gesture. Indeed, Dunn and Risko (2015) found that metacognitive 
judgments of whether an external rather than internal strategy is more efficient 
directly predicts how problem solvers approach a task. Thus, precision estimates 
and reliability judgments may determine whether gestures are produced.  
The idea in the GSA framework that speakers can intuit whether a ges-
ture is helpful or not is compatible with the idea in PPP that the cognitive system 
employs precision estimates as a way to give preference to sensory inputs or 
top-down predictions. In situations where producing a gesture could help the 
system visualize the details of the top-down prediction, a gesture is more likely 
to be produced. 
Simultaneous speaking prevents complete inhibition of motor 
system 
In the GSA framework, the final predictor of gesture is whether speech is 
accompanying the simulation. The GSA framework proposes that because the 
vocal articulators must be moved during speaking, it is difficult to completely in-
hibit the motor activity involved in simulation from being expressed as gesture. 
Although gestures can and do occur without speech (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2015), ges-
tures are typically more prevalent alongside speech than in its absence. 
This explanation is in line with the mechanics of PPP. Recall that sensori-
motor predictions can be inhibited in situations where top-down predictions are 
estimated to be more accurate. This is sometimes referred to as ―gain control‖, 
or the system‘s ability to gate sensori-motor predictions so that only weak signals 
are sent to the muscles (e.g., Grush, 2004). However, when the motor system 
must be involved in the interest of producing speech, it is difficult to completely 
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inhibit all motor signals from being sent to the muscles. In their Action-Based 
Language theory, Glenberg and Gallese (2012) offer a PPP on language, positing 
that language learning, comprehension, and production capitalize on systems for 
motor control. They follow the GSA framework in proposing that gestures are 
the result of activating relevant actions alongside speech paired with an inability 
to completely block these movements from being expressed because speaking 
requires movement of the mouth and vocal articulators. Thus at least one PPP 
has already offered an account of gesture fully in line with that provided in the 
GSA framework. 
As evidence for this account, consider that the articulatory/oral system 
and manual system are closely entrained. For example, humans often open and 
close their mouths during skillful manual manipulation (Darwin, 1998). It has been 
found that when grasping an object with one‘s mouth, the size of the mouth 
opening correspondingly affects the size of index-thumb aperture (Gentiulucci et 
al., 2001). This is also the case the other way around; the size of the manual grasp 
of an object affects the size of the aperture of the mouth. Furthermore, when 
participants had to grasp an object and simultaneously name a syllable printed on 
it (e.g., ―GU‖, ―GA‖), the size of the manual grasp aperture affected lip opening as 
well as voice patterns during syllable expression, showing a clear entrainment 
between manual action and the articulatory system. In sum, the proposal that 
gestures are likely to occur alongside speech because motor activity cannot be 
completely inhibited is compatible with PPP and the existing literature about the 
mutual entrainment of the oral and manual systems. 
Summary 
We have shown that the basic tenets put forth by the GSA framework 
regarding how gestures emerge in the cognitive system are compatible with the 
claims made by Perspective Processing Perspectives (PPP). Put simply, gesture is 
produced by prediction errors that reach the motor plant. Namely, when the 
system predicts some motor-activity, it will produce prediction-errors - as there 
is no motor-activity yet that matches the predictions - which will in turn activate 
gestures. This is akin to what the GSA framework calls strong activation of action 
simulations. Yet there are constraints, on whether the motor system is activated. 
For example, when precision estimates of incoming motor-sensory signals are 
low relative to top-down predictions, than prediction will not be quashed by ac-
tion, as the prediction error that results will be deemed less reliable and top-
down predictions will suffice. This is akin to one way in which the GSA frame-
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work conceptualizes the gesture threshold, or the idea that action simulations 
must be strong enough to pass some resistance to gesture. When gesture does 
not seem useful to the cognitive or communicative situation, action will not be 
activated strongly enough to be realized as gesture.  
Utilizing PPP to think about gesture offers more than just a shift in termi-
nology. On the contrary, in PPP, active inference is a central catalyst for cogni-
tion, suggesting that action in the form of gesture may also benefit the cognitive 
system. As will be explained in the following section, thinking about gesture not 
just as simulated action, but also as predictive action offers a general explanatory 
mechanism for how gestures have their facilitative effects on cognition. 
Gesture as Predictive Action 
In PPP, action can serve as a means of reducing predictive load. That is, 
by engaging the motor system in action, the cognitive system is able to sample 
information about the consequences of a particular action that is more precise 
than the information gleaned from a top-down prediction. We contend that ges-
ture, like action more generally, can have this same effect, by providing the cogni-
tive system with useful sensori-motor information. 
We suggest that the act of gesturing provides visual and proprioceptive 
feedback about the consequences of action that is not available in a static state. 
Gestures thus provide multimodal information that corresponds to (as they nor-
mally co-occur with) the causal consequences of actually acting on an object. The-
se consequences thus inform top-down visual and motor predictions with actual 
kinematic information, which is arguably more reliable than having to predict such 
consequences completely top-down. What results is a generative model dealing 
with more reliable externally supplanted (visual, and proprioceptive) information, 
that allows for less risky (i.e., more accurate) perceptual inferences. This process 
has a number of potential benefits to the cognitive system. 
For example, consider the well-documented finding that gestures reduce 
working memory demands, as speakers who gesture during a primary task (e.g., 
explaining their solution to a math problem) are able to perform better on a sec-
ondary task (e.g., remembering a string of letters) than speakers who do not ges-
ture (e.g., Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001). In our view, this effect occurs because 
gestures have reduced the predictive load involved in the primary task. For in-
stance, as speakers describe how to solve a mathematical factoring problem, they 
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use their hands to explore how the numbers move to the relevant positions in 
the problem space. These gestures provide visual and proprioceptive feedback 
about where the numbers should be positioned, thereby making it easier for the 
generative model to operate as the solution is described. As a result, the cogni-
tive system has more resources available to devote to a secondary task (e.g., re-
membering a list of letters). 
The feedback provided by gesture may help problem solving, as well. For 
example, when speakers are solving a mental rotation problem, moving their 
hand as they would if they were actually turning the block to be rotated will acti-
vate visual information about the end state of that rotation. As they attempt to 
predict the objects‘ end state, participants gesture as a form of active inference 
to determine what the sensorimotor consequences of various amounts of rota-
tion will be, and in doing so, actually provide themselves with information about 
what those sensorimotor consequences are. The same effect is seen as partici-
pants solve the Tower of Hanoi. Producing gestures as-if manipulating the physi-
cal apparatus affects problem-solving performance compared to not gesturing 
(Cooperrider et al., 2015). Such gestures inform top-down predictions with rele-
vant kinematic information. Indeed, when this kinematic information is not rele-
vant to solving the task, performance is hampered (Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 
2010). 
A similar effect occurs during mental abacus. Abacus users, after repeat-
ed training, learn to do complex arithmetic without the abacus; top-down predic-
tions are doing most of the work in these cases. Interestingly however, abacus 
users transitioning to do arithmetic without the abacus often use gestures, as-if 
manipulating the beads of an actual abacus (e.g., Hatano & Osawa, 1983). With 
time, these gestures dissipate, and abacus users learn to do calculations without 
moving, although they appear to still be using a strategy that involves imagining 
use of the abacus (see Frank & Barner, 2012 for evidence). Thus, gestures seem 
to offer some in-between strategy wherein they can supplant the now absent in-
formation normally afforded by a physical abacus. Indeed, while the abacus is ab-
sent, the affordance of generating proprioceptive and visual consequences that 
normally occur with acting on an abacus are ready to hand when gesturing. Using 
this second-hand information afforded by gesture (rather than interaction with 
the abacus), allows the generative model to deal with a certain amount of uncer-
tainty still present in top-down predictions.  
Can this account also explain the effects of gesture on linguistic pro-
cessing? For example, gesture production has been shown in some circumstances 
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to act as a cross-modal prime that speeds access to corresponding words 
(Krauss, 1998). In their Action-Based Language Model, Glenberg and Gallese 
(2012) explain this as occurring because the predictors associated with a physical 
action and the predictors associated with the articulation of the lexical label for 
that action are overlapping. We build on this explanation to offer the following 
account. When speakers are thinking of describing a particular action, they at-
tempt to access the action plan for articulating the correct lexical label. When 
the precision estimate for accessing this label is low, speakers engage gesture as a 
means of gathering more information. Because linguistic knowledge is grounded 
in sensorimotor experience (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012), the 
act of gesture can provide proprioceptive, visual, or kinematic cues that then 
strengthen activation of the word. 
This is especially apparent in the case of gesture-speech mismatches, in 
which a speaker conveys information in gesture that is not conveyed in the im-
mediately accompanying speech (e.g., Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986). Such ges-
ture-speech mismatches have been observed in children (and adults) in a wide 
variety of learning tasks (e.g., solving mathematical equations, balance beam prob-
lems, and chemistry problems), and predict children‘s learning trajectory (for a 
review see, Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 2015). When learning a new task, children 
tend to first produce incorrect solutions in both gesture and speech. With addi-
tional learning, it becomes more likely that a correct solution is expressed in ei-
ther gesture or speech (but not both), before the child finally settles into a stable 
state where gesture and speech both express a correct strategy (Alibali & Gold-
in-Meadow, 1993). Thus, it seems that learning does not follow an either-or tran-
sition of understanding (i.e., eureka!), but a negotiation of different ways of un-
derstanding brought forth through gesture and speech.  
From the present perspective, these different ―ways‖ of understanding 
correspond to the different kinds of predictive processing that govern gesture 
and speech. Namely, explaining a solution in speech involves predictions that are 
linear and rule-based (i.e., knowing-that). Speech targets regularities that are pre-
sent on slower time-scales, which can be applied to several phenomena inde-
pendent of a single observation (e.g., in a conservation task, knowing that any 
action could be undone to return to the original state). Yet, these abstract regu-
larities need to be observed and discovered to become articulable. Here, gesture 
comes into play. As the child thinks about the task without a clear top-down so-
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lution in mind (i.e., top-down prediction estimates for speech are low), the child 
initiates gesture as action to explore the manual affordances of the apparatus. 
These gestures are governed by the task‘s predicted manual affordances (e.g., 
know-how) and not necessarily by representations of an abstract rule (Pouw, Van 
Gog, et al., in press). The gestures provide proprioceptive and kinematic infor-
mation about the transformation that goes beyond what the child can see in the 
stimulus. Through repeated instances of gesturing, invariants can be discovered 
that become parsed in meaningful sequences that correspond (or not) with seg-
ments in speech. Under this view, a stable state is reached when the prediction 
error between discovered higher order invariants in gesture are resolved with 
categorical speech predictions that target those invariants.  
In sum, we believe that many of the documented effects of gesture on 
cognition and language can be explained by considering gesture as a case of active 
inference. By engaging action/gesture, the cognitive system creates new bottom-
up input that can inform the top-down predictions necessary for a problem solv-
ing or language task.  
Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, we have offered a preliminary sketch for considering ges-
ture as a case of predictive action. Considering gesture as an example of action in 
a Predictive Processing Perspective offers a powerful description of how gestures 
come to have their facilitative effects, as well as how they arise out of anticipa-
tory sensori-motor states (simulations vis-à-vis top-down proprioceptive predic-
tions). Under this view, the distinction between the origin of gesture and their 
function in the cognitive system is not so clear. Gestures occur because they can 
have powerful effects on the cognitive system, yet the effects they have are the 
direct result of their origin as simulated and predictive actions in that cognitive 
system.  
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Chapter 10 
Summary and General Discussion 
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The overarching questions guiding the research presented in this dissertation 
were: If cognition depends directly or indirectly on bodily processes, then what 
are the implications for learning and problem solving? In other words, what type 
of behaviors and interventions would we expect to impact learning and problem 
solving if cognitive processes are dependent on bodily processes? 
This dissertation consisted of three parts. Part 1 focused on the applicability of 
embodied cognition approaches for improving learning from instructional anima-
tions and manipulatives. More precisely, it was concerned with the question of 
whether manual activity during learning can change the way learners represent 
problem solutions related to the learned content, thereby improving their learn-
ing outcomes. Part II investigated the occurrence of non-communicative hand-
gestures and their influence on problem-solving performance. In part III, which 
includes this discussion chapter, the main ideas in the dissertation are synthesized 
and interpreted in light of recent developments.  
The key findings from each of the three parts are summarized and briefly dis-
cussed in relation to the overarching questions of the dissertation. 
Part 1: Effects of Manual Activity on Learning 
 
Part I focused on whether learning in more bodily engaged ways may re-
sult in thinking about the learned content in more productive ways. In Chapter 
2, a theoretical review paper was presented concerning instructional manipula-
tives. The early rationale (advocated, for instance, by Montessori [1870-1952] 
and Pestalozzi [1746-1827]) behind the use of instructional manipulatives is that 
essential information can be picked up through interaction with the manipulative 
that is difficult to obtain in more passive modes of learning. Yet, the review of the 
recent literature on instructional manipulatives showed a more negative senti-
ment concerning its effective qualities (e.g., McNeil & Jarvin, 2007). Part of this 
negative sentiment is driven by research that shows digital mouse-based instruc-
tional manipulatives are as effective, or even more effective, than classic physical 
manipulatives. Digital manipulatives typically have less degrees of self-guided inter-
active freedom, lower visual complexity and a smaller range of kinesthetic expe-
riences. According to some researchers studying manipulatives (e.g., T. De Jong 
et al. 2013, Triona et al. 2005), such findings are surprising from an embodied 
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cognition perspective, which would predict more physical experiences lead to 
richer knowledge-representations.  
However, we came to a different conclusion based on a reassesment of 
basic findings that ground the embodied cognition approach, and related findings 
on instructional maniplatives. The most important finding was that perceptual and 
interactive richness of manipulatives are effective only when such features are 
functionally relevant for the concept that is being learned. To provide one exam-
ple, it has been shown that chemistry students who have to learn how to trans-
late one molecular scheme into another are aided by manipulating a physical 
model of the molecular bond (Stull et al., 2012). Indeed, basic research has al-
ready shown that expert tetris players can perform on such high levels because 
they minimize the mental rotation of zoids by rotating the zoids directly rather 
than mentally (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). The translation of molecural schemes, too, 
requires effective (mental) rotations. Importantly, this effect is ill-interpreted 
when assuming that these findings show that ―more‖ sensori-motor experiences 
improve learning. Indeed, Stull and colleagues (2013) have shown in a subsequent 
study that when rotations can be made with a digitially presented 3-D molecular 
model, this can be as effective as learning with a physical manipulative. And this 
effect was attributed to the fact that digital rotation enabled learners to rotate 
the bond on one central axis, reducing additional degrees of freedom that are not 
productive for thinking about the problem (i.e., reducing the number of axes on 
which a molecular model can be rotated). This example shows that reducing the 
richness of kinestethic experience with a manipulative can allow for more pro-
ductive interactive (i.e., ―embodied‖) information to emerge that is more effec-
tive than passive modes of learning. Very simply put, sometime less is more, as 
less interaction in this case solicits more productive embodied problem solving. 
We conclude on the basis of these and related findings that embodied cognition 
fosters understanding of the effectiveness of instructional manipulatives, if it is 
pinpointed what relevant information can emerge through interaction with the 
environment that is not available in passive mode. As such the digital vs physical 
debate can be illuminating in further assessing the functionally relevant infor-
mation that emerges in interaction.  
In Chapter 3 we attempted to manipulate functionally relevant infor-
mation in interactional learning. Consider that the central assumption in ground-
ed cognition (applied to manipulatives) reads that physical experiences that are 
obtained during learning with manipulatives may become functionally re-used 
when reasoning without such manipulatives (Barsalou, 1999). To use a previous 
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example, we can expect that having rotated the molecular bond on one central 
axis will result in mental rotations on that central axis, thus leading to more pro-
ductive mental rotations because of previous physical experiences (see e.g., Chu 
& Kita, 2011; Flusberg & Boroditsky, 2011). To further avoid a simplistic reading 
it should be made clear why some physical experiences (rotating on one bond) 
are functionally relevant to (learning to) perform some cognitive task. As such, 
Chapter 3 was designed to gauge the potential benefits of learning through physi-
cal interaction by manipulating the meaningfulness of the information that could 
be gained through interaction.  
Participants (76 university students) learned from an interactive instruc-
tional animation about the key principles of class-1 levers (represented by a see-
saw). All particpants were physically interacting with the instructional animation 
by pushing with their hands on Nintendo Wii-Board. As such, the mode of inter-
action was kept constant for all participants, to avoid possible confounding moti-
vational factors related to having to physically interact versus being in some pas-
sive learning condition (e.g., Kontra et al., 2015; Skulmowski et al., 2016; Zacharia 
et al., 2012). Instead, we manipulated the type of information to be gained 
through interaction in three ways. Firstly, a third of the sample engaged with the 
instructional animations through the Wii-board, by learning to apply the appro-
priate force to balance a seesaw depending on the presented counterweights and 
their relative positions on the beam (as to learn about the principle of mechanical 
advantage, see chapter 3). Importantly, in this ―meaningful‖ interaction condition 
there was a lawful correspondence between the physics of class-1 levers and the 
different forces that the participant learned to apply. In contrast, a third of the 
sample was assigned to a ―non-meaningful‖ interaction condition, wherein the 
forces that needed to be applied to balance the seesaw were inconsistently relat-
ed to the physics of class-1 levers. The final third of the sample was assigned to a 
―minimal‖ interaction condition, wherein participants briefly applied a consistent 
force (with two hands) on the wii-board to make a seesaw balance out. After the 
learning phase participants performed three test-tasks, each designed to tap into 
different types of knowledge. Firstly, participants performed a three-choice reac-
tion-time task wherein they needed to judge (as fast as possible) what the end-
state of a seesaw would be given the number of counterweights and their posi-
tions on the seesaw. This task was designed to tap into automatic, pre-reflective 
knowledge about the dynamics of the seesaw. In the transfer task, participants 
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had to extend the learned principles to more complex representations of class-1 
levers (e.g., judging the endstate of interconnected seesaws). This task thus re-
quired a more reflective reasoning process as inferences needed to be made 
from the more basic principles covered in the instructional animation, and to be 
applied to a new problem situation. Finally, we assessed participants ―motor-
knowledge‖, by letting them judge over several trials the amount of force that 
needed be applied to balance a seesaw given the amount of counterweights and 
their positions.  
It was expected that having had meaningful physical experiences that law-
fully correspond to the physics of the seesaw would result in higer performance 
on subsequent test-tasks compared to the minimal and non-meaningful condi-
tions. The rationale is that the motor-knowledge that learners acquire to cor-
rectly apply force to balance a seesaw becomes mentally reused for further prob-
lem solving with class-1 levers. Such motor-knowledge is expected to be func-
tional, as it would allow learners to predict end-states of levers on the basis of 
the differing motor-associations that are automatically re-experienced, or ―re-
enacted‖ (Barsalou, 1999). Inversely, providing physical experiences that are in-
consistent with class-1 lever physics should be detrimental to subsequent per-
formance (as compared to the minimal and meaningful condition) as the motor-
associations that are reexprienced do not map onto the correct physics of the 
problem, and are therefore not predictive for the solution of the problem.  
Yet, the findings showed something different. No effects of instructional 
condition on performance were obtained on either the reaction-time task or the 
transfer-task. Interestingly, there was some divergence on the motor-knowledge 
task. Although a pre-defined ratio did not show significant divergence on this 
measure, visual inspection of the force-curves of this task clearly indicated that 
when asked to judge the dynamics of a seesaw motorically, the participants as-
signed to the non-meaningful condition were indeed less able to motorically dif-
ferientate between different forces than participants in the meaningful condition. 
Moreover, even though partcipants in the minimal condition did not learn to dif-
ferientiate forces, they seemed to apply different forces true to the correct phys-
ics of the problem, suggesting that the visual content of the instructional anima-
tion may have led to some transfer in the motor-domain. We can highlight three 
main implications of this study. Firstly, if the current null-results are on track, 
then it seems that a relatively short physically interactive learning intervention is 
not readily functionally redeployed in further reasoning, although it does leave 
traces in motor-knowledge. Secondly, it might be that the visual information ob-
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tained from the instructional animation is relatively dominant, as there was some 
transfer to the motor-domain for participants in the minimal condition. Finally, 
even regardless of the results, the design of the current study provided a novel 
way of assessing the functional redeployment of physical experiences.  
In Chapter 4 a different application of basic research related to indirect 
approaches to embodied cognition was tested for improving learning from non-
interactive instructional animations. Again in the context of class-1 levers, but this 
time with a younger age-sample (74 children between 10-13 years of age), it was 
assessed whether instructional animations augmented with an analogy to physical 
principles inherent to the mechanics of the body improves learning as opposed to 
an otherwise identical instructional animation without such an analogy. This study 
was informed by previous research that has shown that mental rotations are per-
formed more quickly and accurately if the entities under rotation are human bod-
ies versus abstract (but otherwise identical) objects (Amorim et al., 2006). The 
rationale behind this improved performance is that humans are intimitaly aware 
of the spatial properties of their own body, and mental transformation of this 
engrained spatial body image may sometimes be required to act appropriately on 
the environment (e.g., will my body fit through this apperture? Can I reach this 
object? etc.). As such, this practical bodily know-how seems to be functionally 
reemployed when thinking about spatial transformations, according to an embod-
ied cognition perspective on these findings.  
In this study we assessed whether it is possible to improve learning about 
a physical system by tapping into the knowledge inherent to bodily dynamics. 
Namely, we reasoned that the principle of mechanical advantage, a key learning 
principle of class-1 levers, is congruent with physical experiences of placing 
weights on different positions on the arms. To show this, imagine that you have 
two equally weighted objects, one of which is placed on the left arm that is ex-
tended horizontally from the body at the position of the elbow, and the second 
weight is is placed on the extended right arm, but in this case the weight is posi-
tioned at the hand. Although the weights are of equal mass, the object placed 
furthest from the shoulder will feel heavier than the object closer to the shoulder 
(the weight placed at the elbow‘s positions). Identically, when an object is placed 
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on the left side of a seesaw (analogy: left arm18) closer to the fulcrum (analogy: 
left shoulder), and an object of equal mass is placed on the right side of the see-
saw (analogy: right arm) further from the fulcrum (analogy: right shoulder), the 
seesaw will pivot the the right (analogy: the right arm will feel heavier). This anal-
ogy was put to the test. All children learned through an instructional animation 
wherein the basic principles of class-1 levers were explained (using a seesaw). 
Half of the participants learned with an instructional animation in which a trans-
parent body was projected over the seesaw. The other half of the sample was 
not given this body analogy. Afterwards children were tested on a three-choice 
reaction time task and a (simplified) transfer task similar to the procedure used in 
Chapter 3. As younger age-samples show large individual differences in cognitive 
skills (as compared to student-samples), we pseudorandomly assigned children to 
the condition (control vs. body analogy) by matching for level of general math 
skill.  
The results showed that there was an effect of the body analogy on accu-
racy on the reaction-time task, but this effect was qualified by an interaction with 
general math skill. Children with relatively lower general math skills were more 
likely to learn from the body analogy (i.e., provided more correct answers) as 
compared to children with similar math skills who did not learn with a body anal-
ogy. Similar effects were not found for answer-speed on the reaction-time task, 
nor for accuracy and time-on-task on the transfer task. Results did however 
show that children with a relatively lower general math skill showed higher 
speed-accuracy trade-offs on the transfer task when having learned with a body 
analogy as opposed to the control animation. Thus, results on both the reaction-
time task and the transfer task do not converge on whether the body analogy is 
more effective, but do converge on the finding that especially those with lower 
skill in math are likely to be affected by the body analogy, either for better (i.e., 
increased performance on the RT-task), or for worse (i.e., speed-accuracy 
tradeoff on the transfer task). We interpret these findings as being potentially 
promising for educational practices, as it signals that a relatively simple modifica-
tion that allows learners to map relevant bodily dynamics onto a physical system 
can improve learning for some children without hampering learning of other chil-
dren. Yet, although promising, the findings are currently far from applicable yet 
(for a more thorough discussion see chapter 4). This is mainly because the effect 
                                                          
18 Coincidentally, in instructional texts the analogy is already implied as the left or 
right side of the seesaw relative to the fulcrum is referred the left or right arm of the 
seesaw. 
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of the body analogy seems to meet its boundary condition as soon as the analogy 
needs to be applied to slightly more complex instantiations of the class-1 lever 
(i.e., as assessed through the transfer task). Therefore, we recommended further 
exploration of the the applicability of body-anologies to other physical systems, 
while being sensitive to the cognitive pre-dispositions of learners. 
 
Part 1: Brief conclusion and suggestions future research 
Taken as a whole, the studies in part 1 took a closer look at the rele-
vance of embodied cognition for Educational Psychology. The literature review 
suggested that more bodily engagement during learning can be effective because 
of the qualitatively different information it can provide compared to passive 
modes of learning. Yet, although reframing the relevance of embodied cognition 
for learning interventions in this way is more theoretically sound than the idea 
that more bodily engagement is better, further research is needed to pinpoint 
what qualitative differences matter for learning exactly, if at all19. In the case of 
learning about science concepts, future studies could become more sensitive to 
the functional information that is afforded by a particular intervention by loosen-
ing and tightening the correspondence of perception-action loops with the phys-
ics of the learning concept, instead of manipulating only the presence of interac-
tion (active vs. passive learning). Furthermore, more research will be needed to 
assess the boundary conditions of learning in concrete contexts as it is relevant 
for children as opposed to adults, and whether bodily learning in concrete con-
texts transfers to more complex situations.  
 
Part 2: Effects of Manual Activity on Problem Solving 
 
The chapters presented in Part 2 include a theoretical analysis and a set 
of experiments focused on the cognitive function of gestures for the gesturer. 
The main question addressed in this part, is how gestures (i.e., specific bodily 
acts) are functionally important for problem solving. 
                                                          
19 This assertion that the investigation of the functional nature of learning effects in 
embodied cognition research is key for its development as a field resonates further 
with other recent calls for action, for example in the domain of language processing 
(Zwaan, 2014, 2015; see also Wilson & Golonka, 2013). 
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The theoretical analysis presented in Chapter 5, questioned how ges-
tures can aid cognitive processes of the gesturer. That gestures can aid cognitive 
processes is well-established. The effects of gestures that occur in problem solv-
ing contexts are often accommodated by the idea that gestures enable activation 
of internally stored knowledge about actions, referred to as motor-simulations 
(Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011, 2016). The main theo-
retical point made in Chapter 5 is that there is a logical objection to this general 
explanation. Namely, gestures are not effective for spatial problem solving in vir-
tue of tapping into pre-existing internal representations of actions). This is be-
cause the activation of the motor-representation is classically employed to specify 
the production of actions, such as a hand-gesture. A gesture is thus logically prior 
to the activation of a motor-representation (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). What the 
exact beneficial cognitive function of the actual physical production of a gesture 
might be is therefore not clear, or trivial when solely understood as keeping ―in-
formation in the head‖ activated (see also Pouw et al., in press; not in this dis-
seratation). Alternatively, a non-trivial account of the cognitive function of ges-
tures would consist of the specification of how gestures-as-bodily-acts offer a 
particular type of information that cannot be (efficiently) generated (yet) by in-
ternal cognitive means.  
We tried to offer a preliminary sketch of such a non-trivial account of 
the function of gesture by assessing how gestures are used in relation to internal 
cognitive predispositions of the gesturer. Namely, those with relatively lower 
working memory capacity tend to produce more co-speech gestures (Chu et al., 
2015; Gillespie et al., 2014); when cognitive load is increased problem solvers 
tend to produce more gestures (Smithson & Nicoladis, 2014); and gestures be-
come more effective for problem solving when cognitive load is increased 
(Marstaller & Buriánova, 2013; see chapter 5 for further evidence). As such we 
put forth the perspective in which gestures-as-bodily-acts should offer support 
through creating spatial bodily imagery that is mediated by visual and propriocep-
tive feedback. From this we predicted that some of the principles that were put 
forward in chapter 5 could be applied to the phenomenon of co-thought ges-
tures. Co-thought gestures are hand-movements that are often very alike co-
speech gestures (e.g., pointing gestures, actional gestures) but occur, in contrast, 
in the absence of a communicative intention and without speech (e.g., Chu & 
Kita, 2016). Co-thought gestures have been observed in several problem solving 
contexts (e.g., solving gear problems, learning routes from a map), but the most 
prominent work in this domain was conducted in the context of mental rotations 
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(Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011, 2016; see chapter 4, 5, 6, and 9 for a discussion). This 
work has shown that co-thought gestures spontaneously emerge during mental 
rotation tasks, and benefit performance on those tasks.  
In Chapter 6, this potential role of co-thought gestures was assessed in 
two novel problem-solving contexts, namely, the Tower of Hanoi and Chess 
problems. An essential prediction obtained from Chapter 5, and applied in Chap-
ter 6, is that gestures should be more likely to be spontaneously used during 
mental problem solving, and more likely to positively affect subsequent physical 
problem-solving performance when the task is more difficult and when visual-
spatial working memory capacity is low. In this experiment, spontaneous pointing 
gestures (but not iconic gestures) were solicited by the two problem solving 
tasks. Additional to soliciting spontaneous co-thought gestures, we encouraged 
some of the participants to adopt pointing gestures during the tasks. The Tower 
of Hanoi task had a mental problem-solving phase before a physical solving phase, 
and participants completed both a 3-disc and 4-disc (i.e., a more easy and more 
difficult) version of the task. In this mental problem-solving phase participants 
were asked to mentally solve the Tower of Hanoi for 2.5 minutes while the phys-
ical Tower was in sight in starting position. Immediately aftrewards, they had to 
physically solve it. A similar mental-problem solving phase followed by a physical 
solving phase was adopted in the chess task, but this time with 3 trials increasing 
in difficulty. Importantly, participants were randomly assigned to a no instruction 
or a gesture instruction condition, and this intervention was applied during the 
mental solving phases. Those participants in the no instruction condition were 
allowed to gesture, and therefore could be naturally subdivided in two groups: 
participants who spontaneously adopted gestures during mental solving of a trial 
(spontaneous gesture group), and those who did not gesture (no gesture group). 
Their performance could be compared with participants in the instructed gesture 
condition (instructed gesture group). Importantly, since we were interested in 
the question whether gesturing would be especially helpful when visual-spatial 
cognitive resources are limited (particularly when the task is more difficult), we 
obtained scores on a visual working memory and a spatial working memory task 
at the beginning of the study. 
The results obtained in Chapter 6 were mixed. First, in contrast to stud-
ies that have shown that the likelihood and the rate at which participants sponta-
neously use gestures is negatively related to working memory capacity (e.g., Chu 
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et al., 2015; Gillespie et al., 2014), we did not find such a relationship. That is, 
although participants were more likely to spontaneously gesture and to perform 
more spontaneous gestures during the more complex trials of the Tower of Ha-
noi and Chess tasks, neither the occurance nor the frequency of spontaneous 
gestures correlated with the visual or spatial working memory scores obtained 
prior to the experiment. We did, however, find a performance benefit of gestur-
ing versus not gesturing as a function of working memory capacity. More precise-
ly, on the more complex 4-disc trial of the Tower of Hanoi it was found that only 
participants with a lower visual working memory capacity who gestured (either 
when spontaneously adopted or when instructed to do so) performed better 
than those who did not gesture during the mental problem-solving phase. On the 
more difficult chess task trials (requiring 4 and 5 solving steps) it was found that 
participants who were instructed to gesture performed better than those who 
did not gesture, and these effects were further qualified by an interaction with 
visual working memory capacity. In the most complex task we again found that 
those with a lower visual working memory capacity were more likely to benefit 
from gesture (when instructed) as compared to non-gesturers. However, in the 
second-most difficult trial of the chess task this relationship was reversed, show-
ing that especially those with a higher visual working memory capacity benefited 
from gesturing. Interestingly, only visual working memory capacity showed an 
interaction effect with gesturing on problem-solving performance; no such inter-
action was found for spatial working memory capacity. 
In Chapter 7 we sought to determine whether the findings obtained 
with the Tower of Hanoi task with adults in chapter 6, would also extend to a 
younger age sample (8-12 yrs old). Specifically we assessed whether children with 
a relatively lower visual working memory capacity would benefit most from ges-
turing (either when spontaneously adopted or when instructed to do so) during 
mental problem solving as compared to children with a lower visual working 
memory capacity who did not gesture. We reasoned that children might be even 
more likely than adults to gain in performance when gesturing, because their 
working memory functions are still in development. However, although we found 
that children naturally adopted gestures during mental problem solving at similar 
rates as the adults did in the study reported in chapter 6, we did not find any 
benefit of gesturing vs. not gesturing on their subsequent problem-solving per-
formance. This suggests that co-thought gestures are already spontaneosly used 
in problem solving contexts by children, but that effects of co-thought gestures 
may be limited to supporting the current thought processes in children, whereas 
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in adults it seems to have benefits also for the cognitive representation of the 
task, showing in subsequent performance. 
In Chapter 8 we reported a small-scale study (17 participants, within-
subjects design) that aimed to provide additional insight into the functional mech-
anism of co-thought gestures during mental solving of the Tower of Hanoi. From 
previous research (e.g., Kirsh, 2009; Patsenko & Altmann, 2010; Spivey & Dale, 
2011) it is known that problem solvers who mentally think through problem solv-
ing steps do this by visually exploiting a presentation of the task (when such a 
visual presentation is provided). In the context of the Tower of Hanoi, this mani-
fests itself by eye movements that are being made over the three pegs that seem 
to reflect the mental problem solving process of placing discs from one peg to 
another (Patsenko & Altmann, 2010). Interestingly, the same can be said about 
gestures. The pointing gestures trajecting over the different pegs during mental 
problem solving of the Tower of Hanoi seem to reflect the mental solving steps 
that are being made from mentally placing a disc from one peg to another. As 
such, eye movements and gestures made during mental planning seem to perform 
the same function, albeit with different means. As foreshadowed by Cappucio and 
colleagues (2013), it could be that gestures can come to stand in for visual pro-
cessing demands associated with having to keep track of mental solving steps 
through eye-movement redirection. This might directly relate to the findings re-
ported in Chapter 6, that those with a relatively lower visual working memory 
capacity (arguably resulting in higher visual processing load during mental prob-
lem solving) were likely to benefit from gesturing. As such, congenial to the theo-
retical suggestions made in Chapter 5, gestures may offer the gesturer a way to 
keep track of mental solving steps in physical space, monitored through proprio-
ception (the sense of the body/hands in space). As such we predicted that 
whether participants gesture or not should affect the degree to which they ex-
ploit a visual presentation of the task, as measured by fixations and saccades dur-
ing mental problem solving directed at the task representation. Indeed, we found 
that when participants were instructed to gesture (i.e., point) during mental 
problem solving, they reduced their eye movements compared to when they did 
not gesture, and this effect was moderated by visual working memory capacity. 
Congenial to our findings in Chapter 6, especially those with a lower visual work-
ing memory capacity were likely to reduce visual exploitation of the task (i.e., 
reduced fixation and saccades) during mental problem solving when they were 
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instructed to gesture compared to when they were instructed not to gesture. 
No particular benefits of gesturing during mental problem solving for actual prob-
lem-solving were found, but –next to low power of the study when it comes to 
performance data- this is likely due to the fact that the mental problem-solving 
phase lasted only 60 s. in this study (as opposed to 150 s. in Chapter 6). 
 
Part 2: Brief conclusion and suggestions future research 
One of the implications of the studies presented in Part 2 is that we 
should distinguish between different degrees of functional relevance of the body 
for cognition, as it applies to gesture. I have argued, that it is often the case that 
the activation of a motor-representation is posited as the causal agent of some 
benefit in cognitive performance, without explication of the functional role of the 
actual bodily movement itself. The cognitive impotency of a gesture-as-a-bodily-
act on such accounts is apparent, as a neural motor-assembly (i.e., motor-
representation, motor code, etc.) must be the causal agent of the bodily move-
ment itself, and not viceversa. Thus, although a gesture might always follow an 
acitivation of a motor-representation, and although a motor-representation is 
activated because the agent intends to gesture, it can still be that the gesture as 
such is not adding much to the cognitive process (e.g., improved problem solv-
ing). Importantly, whenever we do not posit cognitively potent consequences of 
gesture-as-bodily-acts when explaining some cognitive effect of gesturing, we are 
forced to accept that when the intention to gesture is initated by someone who 
has non-congenital phantom limbs, the described effect of ―gesture‖ must come 
about in virtue of activating cognitive precursors of gesture. To me, this is an ab-
surd consequence of accepting that activation of motor-representations explains 
the cognitive function of gesture, although it might of course be very well true. 
Admittedly, it is much harder to empirically investigate the juxtaposition 
that I have cultivated in Part 2 than to theoretically motivate it. Yet, I do think 
that understanding gestures as producing novel information not already present 
within the cognitive system does lead to particular research questions that can be 
empirically addressed. The particular research questions that I have investigated 
concerned the relation between internal cognitive capacities of the problem solv-
er (working memory system) and the effect gestures have on the problem-solving 
process and problem-solving performance. Indeed, the findings with adults seem 
to indicate that gestures may compensate for detriments in performance that 
normally occur under conditions of limited cognitive resources.  
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Further research on the cognitive function of gesture might specifically 
focus on the understudied phenomenon of co-thought gestures (e.g., Chu & Kita, 
2015), as investigating these gestures is promising for pinpointing cognitively po-
tent consequences of gestures while excluding communicative functions of ges-
ture. Furthermore, the findings that children 8-12yrs already naturally employ co-
thought gestures at similar rates as adults when mentally problem solving further 
invites research on the cognitive function of those gestures for subsequent physi-
cal problem solving (which we failed to detect). Additionally, as shown in Chapter 
8, the study of gaze-behavior when problem solvers gesture or not might further 
help to pinpoint what type of cognitive feats gestures accomplish. As of present I 
know of no studies that have systematically investigated gaze-coordination during 
gesturing.  
 
Moving forward 
In the final chapter reported in Part 3 of this dissertation (Chapter 9) a 
preliminary sketch is provided of how we might understand gestures as emerging 
from action-readiness states (i.e., motor simulations) while maintaining that ges-
tures-as-bodily acts  have a non-trivial cognitive function. Such an account is 
needed because there is evidence that gestures spontaneously emerge in so far as 
the concepts that are thought about invite concrete actions. For example, mental 
rotation gestures are less likely to be produced when the objects-to-be-rotated 
are perceived as less manipulable (Chu & Kita, 2015). Furtheremore, co-speech 
gestures are more likely to be produced when the concepts that are talked about 
are manipulable and less likely when they are not (Masson-Carro et al., 2015). By 
review of a recent grand theory in psychology, called the Predictive Processing 
Perspective (Clark, 2015; Howhy, 2012), it is suggested that gestures might in-
deed arise out of action-readiness states, as predicted by embodied simulation 
theories (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). However, these action-readiness states take 
the form kinesthetic predictions that are constantly produced when talking and 
thinking about manipulative actions. These predictions are imperfect and need to 
be constantly negotiated (i.e., updated) with information in the world. As such, 
predictions are put to the test when actuated in gesture, which offers a way to 
calibrate the kinesthetic predictions from which gesture arises on the basis of the 
actual kinesthethic information that gestures-as-bodily-acts produce.  
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Korte introductie: Belichaamde cognitie 
 
Het onderzoek gebundeld in deze dissertatie neemt theorieën over 
‗belichaamde cognitie‘ als uitgangspunt voor interventies om leren en 
probleemoplossen te verbeteren. Volgens deze benadering van cognitie zijn 
lichaamsbewegingen, en de mentale-neurale mechanismes die bewegingen 
ondersteunen, niet alleen een consequentie van cognitieve processen maar 
hebben ze ook een centrale rol in de totstandkoming en structurering van het 
denken. De belichaamde benadering van cognitie kan worden gekenschetst door 
het volgende simpele voorbeeld, dat als metafoor kan dienen voor cognitie 
(m.a.w. bewust en onbewust denken) in den brede. Stel dat een psycholoog wil 
begrijpen hoe een tekenaar uit het hoofd een bepaalde tekening produceert op 
een blad, zeg een landschap. Een klassieke psycholoog zal theorieën opstellen 
over de mentale voorstellingen en processen die het tekenen hebben gestuurd. 
Immers, de tekenaar moet zijn bewegingen sturen op zo‘n manier dat het 
landschap dat zij ‗voor ogen heeft‘ op het blad verschijnt. Deze sturing komt 
voort uit mentale voorstellingen van de tekenaar. Een psycholoog met 
sympathieën voor een belichaamd perspectief op cognitie, zal het proces echter 
anders interpreteren. Om Bredo (1994, p. 28) te parafraseren:  
 
Zij tekent, reageert op het getekende, tekent wat meer, enzovoort. De 
vooruitzichten voor de tekening veranderen naarmate de tekening 
evolueert, en verschillende mogelijkheden dienen zich aan, waardoor de 
ontwikkeling van de tekening een proces is van wederkerigheid tussen 
denken en handelen. Dit proces is daarom niet gedetermineerd door de 
mentale voorstellingen.‖ 
 (Bredo, 1994, pp. 28, vrij vertaald door de auteur) 
Deze herdefiniëring van tekenen (en andere activiteiten) als een belichaamd 
proces heeft belangrijke consequenties voor het bestuderen van cognitie. De 
klassieke psycholoog zal zich niet geroepen voelen om de kenmerken van het 
potlood, de handgrip van de tekenaar, met andere woorden, het handelende 
proces van het tekenen zelf, te bestuderen. Immers, dit zijn strikt genomen niet-
psychologische processen. Vanuit een belichaamde benadering van cognitie ziet 
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men echter het handelend proces - de wederkerigheid tussen het potlood, blad, 
penstreken, en denken - als centraal voor hoe de tekening tot stand komt.  
 
De Cognitieve Functie van Handbewegingen in Leren en Probleem 
Oplossen 
 In de theoretische en empirische studies gebundeld in deze dissertatie, 
onderzocht ik de rol van lichaamsbewegingen, in specifiek handbewegingen, in 
leren en probleem oplossen. Meer specifiek, werd in Deel I onderzocht of en 
hoe het manipuleren van de leeromgeving en het uitnodigen van handelend 
denken kan bijdragen aan leren. In Deel II en III werd onderzocht of en hoe 
handgebaren kunnen bijdragen aan het oplossen van problemen.  
 Als cognitie afhankelijk is van lichamelijke, handelende processen, wat 
voor implicaties zou dit dan hebben voor leerprocessen en het bevorderen 
daarvan? In Deel I start de verkenning van deze vraag door middel van een 
overzicht van de wetenschappelijke literatuur met betrekking tot het leren met 
fysieke objecten (ofwel ―Instructional manipulatives‖; Hoofdstuk 2). Men kan 
hierbij bijvoorbeeld denken aan het gebruik van blokjes tijdens rekenen om 
optellen en delen te leren begrijpen, aan het gebruik van fysieke modellen om 
moleculaire structuren te bestuderen, of aan het ontdekken van de werking van 
een hefboom middels een schaalmodel en gewichten. Leren met fysieke objecten 
kent haar oorsprong bij pedagogen als Montessori (1870-1952) en Pestalozzi 
(1746-1827). Het devies is dat fysieke interactie met objecten het leren beter 
ondersteunt dan het passief bestuderen van teksten, afbeeldingen, of abstracte 
formules.  
Waarom deze fysieke leermodellen effectief zijn kan worden samengevat 
aan de hand van twee ideeën eigen aan belichaamde cognitie. Ten eerste, fysieke 
objecten kunnen er voor zorgen dat mentale processen worden vervangen door 
handelende processen waardoor het leren wordt vergemakkelijkt. Een goed 
voorbeeld hiervan is de bevinding dat studenten een beter begrip krijgen van de 
verschillende representaties van moleculaire structuren wanneer zij fysieke 
modellen actief kunnen roteren (Stull e. a., 2012). Dergelijke rotaties zouden 
normaliter mentaal moeten worden voorgesteld, wat het leerproces voor 
beginnende leerlingen te moeilijk kan maken omdat het maken van mentale 
rotaties veel van het werkgeheugen vergt. Het uitbesteden van delen van het 
probleem (mentale rotaties) aan handelend denken (fysieke rotaties van het 
model) kunnen het leren over gerelateerde aspecten (representaties van 
moleculaire structuren) dus verbeteren. Ten tweede, zijn fysieke objecten niet 
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alleen belangrijk voor het denken met die objecten maar ondersteunen ze juist 
ook het toekomstig denken zonder deze objecten. Een goed voorbeeld hiervan is 
het leren rekenen met een telraam (ofwel Abacus; Hatano e.a., 1977; Hatano & 
Osawa, 1983). In landen als Japan, wordt er intensief gebruik gemaakt van het 
telraam om kinderen complexe berekeningen te leren uitvoeren. Het kind leert 
hierbij eerst de berekeningen uit te voeren met het telraam. Echter, wanneer 
expertise zich ontwikkelt kunnen de kinderen de complexe berekeningen 
uitvoeren zonder het telraam - dus mentaal. Echter, het telraam is op een 
psychologisch interessante manier nog steeds present. Kinderen die net mentale 
berekeningen leren te doen zonder het telraam, produceren namelijk 
handbewegingen alsof ze nog steeds het telraam manipuleren. Dit laat zien, dat de 
sprong van het fysiek rekenen met het telraam, naar het mentaal rekenen geen 
verandering lijkt te brengen in hoe ze de berekeningen aanpakken. Hier is het 
handelend denken met het telraam geïnternaliseerd in het mentale proces. 
Zonder lichamelijke ervaringen had dit effectieve mentale proces niet tot stand 
kunnen komen. Deze en vergelijkbare bevindingen met betrekking tot 
belichaamde cognitie komen in hoofdstuk 2 aan bod, en vormen de basis voor de 
onderzoeksvragen die in de volgende hoofdstukken worden behandeld. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 tracht ik uit zoeken welke informatie er kan worden 
gewonnen uit interactie met objecten tijdens het leren. Eerder onderzoek heeft 
voornamelijk gekeken naar de effecten van actieve interactie met fysieke of 
virtuele objecten in de leeromgeving in vergelijking met een passieve leerconditie. 
Alhoewel dit de effectiviteit van actieve versus passieve manieren van leren kan 
vaststellen, gaat dit voorbij aan de vraag waarom interactie effectief zou zijn. 
Bijvoorbeeld, het kan zijn dat het leerresultaat verbetert omdat interactie tijdens 
het leren de motivatie en concentratie van de leerling verhoogt in plaats van dat 
het bewegen van het object intrinsieke informatie oplevert over het onderwerp 
van studie. In deze context is er een experiment ontwikkeld waarbij 
jongvolwassenen leerden hoe een hefboom werkt aan de hand van een 
interactieve animatie. Studenten konden actief experimenteren met een wipwap 
(een type hefboom) en bestuderen hoe de wipwap reageert op verschillende 
krachten die werden uitgeoefend op de armen. Hun taak was de wipwap in 
evenwicht te brengen, wat ze deden door middel van het drukken met de handen 
op een Nintendo Wii Balance Board. Drie vormen van interactie werden met 
elkaar vergeleken. In de ‗congruente‘ conditie was de druk die de studenten op 
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het BalanceBoard moesten geven om de wipwap in de animatie in balans te 
brengen in overeenstemming met de afgebeelde objecten in de animatie 
(bijvoorbeeld: als er op de rechterarm één blokje stond, hoefde er links minder 
kracht gegeven te worden om de wipwap in balans te brengen dan wanneer er 2 
blokjes stonden). In de ‗incongruente‘ conditie was de druk die nodig was om de 
wipwap in balans te brengen niet consistent (de ene keer moest er harder 
gedrukt worden wanneer er één blokje stond dan wanneer er twee stonden, 
etc.). In de ‗minimale‘ interactie conditie tenslotte, konden studenten de wipwap 
in balans brengen door een korte druk op het BalanceBoard. 
 De verwachting was dat studenten die op een congruente manier 
interacteerden met de animatie beter zouden scoren op verschillende taken die 
kennis over de geleerde concepten maten dan studenten die niet konden 
achterhalen hoeveel kracht nodig was om de hefboom in balans te brengen 
(minimale interactie conditie) of studenten die verkeerde krachten kregen 
aangeleerd (incongruente conditie). Er werden echter geen verschillen in 
leerprestaties gevonden tussen de condities. Dit was opmerkelijk, omdat een 
motorische test uitwees dat studenten in de congruente conditie het in balans 
brengen van de wipwap wel degelijk beter ‗in de vingers hadden‘ dan studenten in 
de incongruente conditie. We concluderen op basis van deze bevindingen dat het 
weten hoe een hefboom reageert op basis van interacties niet altijd invloed hoeft 
te hebben op het latere redeneren over hefbomen. Deze bevinding lijkt in te 
druisen tegen belichaamde perspectieven op leren. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt eveneens een experimentele studie beschreven 
naar het leren over het hefboomprincipe met behulp van een instructieve 
animatie. In dit experiment werd onderzocht of het uitnodigen tot handelend 
denken kan bijdragen aan het leren van basisschoolkinderen (8-12 jaar). Dit werd 
gedaan door een lichaamsanalogie te bieden voor de werking van de hefboom. 
Stelt u zich voor dat u uw armen horizontaal uitstrekt, en er een object van 2kg 
wordt geplaats op uw linkerarm ter hoogte van de hand, en een object van 2kg 
wordt geplaatst op de rechterarm ter hoogte van de elleboog. De objecten zullen 
niet even zwaar voelen, alhoewel ze even zwaar zijn. Dit is een klassiek 
hefboomeffect (mechanisch voordeel genaamd), waarbij de afstand van een last 
tot het draaipunt (schoudergewricht) mede bepaald hoeveel kracht er wordt 
uitgeoefend (hoe verder van het draaipunt, hoe meer kracht). In dit experiment 
werd er nagegaan of kinderen het principe van mechanisch voordeel van een 
wipwap beter zouden begrijpen als hen werd geleerd dat dit principe zowel op de 
wipwap als op het eigen lichaam betrekking heeft. Het idee is dat handelend 
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denken, het voorstellen van de effecten van kracht op de armen, kan bijdragen 
aan het begrip van de werking van de hefboom omdat deze lichamelijke kennis 
impliciet bekend is bij kinderen, in tegenstelling tot de meer abstracte werking 
van een hefboom. De helft van de groep kinderen werd geleerd over het 
mechanisch principe van de wipwap door middel van een animatie, zonder een 
analogie. De andere helft van de groep kinderen kreeg dezelfde animatie te zien, 
maar dit keer met een bovenlichaam met uitgestrekte armen geprojecteerd over 
de wipwap, wat tot het maken van de analogie uitnodigde. De bevindingen lieten 
ziet dat kinderen over het algemeen minder fouten maakten op een testtaak, in 
het bijzonder kinderen die een lage CITO-score hadden op rekenen. Alhoewel 
het bemoedigend is dat een dergelijke kleine interventie het leren van kinderen 
met lagere vaardigheden kan bevorderen zonder het leren van kinderen met 
hogere vaardigheden te schaden, lieten de bevindingen ook zien dat wanneer een 
taak iets complexer wordt gemaakt door hefbomen met elkaar te koppelen (en 
er transfer van kennis nodig is), het voordelige effect van de analogie verdween. 
We concluderen daarom dat lichaamsanalogieën slechts een beperkt lijken te 
hebben op leren en dat verder onderzoek naar de specifieke grenzen van deze 
effecten nodig is (voor wie en onder welke omstandigheden het effectief is) 
voordat deze methode kan worden toegepast in het onderwijs. 
 
In Deel II wordt de cognitieve functie van handgebaren voor het oplossen van 
problemen onderzocht. Eerder onderzoek heeft laten zien dat het gebruik van 
handgebaren voordelige effecten kan opleveren voor probleemoplossing. 
Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer proefpersonen mentale-rotatietaken moesten oplossen, 
produceerden ze spontaan handgebaren die de mimiek hadden van het 
manipuleren en roteren van de objecten die mentaal moeten worden geroteerd. 
Handgebaren lijken dus niet alleen een communicatieve functie te hebben, maar 
ontstaan ook in niet communicatieve situaties, ter ondersteuning van ruimtelijk 
denken. Een grote uitstaande vraag in gebarenonderzoek is echter hoe gebaren 
probleemoplossing ondersteunen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 biedt een kritisch overzicht van theoretische verklaringen 
voor de functie gebaren in niet-communicatieve cognitieve processen. Een vaak 
geponeerde verklaring is dat handgebaren, bijvoorbeeld gebaren die ontstaan 
tijdens het mentaal roteren, voortkomen uit een mentale simulatie van 
manipulaties op objecten. Het idee is dat we kennis hebben over hoe we 
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objecten kunnen manipuleren, en dat gebaren deze kennis tot uiting brengen met 
als gevolg een betere prestatie. In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt beargumenteerd dat het 
uiten van intern aanwezige kennis niet de enige drijvende kracht achter 
handgebaren kan zijn. Een dergelijke verklaring schiet tekort omdat deze negeert 
dat gebaren ook kunnen bijdragen aan het denken (een stelling die ik centraal 
schaar onder belichaamde cognitie). Waarom zou het cognitief systeem 
(moeizame) fysieke processen (handbewegingen) in gang zetten wanneer de 
kennis die nodig is om het proces mentaal uit te voeren al intern aanwezig is? 
Daarom wordt er in Hoofdstuk 5 een perspectief uitgewerkt waarin handgebaren 
(die worden gemonitord door het visuele en proprioceptieve systeem) cognitieve 
processen beïnvloeden (denk aan het voorbeeld m.b.t. tekenen aan het begin van 
deze samenvatting). In een dergelijke interpretatie is het de visuele en 
lichamelijke feedback die gebaren opleveren waardoor cognitie en 
probleemoplossen ondersteund worden.  
Een specifieke hypothese die uit dit alternatieve perspectief voortvloeit, 
wordt getoetst in Hoofdstuk 6. Namelijk, uit eerder onderzoek naar 
handgebaren die ontstaan tijdens het praten, is gebleken dat wanneer mensen 
meer handgebaren gebruiken tijdens het praten wanneer hun 
werkgeheugencapaciteit relatief beperkt is (Chu e. a., 2014). Vanuit het huidige 
perspectief kan dit worden verklaard doordat gebaren het werkgeheugen 
ontlasten door informatie tijdelijk lichamelijk ‗vast te houden‘. In het experiment 
gerapporteerd in Hoofdstuk 6 is onderzocht of jongvolwassenen inderdaad vaker 
en meer handgebaren maakten tijdens het mentaal oplossen van een logische 
puzzel (de Toren van Hanoi) en een schaakprobleem, wanneer de taken relatief 
complexer waren zij een relatief beperktere visuele werkgeheugencapaciteit 
hadden. Ook onderzochten we of gebaren maken tijdens het mentaal oplossen, 
de latere prestatie tijdens het daadwerkelijk oplossen, verbeterde. Voor aanvang 
van de probleemoplossingstaken werden participanten getest op hun ruimtelijk-
visuele werkgeheugencapaciteit. De taken vereisten van de participanten dat ze 
voor ieder probleem het probleem eerst mentaal doorliepen om vervolgens het 
probleem daadwerkelijk op te lossen. Tijdens het mentaal doorlopen van de 
problemen, hetgeen in stilte gebeurde, vond de experimentele manipulatie plaats. 
De helft van de participanten werd expliciet geïnstrueerd om wijsgebaren te 
maken tijdens het mentaal probleem oplossen. De andere helft kreeg geen 
gebaar-instructie. Een deel van deze groep die geen instructie kreeg, produceerde 
spontaan wijsgebaren die de locaties markeerden van de mentale stappen, terwijl 
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een ander deel van de groep  geen handgebaren gebruikte tijdens het mentaal 
doorlopen van het probleem. 
Onze voorspelling was dat handgebaren vaker spontaan gebruikt zouden 
worden en dat gebaren (spontaan of geïnstrueerd) een positief effect zouden 
hebben op de mentale probleemoplossing (wat tot uiting komt in de prestatie 
tijdens het daadwerkelijk oplossen kort daarna) wanneer de taken moeilijker 
waren (en dus meer druk uitoefenen op intern werkgeheugen) en voor 
proefpersonen die relatief lagere ruimtelijk-visuele werkgeheugencapaciteit 
hadden. Hoewel participanten meer spontaan gingen gebaren bij moeilijke taken, 
was deze toename niet gerelateerd aan hun werkgeheugencapaciteit. Echter, 
zoals verwacht, presteerden proefpersonen die spontaan of geïnstrueerd 
gebaarden tijdens het mentaal probleem oplossen beter op het daadwerkelijk 
oplossen van de problemen dan proefpersonen die niet gebaarden, maar alleen bij 
moeilijkere problemen en voor individuen met een lagere 
werkgeheugencapaciteit. In dit geval lijkt het idee dat handgebaren effectief zijn 
omdat ze het werkgeheugen kunnen ontlasten en het mentaal probleemoplossen 
ondersteunen, stand te houden. 
In Hoofdstuk 7 trachten we de hoofdbevinding van hoofdstuk 6, 
namelijk dat handgebaren effectief zijn voor individuen met relatief lagere 
werkgeheugencapaciteit, te repliceren bij kinderen (8-12 jaar). Kinderen van die 
leeftijd zijn een interessante groep om het effect van gebaren te onderzoeken 
omdat hun werkgeheugencapaciteit nog in ontwikkeling is, waardoor de 
eventuele ondersteunende rol van handgebaren van extra belang kan zijn. Het 
uitgevoerde experiment was exact hetzelfde als het experiment uit Hoofdstuk 6, 
maar beperkte zich tot de Toren van Hanoi taak. De bevindingen van dit 
experiment laten zien dat kinderen, met vergelijkbare intensiteit als volwassenen, 
spontaan gebaren tijdens het mentaal doorlopen van de problemen. Dit is 
interessant, aangezien er weinig bekend is over de ontwikkeling van dit type 
handgebaren bij kinderen. De bevindingen repliceerden echter niet onze 
voorgaande resultaten: er waren geen effecten van spontaan of geïnstrueerd 
gebaren tijdens mentaal oplossen op de prestatie tijdens het daadwerkelijk 
oplossen van de taak. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat, alhoewel gebaren 
natuurlijk ontstaan bij kinderen tijdens mentaal probleem oplossen, het effect van 
deze gebaren op latere prestatie niet duidelijk te identificeren is, dit in 
tegenstelling tot jongvolwassenen. 
288 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 8 betreft een verdiepend onderzoek naar de vraag hoe 
wijsgebaren die worden gebruikt bij mentaal doorlopen van de Toren van Hanoi 
de cognitieve processen ondersteunen. Uit voorgaand onderzoek is gebleken dat 
de oogbewegingen van participanten die de taak mentaal doorlopen, synchroon 
lopen met de mentale stappen die zij maken (Patsenko & Altmann, 2010): 
Wanneer zij een stuk mentaal verplaatsen naar een andere positie, verplaatsen zij 
ook hun blikveld naar die nieuwe positie. De wijsgebaren lijken een vergelijkbare 
functie te hebben. Namelijk, de wijsgebaren markeren de mentale verplaatsingen 
van de stukken. Deze observatie is interessant in het licht van de voorgaande 
bevinding dat specifiek de individuen met een lagere visuele-ruimtelijke 
werkgeheugencapaciteit voordeel hebben van het maken van dit type gebaren. 
Wellicht bieden de gebaren een alternatieve strategie; door een plaats in de 
ruimte te markeren kunnen zij misschien als vervanging dienen voor de meer 
visueel/cognitief belastende strategie van het verplaatsen van het blikveld. Om dit 
te testen hebben we volwassenen de Toren van Hanoi mentaal laten doorlopen, 
eenmaal met het gebruik van wijsgebaren, en eenmaal zonder wijsgebaren 
(volgorde was willekeurig). Tijdens deze procedure werden de oogbewegingen 
van de participanten gemeten en voorafgaand aan het experiment hebben we 
eveneens ruimtelijk-visuele werkgeheugencapaciteit gemeten. De bevindingen 
lieten zien dat participanten die gebaren produceerden tijdens het mentaal 
probleem oplossen, minder hun blikveld verplaatsten vergeleken met 
participanten die geen handgebaren produceerden. Echter dit effect van gebaren 
op verminderde verwisseling van het blikveld was alleen sterk aanwezig voor 
diegenen met een lager ruimtelijk-visuele werkgeheugen. Deze bevindingen 
suggereren dat gebaren effectief zijn voor het ondersteunen van mentaal 
probleemoplossen omdat zij de ruimtelijke posities kunnen markeren op een 
non-visuele manier, namelijk via het lichamelijk verplaatsen van de handen. Deze 
handelingen kunnen als cognitieve vervanging dienen voor de meer 
visueel/cognitief belastende strategie, namelijk het verwisselen van het blikveld. 
Dit heeft voornamelijk voordeel voor diegenen met een lager ruimtelijk-visueel 
werkgeheugen. 
Tot slot wordt er in Hoofdstuk 9 een theoretisch kader geboden 
waarin de veschillende perspectieven op de cognitieve oorsprong en functie van 
handgebaren met elkaar verzoend worden. Er wordt een perspectief geboden 
waarin erkend wordt dat gebaren hun cognitieve oorsprong hebben in intern 
aanwezige kennis over manipulatief handelen (m.a.w. het simulatie perspectief op 
handgebaren), terwijl er tevens vanuit wordt gegaan dat de lichamelijke uiting van 
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deze kennis in de vorm van handgebaren nieuwe informatie tot stand brengt die 
niet intern efficiënt genereerbaar is (m.a.w. beantwoordend aan de kritische noot 
in hoofdstuk 5). Deze verzoening wordt gestaafd aan de hand van een overzicht 
van recente cognitieve theorieën die poneren dat het cognitief systeem als functie 
heeft om een model van de omgeving te kalibreren door het toetsen van 
voorspellingen over de omgeving (Clark, 2015; Howhy, 2012). Gebaren, volgens 
deze theorie, zijn een manier om zulke voorspellingen te kalibreren aan de hand 
van de visuele en proprioceptieve informatie die de gebaren genereren. 
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The human hand has been held to be of crucial importance 
for under standing (the evolution of) human intelligence. Next 
to the unique morphological characteristics of the human 
hand (e.g.,opposing thumbs relative to other digits) that allow 
humans to craft the envi ronment in more flexible and sensitive 
ways than other animals, the use of the hands by humans is 
also truly unique. Notably, humans often move their hands 
in signifying ways that mirror or complement the content 
of speech and thought. To set these unique but ubiquitous 
types of hand-movements apart from the hands’ most con-
crete manipulations, these hand-movements are referred to 
as gesticulation, or gestures in short. This dissertation is about 
the various ways that manual activity, such as gestures, but 
also actions on the environment, can support learning and 
problem solving.
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